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HISTORY INSTITUTE**



ROMANIAN ACADEMY



**„OVIDIUS” UNIVERSITY
OF CONSTANȚA**



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Articles, books for review and any other correspondence should be sent to:

”Nicolae Iorga” History Institute

Historical Yearbook

Avenue Aviatorilor, no.1

Bucharest – 011851

Romania

Tel. (4)021 212 53 37

”Ovidius” University of Constanța

Faculty of History and Political Science

Aleea Universității, no. 1, Campus A, room 114

E-mail: iorgayearbook@gmail.com

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**THE SALIENCY OF THE PAST: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE
CASE OF ROMANIA**
**A Farewell lecture, delivered at Georgetown University, Washington DC,
on 5 May 2020**

Dennis DELETANT*

This is my second farewell presentation. In June 2011, upon my retirement from University College, London – my *alma mater* – I gave an informal address to staff and students to mark my departure from contractual teaching and administrative duties. In the following month - July 2011 - I was unexpectedly invited by Charles King, with the blessing of Angela Stent, to consider an offer to fill the position of Visiting Ion Rațiu Professor of Romanian Studies at Georgetown for a year, an opportunity that I eagerly seized. What began as a ten-month appointment has extended to the present day. Over my nine years as the occupant of this chair, I have been able to take advantage of its endowment. To Nicolae, Indrei and Pamela Rațiu I extend my heartfelt appreciation of their constant encouragement. Here at Georgetown, my work has been inspired by the leadership of Dr Angela Stent of Ceres and the support of her assistants down the years, Christina Watts, Dr Benjamin Loring, and Wesson Radomsky. My professional experience has also been enriched by the contact that I have had with the many students who have taken my classes.

My involvement in Romanian studies began in the mid-1960s with language and literature and has, by natural progression, come to extend to history and culture as a whole. Detailed study over many years has interacted with experience. My teaching and research has drawn not only upon primary sources but also on my contacts with dissidents, especially poets and critics, who emerged in the later stages of the Ceaușescu regime. Not surprisingly, I became *persona non grata* to the regime in late 1988. After the Revolution of 1989, this moral identification with the society - in the broadest sense – opened to me doors which were closed to most indigenous as well as “western” inquirers. My research into the security apparatus and its connections with the political leadership reflect these experiences. That research has continued during my tenure of the Visiting Professorship.

History is a subject that defines us all. It teaches us, but we do not always learn from it. To be ignorant of your past is to remain a child for the whole of your life. One of the most pernicious consequences of Communist

* Emeritus Professor, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College, London, United Kingdom. ddeletant@gmail.com

regimes is the perverted image of the past that they left. Since 1990, new histories of former Communist states have appeared. The approach taken by some of them is novel and of value. This is inevitable, but it does not mean that all histories written before the fall of Communism are less valuable than those written after. It means simply that in the research and writing of history there are no final results. The purpose of history is not so much the chronological recording of events, but rather the description and understanding of problems: description, definition and understanding more than the detailed presentation of events, for although a perfect knowledge of the past is impossible, we can, nevertheless, reach a more advanced level of understanding.

History means a process of continual reflection, of revision and revisiting of the past. History, in the broad sense of the word, is revisionist. People and events are re-appraised and re-appraised again. There is nothing profound in this observation. This is the purpose of thought. The past is the only thing that we know, or we think we know. All that humanity knows today springs from the past. All human thought is built on that which has gone before.

In the words attributed to Albert Camus “if absolute truth belongs to anyone in this world, it certainly does not belong to the man or party that claims to possess it”. What is given to us is the pursuit of the truth. In the spirit of every person lies that something which no other person, not even he or she can understand, discover or unravel. Romanians fret about their history. Often, they have given more importance to opinions than to facts. The thoughts of Blaise Pascal come to mind: “The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know.”

Historical research has often been conducted with the aim of consolidating, of supporting the idea of a nation-state, since only the nation-state, it was argued, could offer the cultural unity in which its members could prosper intellectually and economically. Therefore, all those born to a culture must live under the same political roof. It is evident that the national history, the particularities of a nation, are values without which a culture cannot be understood. Nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies. Yet the distortion of the past for political ends vitiates the future to which many of the younger aspire. We cannot have the benefits of the present age if our sensibilities and intellectual means do not draw upon them. We cannot truly affirm a national identity if it is conceived in opposition to tolerance and embraces racism which dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time.

It was only after 1990 that this “national historiography” was challenged in Romania by a handful of historians, in particular by Lucian Boia. In doing so Boia offered a paradigm for scholars in other parts of Europe to interrogate their own history and presentation of it. His book was the first serious attempt by a Romanian to discuss how the past had been distorted for political ends,

especially during the period of Communist rule when the regime attempted to forge its own version of history, through manipulating accounts of the distant and not-so-distant past. Boia's refreshing interpretation of history and myth, and the role they play in Romanian life, has had a potent impact in Romania, especially upon the younger generation. His study was discussed widely in the Romanian press and in the broadcast media.

In my courses at Georgetown I sought to include the Romanians' experience of their past as one of the many case studies that I addressed. Those courses were *The Devil in History: The Temptation of Fascism and Communism*; *Contested Territories and Divided Societies*; *The Police State, Lustration and Transitional Justice: A Comparative View*, and *The Holocaust in Romania*.

The Devil in History takes its name from the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. He argued that Communism and Fascism represent two incarnations of the disastrous presence of the devil in history. Both ideologies are seen as two sides of the same coin of totalitarianism. The course examined this perspective; it discussed the relationship between communism and fascism, the degree to which both have been forged into a nationalist ideology and presented examples of the repression used in the application of both ideologies. The Romanian past offers an example of the application of both ideologies. Finally, the course considered how far certain of today's Communist regimes merit that label.

Contested Territories and Divided Societies addresses areas of competing nationalisms and discusses the manner in which the ideas of nation and democracy inform the government of selected multi-ethnic states and territories. It seeks to remind us that while the options offered under democracy offer the prospect of finding common ground on which to negotiate, thus carrying the seed of consolidation for democracy in certain states in transition, those same democratic options can complicate transition since they nurture the potential for dispute. The geographical focus is principally, although not exclusively, on Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine and Transylvania as regions of national division and examines how that division has affected the history and politics in these states/regions. The course also examines a number of historical border disputes such as those between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands, and between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir.

The focus of *The Police State: Lustration and Transitional Justice. A Comparative View* is on the coercive mechanisms of selected totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. It tackles the question of to what extent and how democratic governments deal with the crimes and abuses of authoritarian predecessors, and to what degree certain states regard a reckoning with the past as an essential component of the sustainability of democracy. The course is

divided into three parts. The first takes a historical approach and look at forms of the police state in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and certain countries of East Central Europe after World War II, the second considers the theory and practice of transitional justice, and the third examines the approaches to transitional justice taken in selected states, providing case studies that include, for a wider comparative dimension, the experience of South Africa under apartheid, Chile and Argentina.

Finally, The Holocaust in Romania course examines the rise of the anti-semitic Iron Guard after the First World War and the formalization of anti-semitism into state policy in the 1930s. It discusses the drift of Romania into the orbit of Nazi Germany after 1936 and the intensification of anti-semitic measures with the accession to power in September 1940 of Ion Antonescu in tandem with the Iron Guard. Antonescu's preparation for Romania's part in Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union involved the deportation of Jews from the country's eastern areas, culminating in the Iași pogrom of June 1941. This and the subsequent mass deportations of Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina to Transnistria are examined. Conditions in the camps and ghettos are also described using official Romanian documents and survivors' accounts.

What of the saliency of the past in Romania? It is illustrated by the celebration in December 2018 of one hundred years since the proclamation of the union of Transylvania with Romania. Nothing is guaranteed to charge Romanian and Hungarian emotions more violently than the subject of Transylvania since the province is regarded by both Romanians and Hungarians as an integral part of their ancestral homeland. For many Romanians 1 December 1918 marked the day when to use the words of the Irish poet Seamus Heaney, "hope and history rhyme". That "rhyming" was an echo of President Woodrow Wilson's address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918 in which he proposed Fourteen Points as a blueprint for world peace that was to be used for peace negotiations after World War I. Point Ten of his proposals was that "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." This has generally been interpreted by historians as a call for "self-determination". Point Fourteen called for the establishment of a world organization that would provide a system of collective security for all nations. This later point was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles and the world organization would later be known as the League of Nations.

The enthusiasm with which the union of Transylvania with Romania on 1 December 1918 was greeted is recounted by Nicolae Mărgineanu, a high school student in Blaj at the time, who became an instructor in psychology at Cluj university in 1926 and was the first Romanian holder of a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship in 1932:

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points were common knowledge.

His conditions for durable peace included the right to self-determination for all subjugated peoples.

A few weeks later, the Hungarian language stopped being taught, and one evening all of us students gathered in the cathedral square and burned our Hungarian language textbooks, linking hands and dancing around the bonfire. I will never forget the song we sang: 'Let us join hands / Whosoever is Romanian of heart . . .' On December 1, 1918, the Grand National Assembly gathered in Alba Iulia and decided that Transylvania would join the motherland."

That the union of Transylvania with Romania should have evoked such emotion is hardly surprising; the true identity of the Romanians in the province had been frequently denied, and attempts had been made to give them a new one in order to disguise their origin. After more than a century of such manipulation it was only natural that the instinctive identity of the Romanians in Transylvania with their brothers and sisters across the Carpathians should have asserted itself in 1918. And in that assertion, the justice of the Romanians' right to exercise self-determination in order to correct what they considered to be the injustice of the suppression of their identity was self-evident. But the righting of that wrong ran the risk of creating new injustices against the minorities of the newly-enlarged state created by the Paris Peace Settlement.

The nation-state of the dominant majority took the place of the empire of the dominant minority in the new post-war Europe. But in the redrawing of national frontiers new minorities were created and with them the seeds of new territorial disputes sown. This potential for upheaval was recognized by the Great Powers who made their guarantee of new national frontiers conditional upon protection for minorities. President Woodrow Wilson made this clear in a speech of 31 May 1919 at the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris:

We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right and we cannot agree to leave elements of disturbance unremoved which we believe will disturb the peace of the world..... If the great powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantee has been given..... Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities.

For the protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities treaties were signed with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece guaranteeing certain rights of education and worship and participation in the state bureaucracy. Almost identical provisions were introduced into the Peace Treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey. However, no means of enforcing the treaties was established and by the early 1930s they were effectively meaningless. The new minorities of the post-1919 period, in their turn, were incensed with the Peace Settlement, for having been deprived of their former privileged status as part of a majority group. The Hungarians in Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland both belonged to this category. Portraying themselves as “victims of Versailles”, they campaigned against the Peace Settlement and vigorously defended their ethnic identity in the face of pressures to integrate them. By placing loyalty to their ethnic group above loyalty to the state, they invited discrimination and when this inevitably occurred they appealed to their “mother states” for assistance. In the cases of the German and Hungarian minorities, such assistance was more than readily given since both Germany and Hungary considered themselves to have been grossly maltreated at Versailles and were bent on revision of the Peace Settlement. Thus, support of their minorities was soon translated by these states into encouragement of irredentism in an effort to destroy the European status quo. Not surprisingly the host states of these minorities suspected them of being “fifth columns” in the service of a hostile power and regarded it as no accident that the largest number of petitions to the League on alleged minority abuses were presented by the Germans in Upper Silesia, followed by the Hungarians in Transylvania.

Wilson discovered during negotiations in Paris that his ideal of freedom of the national group was impossible to translate in an international agreement. “The doctrine of self-determination, expressive of national freedom, Wilson soon discovered to be an untrustworthy guide, incapable of universal application.” Conflicting aspirations meant, for example, that the principle of self-determination, if applied in the Sudetenland, would contradict the premise of self-determination upon which the new state of Czechoslovakia had been based. In addressing this conundrum Wilson invoked the application of the principle of justice. “It must be a justice that seeks no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.” Yet, as proved in Paris, governments felt that justice to their own people required “a protection of national security that often could be achieved only at the expense of another.”

The union of Transylvania with Romania was confirmed by the Treaty of Trianon of 4 June 1920, as part of the Paris Peace Settlement. The award to Romania, the centenary of which will be celebrated in Romania this summer,

was based on the fact that eleven of Transylvania's fifteen counties had a clear Romanian majority totaling some 2,820,000 persons. Thus, a thousand-year Hungarian link with Transylvania was severed, leaving the province with a substantial Hungarian minority of some 1.6 million persons.

Nicolae Mărgineanu, cited above, was one subject of my research while at Georgetown. He was born in the village of Obreja in central Transylvania on 22 June 1905. I edited his autobiographical memoir, published as *Witnessing Romania's Century of Turmoil. Memoirs of a Political Prisoner*. Nicolae Mărgineanu (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY, 2017, 350 p.) It is a unique and invaluable addition to the literature in English on the experience of political prisoners, not only in Communist Romania, but in authoritarian states in general. It graphically uses the author's incarceration (1948-1964) to underline the arbitrary abuse of authority in Communist Romania and his courage in maintaining his moral integrity and dignity in the face of iniquity. But its appeal goes beyond his post World War II suffering for it offers a wistful and sensitive account of episodes from the author's youth in Transylvania in the period 1916-1918.

In the new cultural climate fostered by the Romanian state in Transylvania after World War I, Mărgineanu was able to develop his talents. He studied philosophy and psychology at the King Ferdinand University in Cluj and was appointed instructor in 1926. Three years later he gained a doctorate from his alma mater. There followed a string of post-doctoral bursaries abroad, at Leipzig, Berlin, Hamburg in 1929, in Paris, in 1930, and in London, in 1935. He was the first Romanian holder of a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship and conducted research at Duke, Yale, Columbia and Chicago in the period 1932-1943. In the meantime, he was promoted to the chair of psychology at Cluj University. Amongst his publications (in Romanian) during these years were *The Psychology of Exercise* (1929), *Contemporary German Psychology* (1930), *Contemporary French Psychology* (1932), *Analysis of Psychological Factors* (1938), and *The Psychology of the Person* (1940).

It was precisely Mărgineanu's university studies in Western Europe and the United States that marked him out to the Communist authorities as a potential opponent of the Communist regime in Romania after the Second World War. With the imposition of Communist rule in 1945 Romania was forced to turn its back on the West and face eastwards. In cultural terms, this meant that the Romanians' debt to the West could no longer be acknowledged nor their links maintained while, conversely, the Romanians' associations with Russia in the past were fraudulently amplified to provide a justification for the new ideological imprint to be given by the Soviet Union. Like many colleagues with a similar career, he found himself the target of the Western Allies' erstwhile partner, the Soviet Union, and its surrogate Romanian Communist Party. Contact with the West became a cardinal sin with which such figures

could be charged, tried and removed. Mărgineanu's experience is emblematic of the fate of most of the intellectuals trained in the West during the 1930s, who were arrested and tried on the grounds of "high treason" against the Communist state even though credible evidence of such a charge was lacking.

Mărgineanu became vice-president of the Romanian-American Association set up after the coup in Bucharest of 23 August 1944 in which the young King Mihai arrested the pro-Nazi dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu. Mărgineanu's lectures praising the United States as a bastion of democracy and its contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers led to his arrest on 14 April 1948 and trial in September on a charge of "high treason", based on his alleged membership of a resistance movement to Communist rule. The movement was, it was claimed, led by Max Aușnit, a Romanian industrialist who had fled Romania in summer 1944 and eventually settled in the United States, becoming a friend of President Richard Nixon. Mărgineanu had never met many of the other persons indicted with him on this spurious charge and in the memoir he describes the farcical background to the drafting of the trumped-up charge. He was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, of which he served sixteen.

A second son of Transylvania to whom I have dedicated much of my research activity at Georgetown is Iuliu Maniu, whose relations with the British are the subject of a 600-page collection of documents drawn largely from the British Archives, edited by two Romanian colleagues and me and published last month in Romania by the Romanian Academy (George Cipăianu, Dennis Deletant, Attila Varga, *Attempting the Impossible. Iuliu Maniu, the British, and Romania's Predicament during the War (1940-1944). Încercând imposibilul. Iuliu Maniu, britanicii, și situația dificilă a României în timpul războiului (1940-1944)*. Academia Română, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Argonaut, Cluj Napoca, 2020, 527 p.) During the Second World War the military situation was never conducive to a defection strategy for Romania. Fear of the Soviet Union had driven Romania into alliance with Nazi Germany and the threat posed by the former continued to cast a shadow over the British Government's efforts to persuade Romania's leaders to steer the country to abandon the Axis. For the British, Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party, was the pivotal point for any action against the Antonescu regime. A great-nephew of Simion Bărnuțiu, one of the leaders of the 1848 revolutionary movement of Transylvanian Romanians and representative of the Greek-Catholic wing, Maniu, born in 1873, attended a Greek Catholic elementary school in Blaj in Central Transylvania and secondary school in Zalău, and went on to study in Vienna and Budapest where he took a degree in law. On his return to Transylvania he became a professor of law at the Greek-Catholic seminary in Blaj and legal advisor to the metropolitan bishop. He joined the Romanian National Party of Transylvania whose programme focused on the establishment of Transylvanian autonomy and the assertion of Romanian rights commensurate with the Romanians demographic majority in the province. In

1909, he was elected a deputy in the Hungarian parliament where he was a powerful advocate of Romanian aspirations. After being called up into the Austro-Hungarian army in 1915, he emerged from military academy with the rank of second lieutenant and was despatched, first to the Russian front, and then to Italy.

As a member of the National Committee of the Romanian National Party he was one of the principal figures that organized the Grand National Assembly of 1 December 1918 which proclaimed the union of Transylvania with Romania. On 9 August 1919, Maniu was elected President of the National Party – as it was known after the Union – and in October 1926, on its merger with the Peasant Party, he became President of the National Peasant Party. In November 1928, he led the party to victory in the general election and served as Prime Minister until June 1930 when Prince Carol returned to Romania.

However, the increasingly dictatorial stance of the King led the NPP to call upon Maniu in November 1937 as the champion of constitutional government. With Carol's suspension of the constitution in February 1938 Maniu's fear of the institution of a royal dictatorship was confirmed. On 30 March, a decree dissolving all political parties was issued and a strict regime of political censorship applied. Maniu's protests to Carol went unheeded and he thus began what was to be a six-year period as head of the opposition in Romania, one tolerated by Romania's pro-Nazi dictator Ion Antonescu.

At this point we should make it clear that we cannot talk about resistance in Romania either to the Antonescu regime, or to his German allies, in the same terms as in the case of France or Yugoslavia. The circumstances of Antonescu's accession to power, his maintenance of Romania's sovereignty during the period of alliance with Germany, and his pursuit of the war against a Communist Russia considered a predator, meant that any armed resistance to his rule was viewed by most Romanians as treachery. It followed from retention of sovereignty that a Romanian resistance movement must engage in resistance not against an occupying power, but in insurrectionary action against its own national government, in conditions of hostility to such a movement itself. The resistance offered was small in scale - there were no organized resistance operations of the kind conducted by the maquis in France, or by Mihailovici and Tito in Yugoslavia. Those partisan groups that took to the mountains of Romania in the summer of 1944 took action not against German troops but against the Red Army which they saw not as their "liberator" from "Fascism" but rather as an instrument of Soviet Communism. This is not to dishonour the few Romanians whose anti-Axis convictions led them to undertake clandestine activities in favour of Allied – particularly British - military intelligence, nor the handful of Communists who carried out isolated attacks on the Romanian rail network designed to hinder the Axis war effort against the Russians. But there was no major public opposition within Romania to Antonescu's rule, only

spasmodic letters of protest from individual Romanians . Resistance, in the Romanian context, meant political opposition, and that opposition was led by Iuliu Maniu. It was manifested at two levels. First, the delivery of military intelligence to the British and second, attempts to remind Antonescu of the cost of his alliance with Nazi Germany. In furtherance of these aims wireless transmitters were placed with Maniu and his associates in the National Peasant Party during the period 1940-1944 by British and pro-western Romanian and Turkish agents.

Maniu retained a pre-war image of Britain, coloured by a belief in Britain's imperial might and an assumption that Churchill would contest at every step Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe. The British did little to disabuse him of his view. When Ion Antonescu was summoned to Germany after the German occupation of Hungary on 19 March 1944, Mihai Antonescu, his deputy but no relative, sent a message to the British via Istanbul asking what Allied help Romania could count on. General Wilson, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, responded by urging the Marshal not to visit Hitler and to order his troops to cease resistance to the Red Army. Antonescu could count on air support. On 20 March, Wilson had a message from Maniu enquiring what assistance the Allies could give in the event of a coup. Wilson said that Romania's future was linked to her determination to overthrow the Antonescu regime and that powerful air attacks would be directed against targets indicated by Maniu, but the sentence "no land assistance can be given from this theatre" was removed by the British Foreign Office from his draft, thereby laying the seeds of misunderstanding between Maniu and the western Allies.

Maniu did not enjoy enthusiastic favour in parts of the Foreign Office. Maniu's attempts to reconcile his pro-Allied sympathies with his contempt for totalitarian rule and mistrust of the Soviet Union gave the British the impression of vacillation and indecision. His refusal to participate in the government appointed by King Mihai after the coup on 23 August 1944 proved in retrospect to be a major tactical error for the National Peasant party was more easily relegated to the sidelines as Stalin imposed his will on Romania. The suppression of the democratic process required the elimination of the 'historical' parties. Maniu begged repeatedly to be told whether Romania had been traded into the Soviet sphere of influence, and each time British representatives were instructed to deny this. Several years later, Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in Moscow who visited Bucharest in the spring of 1945, confessed that one of the most distasteful things he had ever been asked to do was to lie to a man like Maniu. These lies led Maniu, and other democratic leaders in Romania, to compromise themselves unwittingly in the eyes of the Soviets in actions which were to cost them their liberty and were to condemn them to spend their final years in prison.

The arrest of senior figures in the National Peasant Party while trying to flee the country on 14 July 1947 provided the Communist-led government with

a pretext for arresting Maniu and his deputy Ion Mihalache on 25 July on the grounds of plotting to overthrow the state. They and several other prominent members of the National Party were tried, found guilty and given life sentences on 11 November. After four years in Galați prison (14 November 1947-14 August 1951) Maniu was transferred to Sighet jail where he died on 5 February 1953.

Upon the conclusion of the war the British and Americans were faced with a Soviet Union in military occupation of much of Central and Eastern Europe. Their thoughts turned to damage-limitation, but without an effective lever of sanction, apart from the military option which no senior politician in the wake of a long war was prepared to countenance, they were reduced to the role of spectators in the Soviet colonization of the region. Yet in the eyes of many in Eastern Europe, the West had compromised its own principles. By failing to honour the pledge in the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe”, made at the end of the Yalta Conference in February 1945, to “foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise ... the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”, Britain and the United States gave the appearance of legitimacy to what Churchill himself called “force and misrepresentation”. It was this failure which damaged the West most in public opinion in the eastern half of Europe in the postwar period.

At the beginning of this address I stated that “one of the most pernicious consequences of Communist regimes is the perverted image of the past that they left.” The collapse of Communism has allowed a restoration to history of those figures who like Maniu have been victims of the misrepresentation of the past. It is my hope that the Rațiu Visiting Chair will continue that process of continual reflection, of revision and revisiting of the past.

INVENTING FRIENDSHIP AT THE BORDER OF THE *REICH*.
ROMANIA AND CROATIA:
PROPAGANDA AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, 1941- 1944

Florin ANGHEL*

Abstract: The official cultural relations between Romania and Croatia in 1941-1944 have developed having as starting point two political and ideological regimes which were totalitarian, anti-Semite, xenophobe, lacking any openness towards civic, social or cultural freedom (considering the terms in which the norms can be applied to a democratic society). The Croatian ideological exclusivism has hindered the development of abundant bilateral relations – including the cultural ones – with Romania. This is also the context in which, in the Balkans, Zagreb did not succeed in finding too many political, diplomatic and ideological projects common with Bulgaria. Tsar Boris III was rather insisting for closer economic, politic and cultural connections with Romania, while already from 1943 it was obvious the closeness between Bulgaria and Hungary. Coming from Bucharest, the ambiguous attitude in the foreign policy – especially after year 1942 the Romanian diplomats and officials have contacted the representatives of the Allies for a possible withdrawal from the Axis – did not help in reaching a conclusive and increased closeness to a political regime considered as a *marionette* and, consequently, with no future.

Under these circumstances, the segregation of political, military and strategical interests from the propagandistic–cultural ones, even in the conditions of vital necessity of stopping and/or combating Hungarian lines of action in Central and South-Eastern Europe and in the capital cities of the Axis, has become practically impossible. Already the dissolution of the fascist regime in Italy and the transformation of Croatia into a German dominion, in the second half of year 1943, has marked the freezing of the bilateral Romanian-Croatian relations: in the spring of 1944 the rupture had become already predictable.

The Croatian culture was confronted not only with the unmerciful linguistic obstacle (in the alliance of the Axis were predominating the speakers of Germanic and Romanic languages) yet also and especially with the precariousness of the means of expression, of strategies and means of action during the four years of existence of the Ustasha Croatian state. The official *Propaganda*, evenly disseminated by means of the few diplomatic missions abroad, has rapidly replaced the efforts of promoting the real cultural values.

* "Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania. fl_angel@yahoo.com

The selection of such has become a bureaucratic strategy often used as political weapon of response to the unfriendly actions of the neighbours.

The public representing Romanian readers did not read translations from the Croatian literature during the Second World War, it could not enjoy the achievements in the art of this country, it has listened only seldom – and only to the radio – some specific musical rhythms and it did not succeed in buying from kiosks magazines or journals published in Zagreb. Excerpts of Ante Pavelić's speeches, news taken over from the censure, of no importance, short documentaries of propaganda, some specific photographs ingeniously elaborated by the Ustasha propaganda, these represent all the information that Croatia has released in Romania throughout the three years of alliance.

The same way, the dissemination of Romanian culture in Croatia took place also through the means of official channels of propaganda. The outbreak of the war against U.S.S.R. has determined the political leadership in Bucharest to decide the *assimilation of propagandistic efforts* with the *cultural official changes*.

Keywords: Romania; Croatia; Ustasha; Propaganda; Axis; Nazi Germany; Ante Pavelić; Ion Antonescu

1. Political Patterns: Romania and Croatia in Search of a new Little Entente

Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki officially received by Mussolini in the afternoon of July 3rd 1940 to present his own fundamental objectives of foreign policy, in the circumstances of the new geopolitical reality – the decline of France and especially the cession of Bessarabia, of the North of Bucovina and of the Herța county to U.S.S.R., following the ultimatums presented by Kremlin on June 26th-28th 1940 – was insisting on the Budapest guideline. The statesman confessing that “Throughout the twenty painful years that our homeland and people have endured the idea of regaining Transylvania was always the dearest and most wanted idea. (...) The people do not understand discrimination between the Russian claims (A/N – reference to the ultimatum notifications addressed to Bucharest on June 26th-28th 1940) and the Hungarian ones. The fact is that if Romania will not cession to us – by good will or forced by Italy and Germany – Transylvania or the territories you will indicate, we will have to choose between *an army occupation* and *an eventual revolution* (author's underline). (...) It is already difficult for the Hungarian nation to understand, the moment Romania has ceded to Russia all it has requested, that we would

request a compromise, willingly and definitively ceding immense territories that the nation sees as millenary patrimony”¹.

Subsequent researches have proved that about the time of the conclusion of the Second Vienna Arbitrage, August 30th 1940², Hungary was prepared inclusively from military point of view³ in view of accomplishing the territorial revisions after the Treaty of Trianon and for taking over the role of main geopolitical actor in South-East Europe. The war in the Balkans from the spring of 1941, resulting in the breakup of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of Croatia’s independence, has directly involved Budapest in the reconstitution of the Crown of Saint Stephen and in obtaining the statute of regional power. After the deterioration of the South-European balance, the Hungarian troops have occupied the Serbian Banat region, the areas from the frontier with Vojvodina and the Medjimurie region, with a population of about 97% Croatian ethnic origin.

The warring act was in fact a repetition of the action from March 1939 against the Slovak state that was newly built and has determined the Croatian authorities to become reluctant in their relations with Hungary and has impelled them to search for dialogue partners in the area with which they could act in view of solving some common issues. Romania has represented, for the Ustasha governing, the best regional opportunity: this is proved by the rapidity of fulfilling the formalities for setting diplomatic relations. On May 6th 1941 the Bucharest was officially recognizing the independence of the Croatian state⁴ and

¹ *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Nona Serie, 1939-1943, vol. V (June 11th-October 28th 1940), Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Roma, 1965, p. 161-161; the memo of the conversation between Benito Mussolini and Pál Teleki, July 3rd 1940.

² Direct participants have left different testimonies regarding this event: Mihail Manoilescu, *Memorii (Iulie-August 1940). Dictatul de la Viena*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1991; Valer Pop, *Bătălia pentru Ardeal*, Editura Colosseum, (f. l.), (f. a.); Galeazzo Ciano, *Jurnal politic*, Editura Elit, (f. l.), (f. a.).

³ We mainly refer to two works of Ottmar Trașcă, *Stenogramele Consiliului de Miniștri al Ungariei din 22, 28, 29 și 31 august 1940 referitoare la cel de-al doilea Arbitraj de la Viena*, în „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj Napoca”, XXXVII, 1998, p. 177-200 and Idem, *Planul de atac al armatei maghiare împotriva României (30 august 1940)*, în „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj Napoca”, XXXVIII, 1990 - 2000, p. 219-230. Daniel Csátári, *Dans la tourmente. Les relations hungaro-roumaines de 1940 à 1945*, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1974; Stelian Mândruț, *Arbitrajul/Dictatul de la Viena, în istoriografia românească actuală. Etică „versus” Istorie (1989- 2010)*, în „Satu Mare. Studii și comunicări”, XXVII/II „Suplementum. Al II- lea Arbitraj de la Viena din 30 august 1940. Antecedente și consecințe”, Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, Satu Mare, 2011, p. 9-26.

⁴ Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române 1938-1944*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994, p. 163 and p. 361. Related to the evolution of the Romanian foreign politics during 1940-1944: Dennis Deletant, *Hitler’s Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940-44*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006. Habitually, the historiography and contemporary European political analyses regard the *Croatian Independent State* during 1941-1945 as a *marionette-state*.

on June 1st the plenipotentiary Minister of Romania, Dimitrie Buzdugan⁵ (which will remain in his position until October 1943), a former counsellor for a long time at the Legation in Rome⁶ was arriving to Zagreb.

Circumscribed directly to the Italian strategic interests in the Balkans, Croatia has evolved, until the disintegration of the fascist regime in Rome (July 1943), rather as a result of the politics of Mussolini, more than one of the national aspirations, vigorously affirmed in the time span between the two World Wars. Places of the memory, common, they were ingeniously ideologically mixed to create a bilateral history meant to tie the Italian fascism to the Croatian nationalism.

The adhesion of Zagreb to the Axis was registered in Venice on June 15th 1941⁷, less than a month from the moment when, in May 18th–19th by a bilateral agreement Italy was annexing the entire Dalmatian coast (less Dubrovnik)⁸. *The Treaty of Guaranty and Collaboration between Italy and Croatia* – the only of this kind which was defining the new state as a *kingdom*, signed on August 23rd 1941, was stipulating in article 1 that Rome was to integrally assume “*the guaranty of the political independence of the Croatian Kingdom and that of the territorial integrity between the frontiers which will be set by agreement with interested states*”⁹.

The Croatian Independent State was announced at radio by Slavko Kvaternik on April 10th 1941, at the time when Ante Pavelić was in Rome. Sabrina P. Ramet, in one of monographies dedicated to Yugoslavian states, opinionated that the formation of Croatia as an independent state and the power taken over by Pavelić are related to the “oath of vassalage” taken by the Ustasha leader on April 13 in front of the SS commander Edmund von Veessenmayer, special envoy of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Only after Pavelić has ensured Germany that the future Croatia will not lead a foreign policy independent from Berlin and that, racially, Croats are “Slavophone Germans” – concluded Sabrina Ramet – Italy and Germany have officially recognized Croatia (on April 15th 1941) and the first government was built in Zagreb¹⁰.

In parallel – and concurrently – the diplomatic signals were insisting on the brave objectives of Budapest and on the reopening of the road lost in 1918

⁵ Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (hereinafter referred to as A.M.A.E.), fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 162.

⁶ *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Nona Serie, vol. V, p. 795.

⁷ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 1, f. 13; report no. 17 from Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to General Ion Antonescu, June 15th 1941.

⁸ Ibidem, vol. 6, f. 189-190; report no. 102/Sp. 2 from Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 8th 1941.

⁹ Ibidem, vol. 2, f. 114.

¹⁰ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and legitimation, 1918-2005*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2006, p. 114-115.

to the Adriatic Sea, either by a *Hungarian-Croatian dynastic union* (a comeback to the historical tradition), or by an agreement which would have granted the extra-territoriality on the Budapest-Zagreb-Rijeka railway¹¹ (an innovation of Hungarian diplomats). To this effect, Regent Miklos Horthy was launching the term “surveillance” of the entire “Danube basin”, while Hungary would have been represented the only “state of order and trust in the area of the South-European region”¹². In view of such an action, Budapest was also insisting on the strategical control over the Belgrade-Niš-Thessaloniki transport route, firmly opposing to giving away to Romania any region of the former Yugoslav federation (namely the Banat)¹³. The ideological authority in Zagreb has tightened and consolidated the connections with Bulgaria, especially until the decease of Tsar Boris the 3rd and dissolution of the fascist regime in Italy (1943)¹⁴.

A state of mind common to almost all Hungary neighbours has rapidly led to a concerted, balanced and prudent action in view of achieving a political, propagandistic and maybe military collaboration between Bucharest, Zagreb and Bratislava, project which was overlapping, in its fundamental aspects, on the Interwar Little Entente¹⁵. Before Pavelić, the *Poglavnik* (leader, A/N) of Croatia, summarizing the essence of these approaches during a confidential conversation with the Romanian Minister in Zagreb, Dimitrie Buzdugan, on November 4th 1941: “I wish we would make a politics of the closest collaboration possible with Romania. The interests of our countries are identical

¹¹ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920- 1944 Croatia, vol. 1, f. 234-235; report from Zeno M. Câmpeanu, secretary of the Romanian Legation in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 15th 1942.

¹² Ibidem, f. 60; telegram no. 633/Sp. 2 from Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 17th 1941.

¹³ The request expressed directly on April 19th 1941 to Hitler by Döme Sztójay. See Ioan Chiper, *Obiective, mijloace și metode ale diplomației române în anul 1941*, in “Revista Istorică”, 3-4, 1991, p. 7; Mioara Anton, *În spatele ușilor închise: dosarul revendicării Banatului iugoslav. Aprilie 1941*, in “Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană”, vol. IX, 2010, p. 110- 122.

¹⁴ Nada Kisić Kolanović, *The NDH Relations with Southeast European Countries, Turkey and Japan, 1941-1945*, „Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions”, vol.7, issue 4, 2006, p. 473- 492.

¹⁵ Florin Anghel, *O alternativă de colaborare în interiorul Axei. Spre o nouă Mică Înțelegere, 1941-1944*, in „Revista Istorică”, 3-4, 1996, p. 233-257; Florin Anghel, *Diplomație clandestină. Eșecul proiectului noii Micii Înțelegeri, 1941- 1943*, in Iulian Oncescu, Silviu Miloșiu eds., „Istoria: contribuții în căutarea unui mesaj”, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2005, p. 250-260 și Idem, *The Forgotten Romanian- Croatian Alliance: New Axis Borderlands in the Balkans, 1941-1944*, in Krassimira Mutafova, editor in chief, „Balkanite- Ezik, **Istoriia**, Kultura/ The Balkans- Languages, History, Culture”, vol. IV, Izdatelstvo „Ivis”, Veliko Tarnovo, 2015, p. 143- 152.

and we have a common enemy. *Our hate against it is even older than yours*”¹⁶. During the summer, already, three weeks from the breakout of the war against U.S.S.R., the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mladen Lorković, was communicating to the same Romanian diplomate, on July 16th 1941, that “*the Romanian and Croatian ministers in the capital cities of the Axis will support the legitimate claims, both those of common interest – as is the Banat – those concerning only one of the parties, for example the Medjmurie matter*”¹⁷. As a consequence, Minister D. Buzdugan could do nothing else yet to accept “without reserve” the idea of the collaboration, reminding that Bucharest is available “*to make everything for this collaboration to gain a character as intimate as possible and to be extended to the most diverse areas*”¹⁸.

The chief of the Romanian diplomacy, Mihai Antonescu, in a **Briefing** addressed to the legations in both Zagreb and Bratislava, on September 1st 1941, was grounding the strategical Romanian interest for the two new geopolitical spaces *strictly* from the perspective of the conflict, including the conflict of interests, with Hungary. “*Please – requested the second man of the Executive – carefully follow the Hungarian action in Zagreb. The attempt of getting closer to Croatia, coinciding with the attempt of reconciliation with Slovakia is, I believe, the answer to our initiative and action of Romanian-Croatian-Slovakian closeness. At any cost should be fought the Hungarian action and seen as an illusion. Immediately proceed to the organization of the Romanian-Croatian collaboration. Marshal Antonescu watches with all affinity the reconstruction of the new state of the old Croatian nation*”¹⁹.

What we do know, by means of a late indiscretion, is that the Croatian Minister in Bucharest, Branko Benzon, although a permanent interlocutor of the two Antonescu characters, could not stand any of them. Benzon was informing René de Weck, Minister of Switzerland in Bucharest, on the latest “news” on July 14th 1942, waiting for a hearing with Mihai Antonescu. “*My Croatian colleague – was ironically writing de Weck in his diary –, which is a doctor, gives me information about the illness of the “Leader” that he claims to have read about from a very sure source: during his youth, Antonescu, like any Romanian officer which respects*

¹⁶ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 174; telegram no. 101/686 of Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 5th 1941.

¹⁷ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 6, f. 297; telegram no. 29/199 of Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 16th 1941.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 158; Instructions of Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legation of Romania in Zagreb, September 1st 1941. On July 17th 1941, still, the same M. Antonescu was informing Raoul Bossy, Minister in Berlin, of the fact that “*in terms of the connections with Bratislava and Zagreb we start a direct action – not only through Berlin – because we enter a new phase of the problem of South-East European space once the war against Russia is terminated (sic!)*”. (A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 6, f. 302)

*himself, has caught syphilis. He has recently celebrated the 60th anniversary and, on this occasion, "the signs of his mistakes" recently have come back to him in the shape of a general paralysis*²⁰.

The key of reading the unfolding of these events could lead, in our opinion, to the trenchant formula, invoked in the summer of 1941 by Ante Pavelić. During a hearing offered to the Minister of Hungary, a dignitary which was accusing the reinstitution of the Little Entente, requesting the direct intervention of the Reich, the *Poglavnik* has burst out, angrily and truthfully: "Yes, there is a Little Entente, yet it is not us who have created it, you did, the Hungarians, by your attitude towards our countries"²¹.

2. The Truths outside the Legations: Reciprocal Images and Stereotypes about Croatia and Romania

Zagreb – as a public, political and worldly space – has represented a place of no benefit, of no perspective and lacking the reserves of personal and social relations that the interested person would have found on the Dâmbovița shore. The inconsistency of the historical relations, the inexistence of places of common memory, the diverse spirituality lacking bilateral contacts have greatly contributed to the unawareness /ignorance and to attacks of superiority from the part of Romanian officials.

Liviu Rebreanu, Director of the National Theatre in Bucharest, has accepted to take a propaganda tour in favour of the Antonescu regime: during March 22nd-24th 1942 he was also in Zagreb where, amongst others, was immediately received by Ante Pavelić and by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mladen Lorković. The poverty has depressed the writer, the desolate streets – lacking light and automobile circulation – have convinced him that "no one really trusts the future of the country in its present state. They say the Ustasha were only 1000, at maximum 2000, and by terror they have taken over the country"²². "It was nice at the hotel – observes the writer, accommodated at the most luxurious establishment in the city, "Esplanada" –, yet terribly cold. There are no coals. Otherwise, you can buy pretty much nothing in the city. The bread is made of corn"²³. The "Esplanada" Hotel, built in 1925 and located immediately next to the railway station, was one of the best hotel establishments of the time from the entire Central and South-Eastern

²⁰ René de Weck, *Jurnal. Jurnalul unui diplomat elvețian în România: 1939-1945*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 2000, p. 134.

²¹ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 289; telegram no. 1490 from Gheorghe Elefterescu, Minister of Romania in Bratislava, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 26th 1941.

²² Liviu Rebreanu, *Note de drum. Germania, Austria, Croația, Finlanda și Suedia*, in Idem, *Opere*, vol. 18 ("Alte jurnale", 1928–1943), edition by Niculae Gheran, Editura Minerva, București, 1998, p. 64.

²³ *Ibidem*.

European region. It was a massive edifice, of a marine green, which could have been easily confused with the building of a ministry, offering a luxury decadence – characteristic to England during Edward or to Vienna from the end of the 19th century: a hallway with arcades, paved with white and black marble, decorated with mirrors with golden frames, velvet curtains and red carpets, black furniture, and golden light from the lamps. The hallway and the dining room resembled an art gallery the paintings of which were evoking the universe of Sigmund Freud, Gustav Klimt and Oskar Kokoschka: modernist iconography which indicates social disintegration and the triumph of violence and sexual instinct over the law.²⁴

“Zagreb does not know us – was observing, at the end of April 1944, the new Minister of Romania, M. Mitileu, avoiding all propagandistic formulas of the two totalitarian regimes. *During 1919-1941 the Belgrade has opposed us and we, included in the Little Entente, have evaded any contact, even a cultural one with Zagreb, where we did not even have a career consular post*”²⁵.

Liviu Hulea²⁶, press secretary at the Legation in Zagreb, has ventured to write a vast report concerning the image of Romania in Croatia, especially from the perspective of the major geopolitical directions: the alliance within the Axis and the war against U.S.S.R. “*Seen from here, from Zagreb* – he wrote on January 1st 1943 – we find ourselves in relationships of cordial amity with Croatia and in an alliance which could become useful for the future, in case the favourable conditions would be created. (...) *The large mass of the Croatian people does not look too kindly to our war in Russia*”²⁷ (Author’s underlining).

M. Mitileu wished that, in spite of the resentments towards the Ustasha regime, the authorities in Bucharest would continue to declare the openness to collaboration and support. “*We should not let impression* – he wrote in his report from the end of April 1944 – *that we might take a stand against the aspirations of the Croatian people, for we would make an enemy from a people that is susceptible and suspicious, like all Slavs*”²⁸.

Young Romanian diplomats accredited in Zagreb did not repress, not even in official documents sent to Bucharest, the disappointment against the provincialism and uncertainty fully felt in the Ustasha capital city. The same

²⁴ Robert D. Kaplan, *Fantomele Balcanilor. O călătorie în istorie*, Editura Antet, București, 2002, p. 25.

²⁵ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 473; report no. 433 from M. Mitileu, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 27th 1944.

²⁶ Liviu Hulea will act, after leaving Zagreb, as diplomate to the Romanian Legation in Helsinki, during 1943-1944.

²⁷ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 2, f. 27; report no. 1286 from Liviu Hulea, Press Service of the Legation of Romania in Zagreb, to Alexandru Marcu, Undersecretary of state in the Ministry of National Propaganda, January 1st 1943.

²⁸ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 473.

Liviu Hulea, in the abovementioned report from January 1st 1943, was quantifying his superiors the most complete information on the Croatian capital city, namely that “Zagreb is overpopulated. From the necessity of creating a supportive regime, the regime had to offer labour opportunities and the subsistence possibility to the entire population (350,000 inhabitants), dividing the work in public and particular services, at maximum. As a consequence, according to the made effort, *Zagreb presents today the aspect of a city in which everybody has time and no one is in a hurry*. In public services, the work ends at 2 o’clock in the afternoon. The shops are closing at 4 p.m. Saturday afternoon nobody works, and Sunday is completely off. (...) The worldly life is focused around familiar teas in the afternoon, when people gather to criticise the regime and to comment the news of London radio. In the countryside they are working something more, yet here the work is most of the times useless since partisans are destroying everything to compromise the action of the regime. *To end the gossip*, coffee shops are open only between hours 6 and 10 in the morning and 17 and 21 in the evening”²⁹. Under these circumstances there is no wonder that, in the place where nothing was happening – in the opinion of the intelligent diplomat from Bucharest – that “*the Ustasha movement, which made the revolution, has calmed so much within the city, that it seems to have become a bourgeois one in the bad sense of the term*”³⁰.

A room at “Esplanada” Hotel valued 310 kunas in the summer of 1942 and was offering no luxury, the same fee being paid at “Ritz” in Budapest or “Athénée Palace” in Bucharest³¹. The ordinary food which could be acquired almost exclusively by intermediaries, on the black market, had become a real daily concern even for well-paid individuals. A high official of the Romanian Legation received almost 20,000 kunas monthly while 1 kg of flour amounted to 120 kunas, 1 kg of sugar – 160 kunas, 1 kg of potatoes – 45 kunas, 1 ton of wood – 4500 kunas³². The products which represented worldly delight – champagne, wine, black and red caviar, fresh fruits and vegetables, meat – were either brought from Bucharest, with additional costs, or were purchased by smuggling. The image of a Zagreb modest as perspectives, expensive and lacking opportunities, has become a **stereotype** in the Romanian diplomatic world, influencing also the few Romanians which ventured (or were allowed) to travel to the new state.

Liviu Rebreanu, traveller in Croatia in March 1942, couldn’t stop from observing the frugal official receptions; not until he arrived to the residence of Minister Dimitrie Buzdugan - the hostess being the wife of the diplomat, Constantza - did he see something he was habituated with: “a very rich buffet,

²⁹ Ibidem, fond 71/1920 -1944 Croatia, vol. 2, f. 17-18.

³⁰ Ibidem, f. 17.

³¹ Ibidem, f. 328.

³² Ibidem.

with diverse wines”³³. The show at the Croatian National Theatre, which came after the supper, has profoundly disappointed him: “a mediocre comedy, mediocrely interpreted, by mediocre actors. About an actress I have been told to be very beautiful – nothing”³⁴.

Eugen Coșeriu, as a young doctoral student of the University of Rome, was arriving in Zagreb a half a year later, in the autumn of 1942. The 1,000 Italian *lira* allocated by the Italian government as a scholarship for the study of Croatian modern poetry were representing a ridiculous amount of money for the very high level of the prices: consequently, the Croatian government has additionally allocated, at the request of the educational establishment in Italy, another 12,000 Italian *lira* monthly. Nevertheless, this represented too little and after two months, in the beginning of the winter, Eugen Coșeriu was leaving Zagreb³⁵. His work, elaborated after long and fruitful meetings with Croatian poets Dragutin Tadijanović, Olinko Delorko and Tin Ujević, was enclosing the analysis of 120 poems and of 41 writers from Croatia of decade 1930 and of the first years of 1940. Unfortunately, the manuscript was delivered to the cultural attaché of the Romanian Legation in Zagreb, filed to the archive of the diplomatic mission, and following the dissolution of the bilateral relations, in August 1944, it was definitively lost³⁶.

From the spring of 1941 and until the moment of Liviu Rebreanu’s arrival in the Ustasha capital city, only eight diplomats were leading the permanent missions of their countries, all in the camps of the Axis: Hungary, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Finland, Spain and Romania. Other foreigners, except for the German and Italian militaries and officials, did not exist. And the opportunities of collaboration with the European states outside the continent were extremely precarious, the international community considering the Croatian Independent State nothing more than a province governed from Rome and Berlin.

High level visits between Romania and Croatia did not exist during June 1941 - August 1944. King Mihai I of Romania and Marshal Ion Antonescu did not envisage such an approach. At his turn, Ante Pavelić made no visits to Bucharest. Otherwise, during his official meeting with Liviu Rebreanu, on March 21st 1942, the *Poglavnik* was confessing that the only time he had seen Romania was from the Danube, in front of Calafat, during the first government led by Iuliu Maniu (1928-1930), been put on ABP by the police and by *Siguranța*

³³ Liviu Rebreanu, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

³⁵ Francisco Javier Juez y Galvez, *Munca de traducător și antologator a lui Eugen Coșeriu la Roma, 1942*, în „Contrafort”, Chișinău, nr. 10-11 (108-109), 2003.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

secret police, at the insinuations of Belgrade. “*Maniu is too honest and correct – has remarked Pavelić – he could not refrain from extraditing me, after all*”³⁷.

A possible visit to Bucharest – left in the project stage – was that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mladen Lorković. The chief of Croatian diplomacy – with only thirteen heads of missions in his subordination³⁸ – has postponed the travel “*because he has felt that Italy would not be enthusiastic about an agreement between Romania, Croatia and Slovakia, a reedition of the Little Entente and an encircling of Hungary*”³⁹. The serious reserve of Lorković has then melted with the obvious circumspection of Mihai Antonescu about provoking the reaction of the Reich at the moment of the inopportune advancing towards Moscow. “*We do not want for these visits – declared the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the beginning of December 1941 – to have such a tight succession (A/N – in Bucharest was programmed the arrival of Vojtech Tuka, the Prime Minister of Slovakia) so that their meaning would constitute a useless challenge and a reason for Hungary to start a new action or to complain about the Romanian-Croatian-Slovakian coalition*”⁴⁰. The defeat of the Axis in front of the Moscow, the deterioration of the internal situation in Croatia during 1942, the disaster in Stalingrad and then the disintegration of the Italian fascist regime have eliminated, one by one, the chances of a high level meeting in one of the two capital cities.

Under these circumstances, the leaders of the two regimes have been decorated through the diplomatic representatives: a few days after the arrival in Zagreb in his capacity of chief of the newly founded Legation, Minister Dimitrie Buzdugan has issued on June 15th 1941 the *Order of Carol I of Romania* to Ante Pavelić⁴¹. Only after about a year, on August 25th 1942, Minister Branko Benzon was delivering Marshal Ion Antonescu the order *The Crown of King Zvonimir* from the part of the *Poglavnik*⁴². Afterwards, the same award was also delivered to Mihai Antonescu⁴³. As we can easily observe the head of the Romanian state, King Mihai I, was avoided by Ante Pavelić.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ Miroslav Tejchman, *Attempts to Form Antirevisionist Alliances inside the Axis: Croatian, Slovak and Romanian Collaboration against Hungary (1941-1943)*, “West Bohemian Historical Review”, 2, 2012, p. 147-157.

³⁹ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 7, f. 522; The memo of the conversation between Mihai Antonescu and Mladen Lorković, Berlin, November 27th 1941.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 526.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 221.

⁴² *Ibidem*, f. 230.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, f. 241.

3. *Cistimo!** Propaganda and culture in diplomatic Romanian-Croatian relations during the Second World War

On April 5th 1941, a few moments before the devastating German intervention in Yugoslavia, the Ustasha leader, Ante Pavelić was giving at the Italian national radio an incendiary speech by which, in a few dogmatic, mobilizing phrases was announcing the liberation and proclamation of the independence of Croatia. “*Rise up – was shouting the Poglavnik in Croatian – the moment of our freedom has arrived, it is time to clean (A/N - cistimo) the country from enemies, to establish this freedom in our own house, in a sovereign and independent Croatian state in which all Croatian territories would be reunited. (...) Our victory is assured! (...) In Croatia, bread and prosperity, freedom and honour are assured forever for all generations of Croatsians.*”⁴⁴ At confessional level, the Croatian catholic hierarchy was not using the word “orthodox Serbians”, exactly to signal the interest for the phenomenon of Croatization by catholicization⁴⁵. According to the Croatian catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, until 1943 in Croatia had been Christianized in catholic ritual about 240,000 orthodox Serbians. On July 14th 1941, the authorities of the Croatian Independent State were forbidding “in any situation”, the transition of the orthodox population to the Greek-Catholic Church, exactly to block any attempts of the Serbians to escape the Croatization process.⁴⁶

None of the Pavelić’s promises was put to practice: the lack of the decisional levers (that were practically transferred to Rome and then, from July 1943, to Berlin), the censure adopted by the regime in all debate spaces, the major internal imbalances, which rapidly made from Croatia a non-governable state, the lack of international legitimacy have all led to isolation, frustration, helplessness, institutional blockage.

The Croatian culture, little known by the ex-Yugoslavian space, was confronted not only with the unmerciful linguistic obstacle (in the alliance of the Axis were predominating the speakers of Germanic and Romanic

* Mobilizing urge used by Ante Pavelić, with the meaning of *cleaning, of replacing everything* (in Croatian).

⁴⁴ <http://www.pavelicpapers.com/documents/ap0048.html> 3/6/2006

⁴⁵ There has to be mentioned an essential detail for the definition of the identity of the Croatian propaganda during 1941-1945: Ante Pavelić and the *Ustasha* leaders did not insist on a *gothic racial identity* for the Croats and were admitting a Slavic lineage, even though attenuated, especially in the dialogues between Adolf Hitler and Ante Pavelić. Nevenko Bratulin, *The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory*, Brill, Leiden, 2013, p.6. See also Idem, *The Ideology of Nation and Race: the Croatian Ustasha Regime and its Policies toward the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945*, in “Croatian Studies Review. Časopis za hrvatske studije”, Sydney, 5, 2008, p.75-102 and Christian Axboe Nielsen, *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941-1945*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2013.

⁴⁶ Ion Gabriel Andrei, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română și Biserica Ortodoxă Croată*, in “Magazin Istoric”, no. 2 (527), February 2011, p. 21- 22.

languages) yet also and especially with the precariousness of the means of expression, of strategies and means of action during the four years of existence of the Ustasha Croatian state. The official *Propaganda*, evenly disseminated by means of the few diplomatic missions abroad, has rapidly replaced the efforts of promoting the real cultural values. The selection of such has become a bureaucratic strategy often used as political weapon of response to the unfriendly actions of the neighbours. ***Although from the point of view of the common, historical and civilizational traditions Hungary should have represented the privileged partner of the new state, the aggressiveness of Budapest determined Zagreb to invent friends of an ad-hoc manner, using the weapons of propaganda.*** Romania, the invented friend, yet remained obtuse to whatever Croatia could have offered spiritually: by the end of the Ustasha independence, this country remained as unknown to Bucharest as before.

The public representing Romanian readers did not read translations from the Croatian literature during the Second World War, it could not enjoy the achievements in the art of this country, it has listened only seldom – and only to the radio – some specific musical rhythms and it did not succeed in buying from kiosks magazines or journals published in Zagreb. Excerpts of Ante Pavelić's speeches, news taken over from the censure, of no importance, short documentaries of propaganda, some specific photographs ingeniously elaborated by the Ustasha propaganda, these represent all the information that Croatia has released in Romania throughout the three years of alliance.

The same way, the dissemination of Romanian culture in Croatia took place also through the means of official channels of propaganda. The outbreak of the war against U.S.S.R. has determined the political leadership in Bucharest to decide the *assimilation of propagandistic efforts* (in view building an image of protectors of civilization in front of the Bolshevik "barbarians") with the *cultural official changes*.

An interesting research in this area⁴⁷ has noticed Mihai Antonescu's decision from July 15th 1941, of defining a coherent Romanian-Finish project of cultural collaboration having a hysterical anti-Soviet character. Two steps at least were to represent the fundament of this program: a) the cooperation in the field of press and information and b) the reciprocal organization of visits, conferences and cultural events⁴⁸. Such a model is completely valid also for an analysis of the collaboration with Croatia or Slovakia. In another context was mentioned Mihai Antonescu's project from December 15th 1941 according to which the professionals of the regime propaganda were to prepare within the

⁴⁷ Silviu Miloiu, *Cultures at War: the Cultural Relations Between Romania and Finland During the Second World War*, in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A. D. Xenopol", Iași, XLII, 2005, p. 409 – 421.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 412.

Academy of Diplomatic and Journalistic Sciences that was to function in the subordination of the Law Faculty of the University in Bucharest. The criteria of selection were consisting in: a university title; abilities in journalistic area; knowledge of a foreign language; connections with foreign personalities; knowledge of international right and political economy, as well as aptitudes in using the obtained information.⁴⁹

Institutionally, there is no doubt that a few moments can be highlighted which give substance both to the colors of the collaboration and to the actual broadcast of the cultural products. The mentioned visit of Liviu Rebreanu in Zagreb during March 20th-22nd 1942, in his capacity of delegate of the government, had visible results: meetings with Ante Pavelić, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mladen Lorković, with the Minister of Defence, with Marshal Slavko Kvaternik, receptions with the heads of the Croatian National Theatre, the Croatian Academy, the Opera, the Writers' Society, the National Radio⁵⁰. At his meeting with *Poglavnik* Ante Pavelić, with the participation of M. Lorković and D. Buzdugan, Rebreanu was assured by the head of state that *"there is no need of pleading for Romania in Croatia, where all affinity is for you. (...) Romania and the Romanians, by the bravery and sacrifices they have proved in this war, present themselves as being a first-class state and a nation deserving to play a capital role in the new Europe"*⁵¹. Mladen Lorković also, a "young, brisk, nice, good friend of the Romanians"⁵² has proved his availability in collaborating with the government in Bucharest.

The official reason for this confidential approach was, inevitably, the *bilateral cultural exchange*.

In March 1942 Radio Zagreb has included in its programs *Romania's Hour*⁵³ and Radio Romania has introduced *Croatia's Hour*⁵⁴. Liviu Rebreanu's conference, *The Spiritual Life in Romania* was organized on March 22nd 1942⁵⁵. Rebreanu is describing briefly yet conclusively the atmosphere in front of him during the speech: *"7 ministers were present and what Zagreb has the best. The Conservatorium Hall was overcrowded: over 800 people. (...) the conference was carefully attended, although it was in a foreign language. I have been rewarded with a real round of applause. Buzdugan and the military attaché in Rome have congratulated me that such a*

⁴⁹ Mioara Anton, *Propagandă și război, 1941-1944*, Editura Tritonic, București, 2007, p. 247-248.

⁵⁰ Liviu Rebreanu, *op. cit.*, p. 60 – 63.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 64.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 61.

⁵³ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 321-322; report no. 139 P of C. Miciora, press counsellor at the Royal Legation of Romania in Zagreb, to Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, February 28th 1942.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 7, f. 544; Memo of the conversation between Mihai Antonescu and Branko Benzon, March 2nd 1942.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 321 – 322

conference is the strongest propaganda for Romania”⁵⁶. In the summer of 1942 Mihail Manoilescu, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also spending a few weeks in the Croatian capital. It was, as the daughter of the dignitary mentioned, the last time he left Romania and he had done so to finalize the writing of a book as co-author about the economy of the states in Central and South-Eastern Europe⁵⁷. Even if the two will have reached a final version, the manuscript of the work most probably did not survive the war.

The next year, 1943, in the beginning of June in Zagreb, Nichifor Crainic, Minister of the National Propaganda has arrived in official visit. Just like Rebreanu before, Nichifor Crainic was received by the political, spiritual and military Croatian leaders, including Ante Pavelić⁵⁸. The issues related to serious imbalances within the Ustasha regime, including the chronical incapacity of institutionally stabilizing the basis of the state, have led to a low mediatisation of the propaganda chief in Bucharest. Another cause of the coldness of Croatian media was also the precaution manifested by Romania in ratifying bilateral official documents regarding cultural and professional interchanges.

Institutionally, Bucharest and Zagreb have negotiated and initiated the *Bilateral Cultural Convention* (on July 1943) and the *Convention on the policy of Croatian schools and churches in Romania* (the project was signed on October 28th 1942).

The Cultural Convention, negotiated and signed on July 1943 enjoyed the special attention of authorities in Zagreb, willing to institutionalize the propaganda connections set in the summer of 1941. New times, and more difficult ones, were hitting the regimes of the Axis, to mention only the military catastrophe in front of Stalingrad and the dissolution of the Italian fascist regime (together with the entry of the Allied troops in the Peninsula). Alexandru Marcu, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Propaganda and a very numerous Croatian delegation led by Janko Tortić, Minister Secretary of State by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers⁵⁹, have

⁵⁶ Liviu Rebreanu, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁵⁷ Natalia Manoilescu-Dinu, *Memorii*, Editura Renașterea, Cluj Napoca, 2007, p.190.

⁵⁸ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920 – 1944 Croatia, vol. 7, f. 46; telegram 79/671 from Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 5th 1943.

⁵⁹ Ibidem, f. 68; telegram 546 from Valentin Gr. Chelaru, Head of the Cultural Service of the Royal Legation of Romania in Zagreb, to Alexandru Marcu, Undersecretary of state in the Ministry of National Propaganda. The large Croatian delegation stayed for a week in Bucharest, starting with July 15th 1943, and it was composed by: Dr. Ivo Hühn, Director of Cultural Relations and Press from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Božidar Murgić, Director of Higher Education in the Ministry of National Culture; Dr. Antum Zvonimir Ivanić, Head of the Political Section for the South-Eastern European space in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Hinko Fuxa, Deputy Director of the International Treaties Section in the

composed a simple text, on common strategies and immediate objectives: visits, exchanges, support and consultancy, and openness for reciprocal cultural products.

Yet in July 1943 only a few were having illusions about the applicability (even about the legal one) of this international instrument: in Bucharest at least, the solution was seen rather as an indulgence towards the susceptibility rather than a practical means of collaboration and alliance. In the spring of 1944, several months after the negotiation of the *Convention*, the Romanian Minister in Zagreb, M. Mitileneu, was telling it like it was, namely that although “Croatia shows us the greatest understanding in the Transylvania matter, *it would be of no direct use to us*. Maybe at most some kind of a propaganda. (...) The Croatians can be of some use for us only indirectly, by the claims they rightfully address to Hungary, yet the condition differences from all points of view between our countries make these claims unparalleled, nor should they be parallel”⁶⁰.

This prudence had also been seen at the level of the Croatian Ministry, the same M. Mitileneu informing Bucharest that the head of Croatian diplomacy was, in the beginning of March 1944, profoundly discontent by the fact that “the Romanian Government was obviously delaying the exchange of ratification instruments of the *Cultural Convention* signed last summer. Mr. Perici (A/N – Stijepan Perić, Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs) gives the impression of fostering rather hostile feelings for our country”⁶¹.

Our grounds, just a few points are found in the very confessions of some Croatian high officials: Mihai Antonescu recounts how, after inaugurating the *Hour of Croatia* at Radio Romania, on March 2nd 1942, Minister Branko Benzon has described him straight on “the hardships which the Croatian state faces, the internal troubles which continue, fuelled also by friends (A/N – allusion to Hungary and Italy, suspected for materially and logistically supporting the partisan movements), not only be enemies, and the balance that has to be maintained by the Croatian state between Germany and Italy, telling me that what comes to his mind as *an ever growing necessity is the need of getting closer to Romania for support and for defending its rights*”⁶². Subsequently in Zagreb, Liviu Hulea had found out from sufficient sources, some of them extremely influent that, after all, “*what Croatia is hoping for and expects from us is indulgence and good will*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were joined, in Bucharest, Dr. Branko Benzon, plenipotentiary minister and extraordinary envoy of Croatia to Romania.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 473; report no. 433 from M. Mitileneu, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 27th 1944.

⁶¹ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 3, f. 297; telegram 22/102 from M. Mitileneu, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 3rd 1944.

⁶² Ibidem, f. 544; Memo of the conversation between Mihai Antonescu and Branko Benzon, March 2nd 1942.

*in economic relations. Under these circumstances, Croatia forgets that we are bound to a more difficult war than Croatia is, and it has its eyes fixed only on the mirage of Romanian treasures*⁶³.

The project of the *Convention on the policy of Croatian schools and churches in Romania*, endorsed by the Minister of National Culture and Cults, Ion Petrovici, on October 28th 1942, was meant to regulate the terms of teaching Croatian language in Banat localities where Croatian ethnics were the majority, and the statute of the churches, of priests and teachers in these communes. The text of the project stated that “*the Romanian inhabitants of Croatian ethnic origin residing in communes of Caraşova, Nermet, Iatalcea, Clocotici, Lupac, Votnic, Rafnic (Caraş county), Checea and Caraş (Timiş county – Torontal) are free, based on the provisions of the Law on primary education, to provide training to their children in the mother language*”⁶⁴. The two parties have agreed that “the teachers in primary schools offering education in Croatian language will be of the same ethnic origin and of the same confession as the pupils in these schools” and that “the education in schools providing training in Croatian will take place in Croatian language in all classes, from grade I to grade IV, primary school, except for the class of Romanian language, and of Romanian history and geography”⁶⁵. The teaching staff were to be paid by the Romanian state (in case they were Romanian citizens), and by the Croatian one respectively, in case they came from Croatia⁶⁶.

Confessional aspects – inside the Croatian catholic communities in Banat – were revealed by lecturing the text of the project of the *Convention*, within a large measure of decision, an unusual fact for the conservative structure of orthodox hierarchy. Thus, the number of Croatian priests in Romania was to be set exclusively based on demographical and spiritual realities from the parishes, by competent church authorities in the two states⁶⁷.

We find significant the unconditional support given by the Romanian Orthodox Church to the newly formed Croatian Orthodox Church instituted

⁶³ Ibidem, vol. 2, f. 27; report no. 1286 from Liviu Hulea, Head of the Press Service of the Royal Legation of Romania in Zagreb, to Alexandru Marcu, Undersecretary of state in the Ministry of National Propaganda, January 1st 1943.

⁶⁴ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 256. There is no ample monographic study concerning the formation and evolution of the Croatian community on Romanian territory. We would like to signal, though, the study of Theodor N. Trîpcea, *Craşovenii, „o mărunţă” populaţie din ţara noastră. De unde şi când au venit?*, in „Studii. Revistă de istorie”, 6, 1957, p. 93-101. The conclusion of this text is, yet, that these *Krashovani* (inhabitants of Slavic origin around the Carasova locality, most of the time recognized of Croatian ethnicity) “they are the Bogumils from eight centuries ago in medieval Serbia.” (p. 99). And more recently, Adela Lungu, *Craşovenii între tradiţie şi noutate*, in “Timisiensis”, Timişoara, year VII, no.1, 2000.

⁶⁵ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 256.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ Ibidem.

on April 4th 1942 and institutionalized by the enthronement of Germogen Maksimov as metropolitan of Zagreb on June 7th 1942, in the presence of the President of the Parliament, Marko Došen, and of the government members. The consolidation of the Croatian Orthodox Church has coincided with the sole recognition of its autocephaly on international level, on August 4th 1944, arrived from the part of Patriarch Nicodim of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Moreover, the last Romanian-Croatian public manifestation took place under the aegis of the Church: on August 15th 1944, in Zagreb, Metropolitan Germogen has consecrated Spiridon Mifka, a Russian emigrant, as Bishop of Sarajevo. The ceremony was attended by Virgil Gheorghiu, cultural attaché of the Romanian Legation and the Metropolitan of Bucovina and Transnistria, Visarion Puiu.⁶⁸

The first major outcome of the project of the *Convention*, registered on August 31st 1942, concerns the initiative of Croatia of establishing direct and equal connections among the leadership of the orthodox churches in the two countries: Germogen, the orthodox Croatian Metropolitan has proposed the Patriarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church the official recognition of the new Croatian Orthodox Church, inclusively by sending in Croatia at least two or three bishops to participate to the ceremonies of enthronement of the new Croatian orthodox bishops chosen and ordained according to the provisions of the Constitution of the Ustasha state⁶⁹.

Other types of approaching the propaganda in favour of Romania concern the relations with the undeniable leader of the Axis, Germany, or the settlement of the issue of Jewish communities (an extremely inciting/exciting topic for the Ustasha media). “*Nova Hrvatska*” from February 17th 1942 was publishing a vast material, well garnished with all official formulas, titled *The unbreakable friendship between Romania and Germany*; the same day, on other page the same publication was informing its readers about *Romania and the liberation from the Jewish plague*⁷⁰. The monthly “*Hrvatska*”, from February 1942, was inserting a vast article titled *The historic role of the Romanian people*⁷¹.

An entire page dedicated to Romania – with political, cultural, historical and social information – and with ample references to the works of Liviu Rebreanu and Lucian Blaga could be found on May 9th 1943 (with the occasion of the National Day from May 10th) in “*Nova Hrvatska*”⁷². On the same occasion

⁶⁸ Ion Gabriel Andrei, *op. cit.*, p.22.

⁶⁹ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 512, f. 262; telegram no. 111/1110 from Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 31st 1942.

⁷⁰ A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 321-322; report no. 139 P of C. Miciora, press counsellor of the Royal Legation of Romania in Zagreb, to Dimitrie Buzdugan, Minister of Romania in Zagreb, February 28th 1942.

⁷¹ Ibidem.

⁷² Ibidem, f. 352.

and on the same day (May 9th 1943), the German language newspapers are reproducing ample fragments from novel “Răscoala” [the Rebellion] of Liviu Rebreanu, some of poems of Vasile Alecsandri accompanied by splendid photographic reproductions of some of the work of art from Nicolae Grigorescu, Dimitrie Ghiță and Mac Constantinescu (“*Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien*”)⁷³. In “*Neue Ordnung*”, still in May 9th 1943, Vladimir Kovacić, one of the most famous Croatian cultural editors (working also for the official “*Nova Hrvatska*”), has made up a splendid page of Romanian history, with photographs of the Moldavian rulers Ștefan cel Mare [Stephen the Great] and Alexandru cel Bun [Alexander I of Moldavia]. Again, Vladimir Kovacić is the one that, in this issue, introduces Mihai Eminescu to the Croatian public readers⁷⁴.

Another moment of reference in diffusing some information about the Romanian culture is represented by the pages of Milan Katić, a musical editor at “*Nova Hrvatska*”, on *Romanian plastic art* (in issue from May 12th 1943)⁷⁵ and conferences organized at Radio Zagreb by Zlatko Milković, *the Contemporary Romanian Novel* (on May 12th 1943), Vladimir Ciprin, *the Contemporary Romanian Music* (also on May 12th 1943) and by Dr. Antun Bonifacić, vice-president of the Society of Croatian Writers and Chief of the Cultural Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a presentation made to writer Liviu Rebreanu (on May 13th 1943)⁷⁶.

Amongst the research made through the documents and photographic collages sent by the Romanian Legation in Zagreb, there is also a documentary material which subclasses what we have previously mentioned, in terms of the numerous information presented to a public which was overwhelmed by the necessities and anxieties of daily war life. It is about the pages dedicated to Constantza and to balneary-therapeutic resorts on the Black Sea shore, made by Walter Habiger and published in “*Neue Ordnung*” from May 16th 1943⁷⁷. Constantza and its touristic and economic attractions (the Casino, the promenade, the sea port, the Ovidiu Square) as resorts of Mamaia, Carmen Sylva (nowadays Eforie Sud) and the city of Mangalia are described by vast photographic collages accompanied by generous details. Also a unique moment is represented by a text of N. I. Herescu, *Politics and poetry in the epoch of August*, translated and published in magazine “*Hrvatska Smotra*”, in February 1942⁷⁸.

On June 1943 the Croatian media was publishing two of the pieces of Romania literature – unfortunately not at all the most representative ones –

⁷³ Ibidem, f. 357.

⁷⁴ Ibidem, f. 355-356.

⁷⁵ Ibidem, f. 368.

⁷⁶ Ibidem, f. 386-387.

⁷⁷ Ibidem.

⁷⁸ Ibidem, f. 321-322.

signed I. L. Caragiale (*The Petition*, in German “Das Gesuch”, translated by Max Richter, published in “*Neue Ordnung*”, on June 20th 1943) and by Cezar Petrescu (*The Calculus*, in Croatian “Obračun”, translated by Ton Smerdel, in “*Hrvatski Krugoval*” from June 13th 1943)⁷⁹.

Of an obvious manner, certain representatives of the Romanian culture are promoted relentlessly by the Romanian propagandistic apparatus: writers Liviu Rebreanu, Nichifor Crainic, Cezar Petrescu and I. Al. Brătescu-Voinești would be amongst them. They were joined by prestigious names from the area of music (conductors George Georgescu and Sergiu Celibidache), of historiography (Ioan Lupaș, Victor Papacostea*), of philosophy and history of philosophy (Ion Petrovici). The newspapers, magazines and documentary movies - from Croatia, Slovakia, Italy, and Finland – are presenting them each time a Romanian topic comes to discussion. Many times the same individuals are crossing Europe in war to participate to conferences about the history and spirituality of the Romanians: Liviu Rebreanu, for example, has travelled during 1942-1943 in all states of the Axis.

In the critical political context after the debarking of the Allies in Normandy, Budapest was insisting that the German press from Croatia would appeal to supporting the unity of all states of the Axis, including Hungary and Romania. “*Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien*” from June 25th 1944 was

⁷⁹ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 7, f. 63. Cezar Petrescu was during 1941-1944 one of the literates pampered by the cultural-propagandistic institutions of Antonescu's governance, his works being translated and disseminated in all states of the Axis, yet also in the neutral countries. Mircea Eliade, cultural counsellor of the Legation of Romania to Lisbon, was writing the novelist on August 2nd 1943 that “I have chosen (to be translated and published in Portuguese – A/N) *Omul din vis* [Man in a dream] in anthology. I no longer asked for your permission to translate it, since is a propaganda work and we want it to be issued quickly. (...) Concerning the author's rights, they are not notorious yet in hard currency and, after all, there is an issue of propaganda which is of utmost interest to us. (...) In case you have the French manuscript of *Întunecare* [Gathering Clouds], send it to me. It could be published immediately. And do not forget about *Carlton* and *Cadavrul* [The Cadaver]. And if you happen to have translations in Latin languages from your short novels, even very short works, we would be happy to print them in the literary pages of the newspapers issued here”. (Mircea Eliade, *Jurnal portughez și alte scrieri*, vol. 1, edition by Sorin Alexandrescu, Editura Humanitas, București, 2006, p. 480 – 481).

* Victor Papacostea has headed during the entire World War the magazine “Balcania”, a prestigious scientific expression of the Romanian Balkan school of history and linguistics. No details are known (at least up to now) about his visit/visits in Zagreb. His nephew, academician Șerban Papacostea (1928-2018), has accounted us that Victor Papacostea was avoiding each time a discussion regarding these travels during 1941-1942, especially in Croatia and Slovakia. Yet Șerban Papacostea did not exclude one of the purposes of the visit in Zagreb as being that of getting familiar with the Megleno-Romanian community in Croatia. At the same time, Șerban Papacostea was convinced that his uncle, Victor Papacostea, has accepted the propaganda actions abroad, ordered by the regime of Ion Antonescu during 1941-1943.

straightforwardly mentioning “the common fate of Hungary and Romania”. The same journal was integrally introducing a text of the Hungarian propaganda stating that “there have been, there are and there will be controversies between the two nations (A/N – Romanian and Hungarian), yet today we have to take account of the Bolshevik danger: there is also a Romanian interest for a strong Hungarian state to exist at the Tisa – Danube basin, for the country to be protected from the North-East, as there is a Magyar interest for a strong Romanian state to protect Hungary and the West of Europe, from the Black Sea”⁸⁰.

An important document for our research is represented by a detailed list elaborated in the month of May 1943, *including 46 names of persons from Croatia involved in propaganda and cultural propaganda in favour of Romania*⁸¹. The list, made up by the efforts of almost all services and departments of the Ministry of Foreign, reveals the decisional factors of this project, the areas of influence (ministries, Radio, press, cultural institutions) and the zone of action. Almost the entire Croatian press is involved in supporting and disseminating the Romanian requests, of political and strategical nature: “*Hrvatski Narod*” (Vladimir Ciprin, cultural editor; Dr. Ivo Bogdan, director of the journal), “*Nova Hrvatska*” (Vladimir Kovacić, cultural; editor Milan Katić, musical editor; Ivan Serkani, politic editor), “*Hrvatski Krugoval*” (Ivan Bakan, chief in editor), “*Spremnost*” (Dr. T. Mortiglia, director of the weekly magazine), “*Neue Ordnung*” (Dr. Hermann Proebst, director of the weekly magazine), “*Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien*” (Dr. Erik Röthel, director of the journal; Dr. Josef Bobek, cultural editor), Radio Zagreb (Radovan Latković, general director; Zlatko Grgosević, musical director), National Office of Cinematography (Milan Mikac, general director), Agency “Hrvatska Put” (Ivan Elicić).

The list also encloses, together with artistic names (actors, singers, film and theatre directors, musicians), most of them forgotten today, decision makers from the Ustasha propagandistic institutional apparatus, some persons being won by the Romanian side only in opposition in the issue of the antagonistic relationships with Hungary. We would thus remind Eva Harmel, the chief of the Propaganda Department of the Croatian Sports Organization, Dr. Edo Bulat (the first plenipotentiary prime-minister of Croatia in Bucharest in 1941), Dr. Ernest Bauer, Mato Sokolić and Olinko Delorko, high rank officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ivo Hühn, director of the Department of Press and Cultural Relations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As activists of the propagation of Romanian culture in Zagreb we can name, from this list, Dr. Antun Bonifacić, vice-president of the Society of

⁸⁰ „Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien”, June 25th 1944 in A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Croatia, vol. 2, f. 298; report of M. Mitileneu, Minister of Romania in Zagreb to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 26th 1944.

⁸¹ Ibidem, fond 71/1920-1944 Romania, vol. 485, f. 377-378.

Croatian Writers and head of the Cultural Department from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ivan Esih, director of the Department of the People's Culture from the Ministry of Education, Dušan Janko, general director of the theatres, Jakob Gotovac, director of the National Opera, Matja Soljacić, director of the National Theatre, Mladen Pozajć, rector of Music Academy.

The concerts of Romanian classical music, the exhibits, book launchings and especially conferences with public participation and at Radio, and the press articles were reserved for three years, as we can see, for a rather small number of persons. Those were occasionally joined by others according to the event and to the political decision. A comprehensive Romanian culture propaganda would not have been possible in Zagreb: if we were to consider only the obligations and consequences of the world war and of the internal military conflict on the Croatian territory⁸².

The same reality is valid also for Romania: a fact admitted also, in the last issue of magazine "*Gândirea*", by the Minister of the National Propaganda, Nichifor Crainic: "*The dramatic conditions in which lives the capital of the country, terrorized night and day by American aerial assassins (A/N – innuendo to the aerial Anglo-American bombardments over Bucharest, especially to that from April 4th 1944) have held back the cultural manifestation and in particular the release of publications*"⁸³. It is rather probable that in the Croatian spiritual space, in editorial offices, publishing houses and foundations, these dogmatists (in the end) of the Ustasha regime, invested with power of decision, have made pressures on these men of culture and art, have refused their texts and shows, have requested them to write or not to write about some matter, have imposed them to adopt an attitude or another, have modified the texts presented for publication, have amputated them, deforming them and politicizing them – all these sheltered by and in the name of the official "indications". An extremely harmful aspect in this formalization of an institutionalized culture sent by exclusively diplomatic and political channels was represented, with no doubt, by the reprimand and suppression of the critical spirit, with all resulting consequences, and *the encouraging of the apologetic spirit*. Among the favourite topics, the most exploited of the press in this period – both in Romania and in Croatia – was exactly the description of the contrast between past and present, which became a true ceremonial of taking sides.

One of the vastest cultural projects of independent Ustasha Croatia – if not the most important – was the wording and the publication of the *Croatian*

⁸² We must also consider the financial aspect of the entire propagandistic project. And here we have in view a good response of V. Crevedia, press attaché of the Romanian Legation in Sofia which, in a report from 1942 to the Minister of National Propaganda was frankly explaining: "*The money, Mr. Minister! As we have said so many times. Send us also a lot of money here. Bulgarians like silver coins...*" See Mioara Anton, *Propaganda*, p.286.

⁸³ Nichifor Crainic, *Tehnică fără suflet*, in „*Gândirea*”, no. 6, June-July 1944.

Encyclopaedia (Hrvatska Enciklopedija), started in 1941 and stopped, editorially, in 1942. From the three massive volumes that have been published, 2 volumes in 1941 and one in 1942, presenting letters A, B, and C, an observer – even at first glance – becomes aware, on one hand, of the professionalism of most of the entries (especially those related to culture, geography, army, economy, society, biographies of personalities) and, on the other hand, of the profound ideologization of political aspects. *Hrvatska Enciklopedija*, unlike the *Encyclopaedia of Romania* composed and printed during 1938-1942, was meant to also include amongst its pages the realities outside Croatia.

Romania is present in this ambitious project with *twenty voices*: three in volume 1⁸⁴, seven in volume 2⁸⁵ and the rest of them in volume 3⁸⁶. Volume 1 presents *Alba Iulia*, under the signature of Docent Ph.D. Nikola Peršić⁸⁷, the biography and work of *Vasile Alecsandri*, under the signature of Dr. Petar Skok⁸⁸ and, extremely vastly and eulogistically it presents the military and political carrier of *Ion Antonescu*⁸⁹. An interesting fact is that the author, publicist Dr. Slavko Pavičić, mentions (in reality with no connection to the theme) “the arbitrage in Viena, from August 30th 1940”, when Romania “has lost to Hungary almost 44,000 sqkm and 2.2 million inhabitants, most of them Romanian”⁹⁰.

The second volume, published also in 1941, presents *Babadag* (Docent Ph.D. Nikola Peršić)⁹¹, the biography and personality of *Victor Babeş* (Dr. Andrija Hupbauer)⁹², *Nicolae Bălcescu* (Dr. Petar Skok)⁹³, *George Bariţiu*⁹⁴, *Simion Bărnuţiu* (both also by Dr. Petar Skok)⁹⁵ and *Ioan Bogdan* (Dr. Petar Skok)⁹⁶. *Bessarabia* enjoys an exceptional presentation as typographic space, of almost *three pages*: Univ. Prof. Dr. Grga Novak composes a historical background of the province, highlighting its indissoluble connections with the Romanian space,

⁸⁴ *Hrvatska Enciklopedija*, vol. I, Naklada Konzorcija Hrvatske Enciklopedije, Zagreb, 1941.

⁸⁵ *Hrvatska Enciklopedija*, vol. II, Naklada Hrvatskog Izdavačkog Bibliografskog Zavoda, Zagreb, 1941.

⁸⁶ *Hrvatska Enciklopedija*, vol. III, Naklada Hrvatskog Izdavačkog Bibliografskog Zavoda, Zagreb, 1942.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, vol. 1, p. 174.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 198.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 491.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, vol. 2, p. 52.

⁹² *Ibidem*, p. 53.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 131.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 233.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 240.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 771.

reminding of the events from 1940 and 1941, and attaching a series of photographs and especially a very well accomplished and printed map⁹⁷.

The third volume from *Hrvatska Enciklopedija*, printed in 1942, is the most generous from the point of view of the Romanian realities, with *ten voices*: biographies of *Dimitrie Bolintineanu* (Dr. Petar Skok)⁹⁸, *Constantin Brâncoveanu* (Dr. Stanko Miholić)⁹⁹, *Ion Brătescu-Voinești* (Dr. Petar Skok)¹⁰⁰, *Dimitrie, Ion, Ion I. C. and Vintilă Brătianu* (Dr. Josip Nagy)¹⁰¹, *Dimitrie Cantemir* (Dr. Petar Skok)¹⁰² and Queen Elisabeta (*Carmen Sylva*) (Dr. Petar Skok)¹⁰³. The city of *Brașov* is presented by the article written by Nikola Žić¹⁰⁴ while the capital city, *Bucharest*, is allocated not less than three pages, elaborated by Dr. Josip Nagy¹⁰⁵ (with a historical background of the city, with the presentation of the most important passed historic events, the architecture, the material and spiritual wealth, sustained by numerous photographs and accompanied by a map); Dr. Zdenko Šenva wrote the article *Câmpulung Muscel*¹⁰⁶. Within the same ideological and political frame – presenting the history of the province and evoking the geopolitical situations from 1940, when it was occupied by U.S.S.R., and from 1941, when it was liberated by the Romanian troops – describing Bessarabia in the second volume, is also depicted the theme of *Bucovina*, throughout two pages, with a map and generous and suggestive photographs, everything composed by Docent Ph.D. Zvonimir Dugački¹⁰⁷.

5. Bilateral Relations with a Preannounced End: Why?

The official cultural relations between Romania and Croatia have developed having as starting point two political and ideological regimes which were totalitarian, anti-Semite, xenophobe, lacking any openness towards civic, social or cultural freedom (considering the terms in which the norms can be applied to a democratic society). On July 22nd 1941, the Minister of Education and Culture, a well-known writer, Mile Budak, was underlining within a press conference that “*for the minorities we have three million bullets*”¹⁰⁸. The same opinion

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 447 - 449.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. 3, 1942, p. 31.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 235.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 245.

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰² *Ibidem*, p. 598.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, p. 623 - 624.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 245.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 498 - 501.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 591.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 497 – 498.

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.reformation.org/holoc4.html7/72006>. In 1941, Croatia had almost 6.7 million inhabitants out of which only 3.3 million were of Croatian ethnicity. 700,000 of the inhabitants, the overwhelming majority in Bosnia Herzegovina were Muslims, 2 million were Serbians and about 45,000 were Jewish. Mile Budak, a novelist and one of the most

was shared by his office colleague, Dr. Milovan Zanić, Minister of Justice which on June 2nd 1941, in Nova Grarfiska, was mentioning that “*this state, our state, is only for the Croats and for nobody else. (...) All those who came to our country three hundred years ago must disappear*”¹⁰⁹.

The Croatian ideological exclusivism has hindered the development of abundant bilateral relations – including the cultural ones – with Romania. This is also the context in which, in the Balkans, Zagreb did not succeed in finding too many political, diplomatic and ideological projects common with Bulgaria. Tsar Boris III was rather insisting for closer economic, politic and cultural connections with Romania,¹¹⁰ while already from 1943 it was obvious the closeness between Bulgaria and Hungary. Coming from Bucharest, the ambiguous attitude in the foreign policy – especially after year 1942 the Romanian diplomats and officials have contacted the representatives of the Allies for a possible withdrawal from the Axis – did not help in reaching a conclusive and increased closeness to a political regime considered as a *marionette* and, consequently, with no future.

Under these circumstances, the segregation of political, military and strategical interests from the propagandistic–cultural ones, even in the conditions of vital necessity of stopping and/or combating Hungarian lines of action in Central and South-Eastern Europe and in the capital cities of the Axis, has become practically impossible. Already the dissolution of the fascist regime in Italy and the transformation of Croatia into a German dominion, in the second half of year 1943, has marked the freezing of the bilateral Romanian-Croatian relations: in the spring of 1944 the rupture had become already predictable.

radical ideologists of the Ustasha regime in Croatia has issued on June 4th 1941, in his capacity of a Minister of Education and Cults, *The law of the national culture of the Croatian people* which excluded from participating in the state institutions of all those that could not prove “the Croatian blood” throughout several generations.

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.reformation.org/holoc4.html7/72006>. The speech of Zanić was reflecting nothing else than the conviction of the main ideologue of the regime, Mile Budak, that “Ustasha and Croatia are based exclusively on the Catholic Church”.

¹¹⁰ Mioara Anton, *Propagandă*, p.429.

TURKS IN ROMANIA AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A TURKISH CONSULAR REPORT

Metin OMER*

Abstract: The Ottoman Empire and, later, the Republic of Turkey had a constant diplomatic presence in Constanța. The main reason why immediately after Dobrudja became part of Romania after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 an Ottoman consulate was opened in Constanța, was the existence of a large Turkish community in this region. In the period after the founding of the Republic of Turkey, the consulate in Constanța had the role of a communication channel between the Turkish community in Dobrudja and the new developments in Ankara.

This article analyzes the situation of the Turkish community in Dobrudja at the beginning of the post-war period. The main source used is a report from 1946 prepared by Recep Yazgan, the consul of Turkey in Constanța between 1945-1949. The main aspects captured are the demographic situation, economic problems, changes in education in Turkish language, legislative changes affecting the Turkish community.

Thus, the beginning of the postwar period is characterized by uncertainty about the future of the Turkish community. It is the period in which the communist authorities initiated a series of reforms that aimed to change the traditional way of functioning of the main institutions of the Turks in Romania. From the perspective of Turkish diplomats, the main problem was the possibility that the ties between the Turkish community in Dobrudja and Turkey would be weakened or even broken.

Keywords: Dobrudja; Turks; Tatars; Consulate of Turkey in Constanța; Recep Yazgan

1. Turkish Consulate in Constanta and the Turkish and Tatar community

Part of the Ottoman Empire for almost five centuries, Dobrudja continued to remain an area of strategic importance for Istanbul even after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, after which the territory between the Danube and the Sea became part of Romania. The creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 did not change this situation. A proof in this sense is the

* "Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania. metinomer@yahoo.com

constant presence of Ottoman and Republican diplomacy in this area through the Consulate in Constanța.

The Ottomans maintained their presence in Dobrudja through the consulates in Constanța, Tulcea (lowered in 1884 to the rank of vice-consulate), and the vice-consulate in Sulina.¹ As for the Ankara Government, a few months after the founding of the Republic, it sent an extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister, Cevat Bey (Ezine), to Bucharest on March 19, 1924. A few days later, on March 24, 1924, Gheorge Filality was appointed plenipotentiary minister of Romania in Turkey.² Less than two months after the accreditation of the two ministers, on May 9, 1924, the Turkish Consulate in Constanța also started its activity.³

The continued presence of Turkish diplomacy in this region was due to the existence of an important community of Turks and Tatars, who remained connected to the changes that took place in Istanbul and Ankara. Republican officials assumed the role of kin-state of this community, as they did with all Muslim communities in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. It was part of the identity construction process promoted by the Ankara authorities, the most obvious expression of which was the process of emigration of Muslim populations from the Balkans to the Republic of Turkey. Due to their cultural, religious, linguistic, and historical affinities, the Turks and Tatars in Romania, even though they had never lived in the Republic of Turkey, accepted without too much restraint the protection of Ankara and even its status as a mother state.⁴

This relationship that the Turkish and Tatar community in Romania had with the Ottoman Empire and, later, with the Republic of Turkey, is illustrated by the attitude adopted at the end of the First World War. During this period opposition to the sultan and the principles promoted by him had emerged in Ankara. In this context, in the middle of the year 1923, a delegation of Muslims from Romania, which included Senator Ali Fehmi and the four mufties from Dobrudja, visited the Caliph in Istanbul „to pay homage”, but also Ankara to

¹ See Silvana Rachieru, *Diplomați și supuși otomani în Vechiul Regat. Relații otomano-române între anii 1878-1908*, Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 2018, p. 87-91, 98-99, p. 101-104.

² Ömer Metin, *Atatürk dönemi Türkiye-Romanya ilişkileri 1923-1938*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis defended on November 21, 2011, at “Gazi” University of Ankara, p. 40-43; See also *România-Turcia. Relații diplomatice*, vol. 1, 1923-1938 (edited by Dumitru Preda), Editura Cavallioti, București, 2011, p. 8-13.

³ <http://kostence.bk.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/MissionChiefHistory>, (accessed on January 20, 2021).

⁴ In the interwar period, among some Tatars, there was a current of opinion that designated the Crimean Peninsula as their homeland. However, the representatives of this current did not deny the role of the Republic of Turkey as a kin-state and, influenced by Turkism, saw Turkey as the state that could help all Turkish peoples to establish their nation-states.

express their feelings of „*sincere friendship to the Government of the Grand National Assembly*.”⁵ Thus, the delegation pointed out that regardless of Turkey's political future, the community it represented would remain connected to the ideas promoted by Turkish officials.

The Turkish Consulate in Constanța was the mediator of this relationship. In the first years after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, diplomats at the consulate played an important role in presenting the new regime and promoting Kemalist reforms.⁶ The consulate also organized the emigration of the Turkish and Tatar population from Romania to Turkey in the interwar period.⁷ The importance of the community in the activity of the consulate also results from the fact that out of the three diplomatic representations that the Ottoman Empire had in Dobrudja, only the one from Constanța was preserved. This, in addition to the growing importance of the port of Constanța, was also due to the fact that the main institutions of the Turks and Tartars, such as the Muslim Seminary, were located in this county.

Viewed in this key, the perspective of the Turkish diplomats at the Consulate in Constanța becomes a necessary one to understand the transformations that the Turkish and Tatar community in Dobrudja went through. This article aims to dwell on the first years after the Second World War which brought profound changes in the lives of Turks and Tatars. The main source on which it is based is report no. 92-5 of March 27, 1946, prepared by Recep Yazgan, Consul of the Republic of Turkey in Constanța, sent to the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Bucharest, about the Turks in Romania. The document has not been used by researchers so far, being found in the archives of the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey in Constanța.⁸

As for the biography of the author of the report, it is characteristic of a large part of the founding elites of the Republic of Turkey. Many of them were born in territories that the Ottoman Empire was forced to cede following the wars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were formed in the Ottoman education system, witnessed the Ottoman defeats followed by

⁵ Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (henceforth AMAE), fond 71/Turcia, vol. 58, f. 17-25.

⁶ Metin Omer, *The influence of Atatürk's reforms on the Turkish community of Dobroudja*, in "Turkey & Romania. A history of partnership and collaboration in the Balkans", Florentina Nitu, Cosmin Ionita, Metin Ünver, Özgür Kolçak, Hacer Topaktaş (ed.), International Balkan Annual Conference (İBAC) Book Series (4), Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği Publications, İstanbul, 2016, p. 532-533.

⁷ For the emigration of Turks and Tatars from Romania to Turkey between the two World Wars see Idem, *Emigrarea turcilor și tătarilor din România în Turcia între cele Două Războaie Mondiale*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2020.

⁸ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946.

territorial surrenders, and personally experienced the drama of having to leave the places where they were born.

Recep Yazgan was born in 1904 in Manastır (Ottoman Empire), today Bitola (Republic of North Macedonia). Although he began his education in the Ottoman schools, he completed his studies at the first higher education institution founded after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey, the Faculty of Law, which would later develop and become part of Ankara University.⁹ He began his career in state administration in 1925 at the General Directorate of Settlement (*İskân Umum Müdürlüğü*), an institution that dealt specifically with the settlement of immigrants arriving on the basis of the population exchange between Turkey and Greece.¹⁰ A year later, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. He had foreign missions at the Turkish Consulates in Moscow, Athens-Piraeus, Paris, Rhodes, Cyprus, Antwerp, and the Embassy in Athens. He had his first mission as consul in Constanța (27.12.1945-7.12.1949), later, being appointed in Athens-Piraeus (28 August 1951-12 December 1956), Tabriz (28 July 1958-29 May 1962), Thessaloniki (30 May 1965-09 January 1966). In the ministry, he rose in the hierarchy to the position of co-director general of the Directorate-General for Personnel¹¹ (*Personel Dairesi Genel Müdürlüğünde refakatde Umum Müdür*).¹²

The report that Recep Yazgan prepared on March 27, 1946, deals with four main aspects of the Turkish and Tatar community in Dobrudja: the demographic situation, the economic state, the problem of education, the difficulties encountered by the Muslim community. At the end of the report,

⁹ Ahmet Mumcu, *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Neden ve Nasıl Kuruldu?*, "Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi", no. 44, 1995, p. 550. The institution was opened in 1925 under the name Ankara Hukuk Mektebi, in 1927 it became Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi, and in 1946 it became part of the newly established Ankara Üniversitesi (Ankara University).

¹⁰ *Resmî Ceride*, no. 43, 18 Teşrinisani 1339 (November 18, 1923), p. 1.

¹¹ The position of co-director general was introduced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in the 1960s, in the context of the Cold War, in response to the need to increase existing staff. The attributions of the General Personnel Directorate included the issues related to the appointment, travel, relocation, pension, transport allowances of the ministry officials. See Ali Rıza Özcoşkun, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluşundan Bugüne Dışişleri Bakanlığı Teşkilat Yapısı (1920-2018)*, Türk Diplomatik Arşivleri Yayınları, s.l., 2018, p. 33-40.

¹² Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1964-1965, T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1965, p. 239; <http://atinapire.bk.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/MissionChiefHistory>, (accessed on January 23, 2021); <http://constanta.cg.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/MissionChiefHistory>, (accessed on January 20, 2021);

<http://tebriz.bk.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/MissionChiefHistory>, (accessed on January 23, 2021); <http://thessaloniki.cg.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/MissionChiefHistory>, (accessed on January 23, 2021).

Yazgan makes also a very brief presentation of the situation of Turkish citizens in the area of jurisdiction of the Consulate.

2. An old community, a new political regime

2.1. Statistical data. The demographic and the economic situation of the Turks and Tatars in Dobrudja

In the first part of his report, referring to demographic aspects, the Turkish consul shows that, in 1937, in Dobrudja there were 116,830 Turks¹³ distributed in the four counties: Durostor (63,054), Caliacra (26,151), Constanța (23,541), Tulcea (4,084). He notes that the number of Turks has followed a downward trend. Regarding the causes of the decline, in Yazgan's opinion, it occurred as a result of "*events that have taken place from 1937 until today*", and as an example he mentions the treaty between Romania and Bulgaria signed in Craiova, in 1940, following which South Dobrudja returned to Bulgaria, "*part of our co-ethnics emigrating to the motherland*." The report also shows that some Turks took refuge in Romania during the evacuation organized by the Romanian authorities, but most of them emigrated to Turkey. Of those who remained in Romania, most settled in Bucharest and Călărași, and a very few in Constanța.¹⁴

The Turkish consul mentions in his report a census for 1945 and presents a table by localities showing that in Dobrudja there were 5,696 Turkish families, the total number of members being 25,272: 5,345 families with a total of 22,654 members in Constanța County and 624 families with 2,618 members in Tulcea County.¹⁵ Yazgan does not specify the source of the data. The table presented is all the more interesting as in Romania, around 1946 when the report was prepared, censuses were made in 1941 and 1948. The problem is that, in the published results of the 1941 census, at the ethnic origins rubric are mentioned only Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, being included also the column "*Others and Undeclared*"¹⁶, while in 1948 there is no rubric for ethnic origin, being mentioned the results for the mother tongue, but Turkish and Tatar are missing.¹⁷ Thus, the data obtained by the consul are either the results

¹³ In the report no distinction between Turks and Tatars is made, both populations being called "Turks". In the article we chose to use the name used in the report. Thus, if no clarification is made, when the name „Turks” is used, the reader should understand that we also refer to the Tatars.

¹⁴ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 1.

¹⁵ Ibidem, f. 2.

¹⁶ *Recensământul General al României din 1941, 6 aprilie. Date Sumare Provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică, București, 1944.

¹⁷ Dr. A. Golopenția, Dr. D. C. Georgescu, *Populația Republicii Populare Române la 25 ianuarie 1948. Rezultatele provizorii ale recensământului*, Institutul Central de Statistică, București, 1948.

of a census carried out by the Romanian authorities, but not published, or were obtained following a census carried out by the consulate officials.

In the following lines of his report, the Turkish consul also provides some data on the economic situation of Turks in Romania. It shows that 70% of Dobrudja Turks live in rural areas, only 30% being found in urban ones. As for the villagers, their main occupations were agriculture, shepherding, viticulture, gardening, tobacco growing, beekeeping. According to the information held by the consul, there were also Turkish peasants who had other occupations: merchants, cafe administrators, butchers, blacksmiths, carpenters, stone carvers, carters, ploughmen.¹⁸

However, Yazgan points out that “*the Turkish peasant is best at agriculture*” stating that in Valu lui Traian, Techirghiol, Cobadin, Amzacea, Topraisar, Tătarul, Ciocârlia there are rich Turks who practice agriculture on a large scale.¹⁹ The diplomat’s observation is also confirmed by the results of the 1930 census. Even if it does not provide exact data on the occupation of Turks and Tatars in Romania, analyzing the information presented, we can see that most of them were engaged in agriculture.²⁰

Regarding Tulcea County, the Turkish consul states that the land is not as fertile as the one in Constanța, because of this the Turks dealing with viticulture, gardening, beekeeping, forest exploitation, mining.²¹

Yazgan also refers to *Law no. 187 of March 23, 1945*, for the implementation of the land reform. However, he does not make a very in-depth analysis. Thus, he points out that “*it is said that*” this law improved “*somewhat*” the situation of Turkish peasants who “*due to lack of land had difficulty maintaining themselves*” because of this working as apprentices, tenants, or shepherds.²²

The consul also presents some information on how the law was applied. He points out that all the land over 50 hectares had been expropriated and divided among the “*poor and landless*” peasants. Those who had no land at all received five hectares, the others (who had less than five hectares) receiving enough land to own five hectares.²³

However, he also points out the negative parts of the law, stating that “*if this land reform has brought great benefits to the poor, it has affected quite a lot*” the Turks with large properties. Avoiding drawing a personal conclusion, he

¹⁸ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 2.

¹⁹ Ibidem, f. 3.

²⁰ Metin Omer, *Emigrarea turcilor și tătarilor din România în Turcia între cele Două Războaie Mondiale*, p. 96-97. For data from the 1930 census see Sabin Manuilă, *Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decembrie 1930*, vol. VII: *Profesiuni. Populația pe clase și grupe de profesiuni după sexe, vârstă, instrucție și neam; situația în profesie a activilor*, Editura Institutului Central de Statistică, București, 1938.

²¹ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 3.

²² Ibidem.

²³ Ibidem.

mentions that “*it is believed*” that if one were to compare the total area of land lost by the rich with the area of land received by the poor, one would conclude that “*this law has brought them great benefits to the poor Turks in Dobrudja*.”²⁴ This view of reform was wrong. Yazgan failed to see that, in fact, the purpose of this reform was not to help small-scale peasants, but rather it was part of the communist’s strategy of seizing power by enhancing the popular support.²⁵

As for the Turks in the cities, Yazgan points out that “*unfortunately, most of them are poor. There are very few who own property in city centers*.” The consul also complains that, in relation to the number of the population, there were very few Turks engaged in trade. He gives the example of Constanța which had a population of 3,352 Turks. Only four shops, two paint shops, a watchmaker, five butchers and two restaurants had Turkish owners. There was no Turkish-owned haberdashery shop. Yazgan, however, showed that there were trades where the presence of the Turks was significant: hairdressers, shoemakers, tailors, carpenters, merchants, or street vendors. Most of those living on the outskirts of the city were porters or street vendors.²⁶

According to the consul, the situation of the Turks in the cities with agricultural areas such as Medgidia, Negru Vodă, Techirghiol, Cernavodă, Isaccea and Măcin was the same as those in the villages, as they worked the land. However, he pointed out in his report that Medgidia was a special case because it was in the center of Dobrudja and was famous for the animal fairs and bazaars held there. Therefore, in this town there were quite a lot of Turks with “*considerable fortunes*.”²⁷

The Turks from the localities close to the Danube and the sea, such as Tulcea, Hârșova, Cernavodă, Constanța, Mangalia, also had different occupations than agriculture, such as fishing or navigation. The report also mentions Turks who worked for the state as civil servants or teachers and clerical staff, or were lawyers, doctors, engineers. According to Yazgan, most of them lived in Constanța and Medgidia, in the other cities being “*a handful of them*.”²⁸

2.2. Turkish education in Romania on the verge of communism

The situation of education of Turks and Tatars in Romania has been a constant concern of Turkish officials. After 1923, the main goal they had in the field of education was to teach Turkish in the Latin alphabet in Turkish schools in Romania and to use a program adapted to Kemalist reforms. The most

²⁴ Ibidem, f. 4.

²⁵ Dumitru Șandru, *Reforma agrară din 1945 în România*, Institutul Național Pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, București, 2000, p. 309.

²⁶ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 4.

²⁷ Ibidem, f. 5.

²⁸ Ibidem.

visible transformation in this regard was at the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia, which, following the efforts of Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, changed its curriculum, introduced textbooks brought from Turkey and adopted a new uniform for students.²⁹ These changes had been possible with the consent of the Romanian authorities. Tanrıöver also had very good personal relations with the political elites in Bucharest. The political developments after 1945 were viewed with concern by Turkish officials due to the uncertainty regarding the attitude that the representatives of the new regime in Romania will adopt.

The Turkish consul addresses the issue of education at large, focusing on the issue of teaching Turkish in primary schools and on the situation of the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia. In his report he showed that about 50% of Dobrudja Turks are literate, most of them being concentrated in Constanța County. There were 55 official Turkish primary schools in Dobrudja. Of these, 45 were in Constanța County, and 10 in Tulcea County. In terms of the number of students, 1,800 students were enrolled in these schools. In addition, there were 35 Turkish private schools. At these schools taught 100 teachers, 60 being paid by the state and 30 being paid by the Muslim communities.³⁰

With the exception of primary schools in Constanța, Medgidia and Cernavodă, in the case of villages, Turkish children were enrolled in mixed classes, together with Romanian students, the Turkish language being taught separately by a Turkish teacher. However, the consul stated that “*education in Turkish done in this way was not satisfactory, the villages with a better economic situation hired private teachers thus trying to cover the gaps accumulated by students.*”³¹

From the consul’s report we learn that the primary schools were of two kinds: schools with four and schools with seven classes. Those who did not want to enroll in high school were required to complete seven-grade schools. The primary school in Constanța had four classes and had 150 students enrolled. Of the nine teachers, five were Turks. The salary of teachers who taught in Romanian was paid by the state, that of teachers who taught in Turkish was paid by the Muslim Community in Constanța.³²

The only school at high school level of Turks in Dobrudja was the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia. This had eight grades. The building of the school had a dormitory. The seminar had 140 students enrolled. Of the fifteen teachers, eight were Romanians, the remaining seven were Turks. The director

²⁹ Metin Omer, *The History of the Medgidia Muslim Seminary (1889-1948)*, in Adriana Cupcea, Manuela Marin, Metin Omer (eds.), *Seminarul Musulman din Medgidia. Documente și Memorie/ The Muslim Seminary of Medgidia: Documents and Memory*, Cluj-Napoca 2016, p. 169-170; Müstecip Ülküsal, *Dobruca ve Türkler*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara 1987, p. 127-128.

³⁰ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 5-6.

³¹ Ibidem, f. 6.

³² Ibidem.

of the seminar was Romanian, while the deputy director was Turkish. The consul pointed out that all expenses were borne by the Romanian state but also stressed that *“because the amount was no longer enough, in recent years, a small fee was charged from students with a good financial situation.”*³³

Yazgan also mentions the case of the seminary graduates who had emigrated to Turkey during the 1930s and 1940s. He shows that many of them had gone to Turkey to enroll in universities in Istanbul, Ankara, military schools, or pedagogical schools. Others had hired as officials in the Turkish state or banks in Turkey. According to the consul, the *“departure to Turkey of such a large number of graduates of a school whose main purpose was to train Muslim clergy and teachers in Romania”* was not welcomed by the Romanian Government and solutions were sought to keep future graduates in the country. In this sense, the Turkish consul pointed out that the seminar graduates will be facilitated to enter the Romanian universities.³⁴

In his report the consul specifies that *“it has been heard”* that an attempt is being made to appoint a Muslim to lead this educational institution. However, he also emphasizes that, although at first glance it seems a good initiative, there are *“negative political goals”* behind it. This is because Seyit Abdullah³⁵, who *“is said”* to be the director, before becoming a professor at the seminary, worked as a secretary at the Turkish Legation where he was fired by Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, because he was involved in some illegalities. The consul also stated that if Abdullah will be appointed director, the reforms implemented by Tanrıöver in 1935 will be stopped.³⁶

According to Yazgan, the main culprits of this initiative were the mufti Murat Iusuf Abibula, *“a member of the Communist Party”*, and the *“Union of Muslims in Romania”*³⁷, *“founded about a month ago”* and which *“was created at the suggestion and desire of the Government”*.³⁸ Yazgan also notes that *“the role and purpose of this organization are not yet known”*, but *“it seems that it will be given extended authority and nothing will be done about the problems of Muslims without obtaining its approval”*.³⁹

³³ Ibidem, f. 7.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ We have not been able to identify “Seyit Abdullah” among the teachers at the Muslim Seminary. It is possible that Recep Yazgan referred to Abdula Abdulatif, a professor at the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia from 1920 to 1958, graduate of theological studies in Istanbul. See Adriana Cupcea, Manuela Marin, Metin Omer (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 69, 453.

³⁶ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 8.

³⁷ It is, in fact, about the Democratic Union of Muslims in Romania (Uniunea Democratică a Musulmanilor din România), established on January 14, 1945. The rumors mentioned by the consul in his report on the importance to be given to this organization have never materialized. Similar organizations were founded, but their role was to attract the support of the Turks and Tatars until the grip on power of the new regime was strengthened.

³⁸ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 8.

³⁹ Ibidem, f. 8-9.

Regarding the leadership of the association, the president was “*lanyer Hamdi*”⁴⁰, and the secretary was “*Tahsin Cafer*”⁴¹. The other positions had not yet been filled.⁴²

In his report, Yazgan points out that the intervention of the “*Union of Muslims in Romania*” had an important role in the appointment of Murat Iusuf Abibula. Following the appeals made by this Union, Abibula had become a mufti, although the ministry had initially appointed Cemil Resit. Yazgan also showed that Abibula was a graduate of the Muslim Seminary, had a farm and properties in Constanța. Between 1937-1938 he had emigrated to Turkey but, being dissatisfied with the conditions found, he had returned to Romania. Yazgan states that “*out of a desire to become a mufti, he had joined several parties*” and managed to achieve his goal in October 1945 after joining the Communist Party.⁴³

Regarding the inspection of Turkish schools in Dobrudja, Yazgan points out that Mehmet Halim Vani⁴⁴, a Romanian language teacher in the village of Valea Seacă (Omurşa), had been appointed as an inspector of Turkish schools. Vani was a graduate of the Muslim Seminary “*who had joined the Socialist Party*”. The consul adds that “*it is said*” that, “*known since the past as a nationalist*”, this inspector was working to make education better.⁴⁵

Referring to the difficulties faced by the Turkish schools and the Muslim Seminary, in Yazgan’s opinion, the main problem was the lack of books. He pointed out that textbooks brought from Turkey before the war “*with the help of ambassadors or through personal initiatives*” had been exhausted, and “*Turkish schools in Dobrudja were left without textbooks*”, adding that “*all the teachers I met asked me to find a solution to this problem and expressed the hope that the necessary textbooks will be brought from Turkey.*”⁴⁶

Another concern expressed by the consul was that, “*as they say insistently*”, the Romanian Government was planning to introduce in the Turkish schools in Dobrudja education with the Arabic alphabet, “*even in Tatar*”, with the textbooks brought from the Soviet Union or edited in the country. The

⁴⁰ Hamdi Nusret, editor of the *Halk* newspaper that appeared in Constanța between 1936-1939 in Turkish and Romanian. In 1949 he managed to escape to Turkey boarding a Turkish ship.

⁴¹ Tahsin Geafer, graduate of the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia in 1941.

⁴² T.C. Köstence Başkonsoloslugu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 9.

⁴³ Ibidem, f. 12.

⁴⁴ Mehmet Halim Vani Yurtsever, teacher, imam, teacher of Turkish and Tatar languages, writer, personality of the Tatar community. Between 1952-1957 he was imprisoned for political reasons. In 1971 he emigrated to Turkey where he lived until the end of his life in 1994.

⁴⁵ T.C. Köstence Başkonsoloslugu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 9.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

consul indicated that the Communist Party had charged “*Benli Seyit*”⁴⁷, a native of Constanța, graduate of the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia, with propaganda in this regard. According to the information gathered by the consul, during World War II he had been a prisoner in the Soviet Union “*being trained there in accordance with communist aims.*” Yazgan also pointed out that Seyit was under the protection of the Prefect of Constanta and was among the main founders of the „Muslim Union”. Also, “*from what was said among the people*”, the consul added in the report that he was preparing a report for the „Ministry of Minorities” (the consul referred to the Ministry of Cults) on the political and social situation of Muslims and “*especially*” on the rapprochement of intellectuals with Turkey and Turkism.⁴⁸

Recep Yazgan’s concern was justified. It’s just that he hadn’t exactly predicted the intentions of the new authorities in Bucharest. Education in the Tatar language was introduced, but not in the Arabic alphabet, but in the Cyrillic alphabet, with textbooks being brought from Kazan, the Soviet Union. The aim was to distance the Turkish and Tatar community from Turkey, a state in a different system of alliances. At the same time, the option was forced by developments in the USSR. On May 18, 1944, the Crimean Tatars, very close in language, culture, and history to those of Dobrudja, had been deported by order of Stalin, their existence as a nation being denied. Moscow promoted the idea that there were only Kazan Tatars, so it could not accept that a Tatar language which, according to Soviet policy, did not exist, be taught in Dobrudja. This system was not used for a long time for the simple fact that textbooks brought from the Soviet Union were not even understood by teachers. After the Tatar language in Dobrudja was taught for a short time, in 1959 all Tatar schools in Romania were closed.⁴⁹

2.3. Legislative framework and institutions of the Turkish community

The functioning of the representative institutions of the Muslim community in Romania has always been of interest to Turkish officials. After 1878, in Romania, the organization from the Ottoman period was preserved with small modifications. At the head of the hierarchy was the Muftiate to which the Cadiate (Islamic courts) and the Muslim Communities were subordinated. There was a dispute between Romanian and Ottoman officials regarding the religious hierarchy of the Muslim community in Romania.

⁴⁷ It is about Menseit Ilias, vice president of the Democratic Union of Muslims in Romania, member of the Communist Party.

⁴⁸ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 9-10.

⁴⁹ Filiz Tutku Aydın, “Identitatea etnonațională a diasporei tătare crimeene din România, în perioada comunistă”, in Metin Omer, Adriana Cupcea (coord.), *Un destin la Marea Neagră: tătarii din Dobrogea*, Editura ISPMN, Cluj-Napoca, 2017, p. 110.

According to the Ottomans, the Mufti should have been appointed by Şeyhulislam, in his capacity as the supreme head of the Muslim believers in the Ottoman Empire. For officials in Bucharest, this desire was seen as an interference in the country's internal affairs. Finally, a compromise option was chosen, the appointment of the mufti being made by the Minister of Cults and Arts of Romania with the formal approval of the religious leader from Istanbul. This problem disappeared after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 when, as a result of the process of secularization of the state, there was no longer a spiritual authority to claim precedence over Muslim believers.⁵⁰ After this, Ankara was involved in the functioning of the representative institutions of the Muslim community in Romania on the margins of diplomatic relations between the two countries, being interested in them remaining connected to developments in Turkey. The best example of this is the abolition of cadiates in 1935 due to the influence of Kemalist reforms.⁵¹

At the same time, Turkish diplomats were concerned about the proper functioning of these institutions. In the interwar period, the main problem in this regard was the creation of a statute regulating the functioning of Muslim religious institutions. In his report, Recep Yazgan points out that the main problem was the lack of unity of the community because of "*Turkism and Tatarism ideas, and the pride of leaders and their choices*". As a result, even if two statutes had been prepared at the 1913 congresses in Constanța and 1921 in Bazargic, they were never adopted. He also complained about the way the representative bodies of the Turks in Dobrudja work, pointing out that the problems of the Turkish minority are dealt with by the local Muslim Communities, but that although they have statutes on the basis of which they are elected and function, they depend on the will of the mufti who rules by "*orders and directives*". The Turkish consul also noted the instability in the leadership of the Muslim communities stating that from 1937 to 1946 the Mufti of Constanța changed six times, each time being also changed the leadership of the Muslim Community.⁵²

As for the Muslim Communities, the consul stated that their income came from rents obtained from the properties they owned, agricultural land or buildings. The community with the highest incomes was the one in Constanța. According to the consul's sources, this had large buildings on Carol, Mangalia, I.G. Duca and Vintilă Brătianu streets, and on Cuza Vodă street there was the building of a primary school with 13 classrooms. On the other hand, the Muslim Communities in the cities of Medgidia, Cernavodă, Mangalia, Hârșova,

⁵⁰ Metin Omer, *Emigrarea turcilor și tătarilor din România în Turcia între cele Două Războaie Mondiale*, p. 117-128.

⁵¹ Constantin Hamangiu, *Codul General al României*, vol. XXIII, București, 1935, p. 247-248.

⁵² T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 10-11.

Tulcea, Măcin and Isaccea did not have buildings that would bring them enough income. They had only a few “old shops”. As for the purpose of the Muslim Communities, according to those presented by the consul, it was to rent the lands and buildings owned by the community, the administration of Muslim schools, mosques, cemeteries, to ensure the salary of imams and teachers, and “if the budget allowed, they could help poor students”.⁵³

Regarding the Muftiate, Yazgan shows in the report that until South Dobrudja was ceded, in Romania there were four Muftiates. After this moment only the Muftiate from Constanța remained, becoming the “*Muftiate of the Muslims in Romania*”. The Mufti had attributions regarding the recommendation to the Ministry of Cults of the clergy to be appointed to the post, their control and remuneration, the supervision of matters related to the mosques and the community. The Turkish consul also points out why the leadership of the Muslim cult was not stable: “*Muftis are generally people affiliated with political parties. Therefore, each party in Romania has a candidate for muftiate. The Mufti do not shy away from influencing Muslims to impose the goals of the party they belong to.*”⁵⁴

In his report, Yazgan also made an inventory of the Muslim cult. It showed that in the whole of Dobrudja there are about 150 mosques, of which 121 were in Constanta County, and 29 in Tulcea County. With the exception of the Carol Mosque in Ovidiu Square in Constanța, the rest of the mosques belonged to the Muslim Community. Most of the clerics who served in these mosques were graduates of the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia, some of whom were also primary school teachers. The teachers were employed according to the law of civil servants and their salary was ensured by the Romanian state. In the 150 mosques in Dobrudja, there were 200 clerics, 120 of them being paid by the state, and the remaining 80 receiving salaries from the Muslim Communities.⁵⁵

Regarding the organization of the Muslim community in Romania, Ankara’s diplomat in Constanta also signaled an uncertainty. He pointed out that, “as far as it was known”, the Ministry of Cults was preparing a law on “*cults in Romania*”, the purpose of which was to ensure equality between Romanians and other religions and cults. In this regard, according to Yazgan, the ministry had sent an address to all religious organizations asking them to express their wishes. As a result of this address, the Mufti had also prepared a project proposal to the Ministry of Cults. Regarding the content of the new cult law, after stating that it is already being worked on, Yazgan mentioned that it would be adopted soon and that according to it “*the mufti would be elected by the people*”.⁵⁶ Finally, the status of the Muslim community was established by a decree of the

⁵³ Ibidem, f. 12-13.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, f. 15.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, f. 14.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, f. 15-16.

Presidium of the Grand National Assembly in 1949⁵⁷, but it did not include the provisions mentioned by Recep Yazgan. In fact, starting with 1947, until the fall of the communist regime, only one person, Iacub Memet, exercised the function of Mufti of the Muslim community in Romania.

3. Turkish citizens in Romania at the End of the Second World War

In the last part of the report, the consul also refers to the Turkish citizens residing in the area of jurisdiction of the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey in Constanța. According to the statistics presented by Yazgan, Turkish citizens were present in the following settlements: 173 in Constanța, 69 in Constanța County, 59 in Tulcea County, 21 in Brăila, 15 in Galați and 17 in Moldova region. Out of a total of 354 Turkish citizens, 267 were ethnic Turks, 37 Armenians, 35 Greeks, 13 Jews and two Russians. Of these, only 17 had a good financial situation being involved in trade, the rest being craftsmen, farmers, street vendors or workers.⁵⁸

Conclusions

One of the most important factors that determined the existence of a consulate of the Republic of Turkey in Constanța, was the presence of a large Turkish community in this region. The Turkish diplomats in Constanța acted as intermediaries between the community and the new Republic. They were interested in the situation of the Turkish community, trying to ensure that the developments within it did not run counter to the principles promoted by the country they represented. Until the Second World War, this concern was eased by the closeness that existed between Romania and Turkey. Because of this good relation, Turkish diplomats managed to promote Kemalist reforms among the Turkish community in Romania and to organize emigration, the most important process that affected the Turkish community in Dobruja.

The situation changed at the end of the Second World War due to the uncertainties in the Romanian political life. During this period of profound change, Turkish officials were concerned about how the Turkish community would be affected. This interest can be seen in the report that the Turkish consul in Constanța, Recep Yazgan, prepared in 1946. In the report, the consul focuses on the demographic, economic, educational situation, and the legal transformations that the community goes through at the beginning of the postwar period. Also, at the end of the report, Yazgan briefly presents some statistics on the situation of Turkish citizens in the consulate's jurisdiction.

⁵⁷ *Monitorul Oficial al României*, Partea I, no. 469, 25 June 2008, p. 4.

⁵⁸ T.C. Köstence Başkonsolosluğu Arşivi, document no. 92-5, March 27, 1946, f. 15-16.

The report prepared by Recep Yazgan clearly shows the uncertainty with which the future of the community was viewed. That is why the Turkish consul is reluctant to express clear views on the issues addressed. Instead of taking a personal position on what was presented, he only preferred to refer to the information he had managed to obtain. However, the Turkish diplomat does not mask his concern about the nature of the Turkish state's ties with the Turkish community in Dobrudja in the future. The main fear was that, by controlling the traditional institutions of the Turkish community in Romania, such as the Muftiate, or by reforming areas such as education in accordance with the new ideology, the new regime will move the community away from Turkey.

At the same time, the Turkish consul failed to understand the true dimension of reforms such as the land reform of 1945, or failed to obtain clear information on the intentions of the new officials in Bucharest on regulating issues related to community's life, such as institutional or educational reform. However, the report prepared by Turkish Consul Recep Yazgan on March 27, 1946, is an important document for understanding the transformations the Turkish community was going through at the beginning of the postwar period in a new regional context in which Romania and Turkey did not continue their interwar close relation.

REPATRIATION OF THE POLISH POPULATION FROM THE IZMAIL REGION IN 1945-1946 (ACCORDING TO THE STATE ARCHIVES OF THE ODESA REGION)

Taras VINTSKOVSKIY*

Abstract: The article examines one of the previously unknown aspects of the deportation and repatriation policy of the USSR government in the mid-1940s. Based on the documents of the State Archives of the Odesa region, the preparation and repatriation of Polish citizens from the Izmail region of the Ukrainian SSR, who were deported to remote regions of the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War, is analyzed. The author concluded that preparatory measures in the Danube lands were carried out mostly in the second half of 1945, after the signing on July 6, 1945 of the Agreement between the governments of the USSR and Poland on the mutual evacuation of the population. According to the considered applications by December 20, 1945 the lists of those wishing to leave the territory of the USSR were formed. They included 2,634 people from three districts of the region, and this figure allows us to define the Izmail region as one, which was home to one of the largest groups of former Polish citizens deported to the USSR since the beginning of World War II. According to the State Archives of Odesa region, they lived in 21 settlements of Tarutyn, Borodino and Artsyz districts, where they moved in 1944. Their temporary residence was mostly villages founded by German colonists, who were deported by the Soviet authorities in 1940. The immediate start of transportation of the controlled population began in early March 1946, when the first group of people left the Danube region. As a result, by the summer of 1946, the relevant authorities of the Izmail region had completed the implementation of the Soviet-Polish agreement on mutual exchange of population, and most of the Polish population had been repatriated to their homeland.

Keywords: Second World War; deportation, repatriation; USSR; Izmail region; Poland

The course of the Second World War in 1944-1945 and the strategic plans for the post-war settlement of Central and Eastern Europe additionally motivated the governments of different countries to look for solutions to a

* "I. I. Mechnikov" National University, Odesa, Ukraine. taras.ist@gmail.com

number of issues. Among them, potentially one of the most difficult could be the problem of arranging the Polish-Soviet border. Disagreements between the London exile government of S. Mykolaychuk and the Kremlin over the prospects of establishing a postwar Polish border were determined by fundamental differences, as one side insisted on restoring the integrity of their country as of September 1, 1939, and the other that the “Curzon line” should be taken as a starting point.

However, discussions about the affiliation of certain areas to Poland and the USSR within a certain discourse could not automatically solve the concomitant problem. The presence of large ethnic minorities in disputed areas on both sides of the border could be an element of socio-political instability indefinitely. Thus, one of the most effective tools of “surgical intervention” in the long Polish-Ukrainian conflict could be the creation of a monoethnic space. Therefore, in 1944, the USSR government and the Polish National Liberation Committee (established on July 21, 1944 on the initiative and with the assistance of the Kremlin, headed by E. Osobka-Morawski, *hereinafter* – PKNV) launched a mechanism of mutual evacuation of the population, which lasted several years. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 finally approved the eastern border of Poland. In August 1945, both countries confirmed the previous decision by the relevant Treaty¹.

This topic has been systematically studied in recent decades, mostly by Polish and Ukrainian historians. The scientific heritage was replenished with works of various kinds², including collections of documents from Soviet archives³. It is quite obvious and justified that the main emphasis in the vast

¹ *Україна в Другій світовій війні: погляд з XXI ст. Історичні нариси. Книга друга*, К., Наукова думка, 2011, С. 481-482.

² Евсеев И. Ф. *Сотрудничество Украинской ССР и Польской Народной Республики (1944-1960 гг.)*, К., Издательство Академии наук Украинской ССР, 1962, 368 с.; Бугай М. Ф. *За повідомленням НКВС СРСР, були переселені. Про депортацію населення з України у 30-40-і роки*, К., 1992, 47 с.; Козловський І. *Встановлення українсько-польського кордону 1941-1951 рр.*, Львів, Каменярь, 1998, 222 с.; Нгусяк Г. *Przemieszanie – byli zesłańcy i uciekinierzy z Polski w obwodzie Odeskim w latach 1944-1946*, Поляки на Півдні України, Одеса, Ополе, Ольштин, Гермес, 2006, С. 205-216; Боляновський А. *Депортації як чинник впливу на розвиток українсько-польських стосунків у 1944-1945 рр.*, Україна – Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість / Національна академія наук України, Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, Вип. 2: Депортації 1944-1951, Львів, 2007, С. 54-71; Стемпень С. *Переселення поляків з України в 1944-1946 рр.*, Україна – Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість, Вип. 2: Депортації 1944-1951, Львів, 2007, С. 172-181; Цепенда І. *Українсько-польські відносини 40-50-х років XX століття: етнополітичний аналіз*, К., 2009, 387 с.; *Національне питання в Україні XX – початку XXI ст.: історичні нариси*, К., Ніка-Центр, 2012, 592 с.

³ *Українська РСР у міжнародних відносинах*, К., Видавництво Академії наук Української РСР, 1959, 752 с.; *Українська РСР на міжнародній арені. Збірник*

majority of explorations was on the territories of Galicia, Kholm, Podlasie, and so on. After all, first of all, the population of these lands was forced to change their place of residence, sometimes their way of life, cultural and mental space.

However, evacuation measures were also organized in regions further away from the Polish-Soviet border. One of them was the Izmail region, where part of the former citizens of the second Rzeczpospolita temporarily lived. At the beginning of World War II, they were deported to remote regions of the USSR. Thanks to the efforts of the Polish government in London, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in August 1941 passed a decree according to which Polish citizens were released from special settlements. Under the directive of the NKVD of the USSR, they were allowed to live in the country, except in border and restricted areas⁴.

In accordance with the resolution of the Soviet People's Commissar of the USSR of April 5, 1944 and July 11, 1944 "On partial resettlement of former Polish citizens" the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR by its resolution №808-43 of July 17, 1944 decided to resettle this category people in the amount of 29,700 people. They were to arrive from other republics of the USSR in Ukraine during August-September of the same year. The legal basis was strengthened by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On granting amnesty to Polish citizens convicted of crimes in the USSR", which appeared on August 10, 1944. According to the annex to Resolution №808-43 USSR. Thus, 2,150 people from Kazakhstan were to arrive in the Odesa region within its borders at that time. Instead, we did not find any mention in the document about the prospects of relocation to the Danube region⁵. The answer to this conflict can be found in the study of T. Pron', where the author points out that in 1940, residents of Lviv and Volyn' regions were evicted to the Izmail region⁶. This fully applies to the scientific

документів і матеріалів 1944-1961 рр., К., Державне видавництво політичної літератури УРСР, 1963, 576 с.; *В інтересах миру і дружби між народами. Міжнародноправова діяльність Української РСР. 1945-1972*. Документи і коментарі, К., Вища школа, 1974, 336 с.; *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках ХХ століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, 1008 с.

⁴ Бугай М. Ф. *За повідомленням НКВС СРСР, були переселені. Про депортацію населення з України у 30-40-і роки*, К., 1992, С. 25-26.

⁵ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках ХХ століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 62, 64, 114.

⁶ Пронь Т. *Репатріація польського населення з Південно-Східних та Центральних областей Української РСР у Польщу у 1944-1951 роках*, Україна – Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість, К., 2010 – 2011, Вип. 3-4, С. 184.

intelligence of M. Bugay⁷. It is clear that we do not find any mention of deportation practices in the development of Soviet historiography⁸.

Since we have not found special works on the problem addressed in the title of the article, it should be recognized that the chosen area of research was on the margins of scientific studies. An unnecessary argument in favor of the thesis is T. Pron's remark on the need to "deepen historical knowledge of the process of resettlement of Poles to Poland in the postwar years, supplementing the source base with documents of regional and national archives of Ukraine <...>". And in the conclusions to the article, she summarizes the need for a deeper and more comprehensive study of the problem⁹.

Thus, we aim to find out the repatriation of the Polish population from the Danube lands to their homeland. It can be implemented by studying the preparatory measures, establishing the places of residence of former Polish citizens within the Izmail region, finding out the number of evacuees, covering the course and consequences of resettlement. The source support of the topic is the documents of the State Archives of Odesa region, which are stored in a separate case, directly devoted to the outlined issues. Most of them are job descriptions, correspondence of the relevant commission with the republican and union authorities, lists of persons approved for evacuation.

As part of the Soviet-Polish dialogue on the settlement of territorial disputes, on July 26, 1944, an agreement was concluded between the representatives of both countries, which defined a specific line of the postwar Polish-Ukrainian border. And on September 9, 1944, an agreement was signed between the PKNV and the government of the Ukrainian SSR¹⁰ on the "evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland". On September 19, 1944, the Agreement was approved by a joint resolution of the SNC of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. M. Pidgorny was appointed Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in Lublin, which was identified as one of the centers for coordination of actions¹¹. In order to implement the Repatriation Agreement, a secret instruction was prepared,

⁷ Бугай М. Ф. *За повідомленням НКВС СРСР, були переселені. Про депортацію населення з України у 30-40-і роки*, К., 1992, С. 25-26.

⁸ Бачинский А. Д. *В семье советской. Социалистическое строительство в Приднестровских землях Украинской ССР*, К., Одесса, Вища школа, 1984, 171 с.

⁹ Пронь Т. *Репатріація польського населення з Південно-Східних та Центральних областей Української РСР у Польщу у 1944-1951 роках*, Україна – Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість, К., 2010 – 2011, Вип. 3-4, С. 171-172, 185.

¹⁰ З 1 лютого 1944 р. НКЗС УРСР отримав дозвіл Москви діяти як квазісуб'єкт міжнародного права.

¹¹ Цепенда І. *Українсько-польські відносини 40-50-х років XX століття: етнополітичний аналіз*, К., 2009, С. 130.

which defined the principles, methods, terms, etc. of evacuation measures¹². In particular, it was assumed that the evacuees had to submit their passports and other documents, in addition to the metrics, and leave the territory of the USSR within 15 days of receiving the certificate¹³.

In Ukrainian historiography, the appearance of documents was explained as follows. Firstly, given that the future borders did not correspond to the ethnic map of the region, this created the danger of a possible demand for their revision by the Polish political elites stationed in London. Acting ahead, Moscow decided to relocate 481,200 Ukrainians from Kholm, Nadsyannia, Lemkivshchyna and Podlasie to the USSR. And 787674 citizens of pre-war Poland, who were mostly of Polish and Jewish origin, from the western regions of Ukraine to the Commonwealth¹⁴. Secondly, the USSR feared the further spread of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Western Ukraine. Third, the Polish government also sought the monoethnicity of its country. Finally, the Soviet Union assisted Poland in the final settlement of the problem of ethnic minorities in exchange for its adoption of the Soviet model of domestic and foreign policy¹⁵.

However, the remark on the western region of the USSR should be adjusted, because the Agreement between the PKNV and the government of the USSR of September 9, 1944 was not limited to certain areas, but extended to all regions of Ukraine. The right to evacuate from the USSR to Poland was granted to “all Poles and Jews who had Polish citizenship until September 17, 1939”. The agreement provided for evacuation measures on a voluntary basis, for which those wishing to submit an application in writing or orally. This required the consent of the host party, ie PKNV. Repatriates were allowed to carry with them all their own livestock and poultry, tools, up to two tons of other property per family¹⁶.

The parties to the Agreement agreed that the evacuation would begin on October 15, 1944 and end on February 1, 1945. But the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, signed between the parties in Warsaw on December 14, 1945, extended this period initially to January 15¹⁷, 1946 and then to 15 June

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках XX століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 146, 148.

¹⁴ Козловський І. *Встановлення українсько-польського кордону 1941-1951 рр.*, Львів, Каменяр, 1998, С. 113.

¹⁵ *Національне питання в Україні XX – початку XXI ст.: історичні нариси*, К., Ніка-Центр, 2012, С. 465.

¹⁶ Евсеев И. Ф. *Сотрудничество Украинской ССР и Польской Народной Республики (1944-1960 гг.)*, К., Издательство Академии наук Украинской ССР, 1962, С. 114-115.

¹⁷ *В интересах миру і дружби між народами. Міжнародноправова діяльність Української РСР. 1945-1972. Документи і коментарі*, К., Вища школа, 1974, С. 63-64.

1946¹⁸. Therefore, it is worth agreeing with the opinion of the Ukrainian historian I. Tsependa that from the very beginning the terms were unrealistic¹⁹.

This applies to a large extent to the Izmail region, where the preparatory processes apparently began with a significant delay. A possible explanation for this can be found in the intelligence of the Polish historian S. Stempnia. He claims that the Soviet-Polish agreements provided for the right to leave the USSR only to those families in which someone had fought in the units of the Polish People's Army. Attempts to change these decisions by appealing to the PKNV and later to the Provisional Government of National Unity of the Republic of Poland did not yield the desired result. The Soviet authorities treated the Poles there as a category of society that did not constitute an element of socio-political destruction. And also as a labor force, the loss of which could cause damage to the collective and state farm system. After all, most of them lived in rural areas. Among other things, there was a significant lack of technical means to transport a significant number of people and property²⁰.

After the capitulation of Germany, the situation gradually changed. The legal basis for the exchange of population was strengthened by the agreement on the right to renounce Soviet and Polish citizenship, signed on July 6, 1945 between the USSR SNK and the Provisional Government of National Unity of the Republic of Poland²¹. As well as a number of documents at the governmental and party levels, that prescribed the algorithm of action. They went to the regional commissions to organize the repatriation of the Polish population.

The resolution of the SNC of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CP(b)U of November 29, 1945 approved the reporting form and determined the deadlines for submitting statistical data on persons wishing to leave for Poland. The first stage of the work of the commissions for consideration of applications of the Polish population for evacuation was to last until January 1, 1945. All processed information on the submitted applications was to be submitted to Kyiv as of January 1, 1946. November 1945, as well as

¹⁸ Бугай М. Ф. *За повідомленням НКВС СРСР, були переселені. Про депортацію населення з України у 30-40-і роки*, К., 1992, С. 33.

¹⁹ Цепенда І. *Українсько-польські відносини 40-50-х років XX століття: етнополітичний аналіз*, К., 2009, С. 128-129.

²⁰ Стемпень С. *Переселення поляків з України в 1944-1946 рр.*, Україна – Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість, Вип. 2: Депортації 1944-1951, Львів, 2007, С. 180-181.

²¹ Евсеев И. Ф. *Сотрудничество Украинской ССР и Польской Народной Республики (1944-1960 гг.)*, К., Издательство Академии наук Украинской ССР, 1962, С. 130-131.

orders № 277 of October 17, 1945 and № 0219 of August 24, 1945, which provided for the request of relevant documents from Moscow²².

According to the Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Lieutenant General S. Savchenko, the departure of repatriates from the territory of the “eastern regions of Ukraine” to Poland began on December 20, 1945²³. But in the Danube it started a few months later. Only on December 10, 1945, the commission under the Izmail Regional Executive Committee for the Resettlement of Polish and Jewish Nationalities to Poland held its first meeting at which the lists of those wishing to leave for the neighboring state were considered and approved. This category included repatriates who fell under the Soviet-Polish agreement of July 6, 1945 on renunciation of Soviet citizenship and evacuation to the homeland. The commission was headed by Deputy Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee and Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation for the Izmail Region S. Vaganov. The members of the commission were Antipov, Deputy Head of the NKVD Department of the Ukrainian SSR in the Izmail Region, Lieutenant Colonel A. Pavlov, Deputy Head of the NKDB-MGB Department of the Ukrainian SSR of the Izmail Region, and Lyubych, Regional Prosecutor²⁴.

As there were short deadlines for the completion of work on the formation of lists for evacuation and their submission for approval to the Republican Commission under the SNC of the USSR, on December 20, 1945, the regional commission held two more meetings. The result of the consideration of the issue was the confirmation of 1223 applications for departure. More than two dozen people were denied, citing their Ukrainian origin. It is noteworthy that both groups included families with specific Ukrainian surnames²⁵. And according to T. Pron', among all former Polish citizens living in the Danube, as of November 20, 1945, there were only 930 ethnic Poles out of 2,682²⁶. If the bearers of the surnames Fedorchuk, Stepanyuk, Rol'ko, Kornelyak, Sytnyk, Butrym and others were forbidden to

²² *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746 (Виконавчий комітет Ізмаїльської обласної Ради депутатів трудящих (облвиконком), М. Ізмаїл), оп. 1, спр. 11 (Інструктивні вказівки Переселенського Управління при РНК РРФСР щодо супроводу переселенців і протоколи засідання комісії при облвиконкомі з переселення осіб польської та єврейської національностей. Список осіб затверджених до переселення в Польщу), арк. 2 а.

²³ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках ХХ століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 884.

²⁴ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 61.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, арк. 66, 67, 78, 92.

²⁶ Пронь Т. *Репатріація польського населення з Південно-Східних та Центральних областей Української РСР у Польщу у 1944-1951 роках*, Україна – Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість, К., 2010 – 2011, Вип. 3-4, С. 184.

evacuate from the Izmail region, the applicants Nazaruk, Zagrebel'ny, Hryshchuk, Koval', Koval'chuk, Medvedyuk, Moroz, Stepanyuk, Yanyshyna, etc. checkout lists²⁷. This circumstance gives grounds to assert that the main selection criterion was not the ethnic origin of the person, but the existence of legal grounds to renew/obtain the citizenship of the Republic of Poland.

In addition to the formation of evacuation lists, the regional commission was to take care of the organizational and technical support of repatriation. As noted above, the implementation of such measures was prescribed by government instructions. They detailed the need to provide the evacuees with clothing and footwear, food, and the size of the property and livestock they had taken out. On January 21, 1946, Ishmael received another instruction, which was sent to D. Bychenko, head of the Resettlement Department under the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR, and A. Alexandrov, head of the Soviet delegation to the mixed Soviet-Polish evacuation commission. It required the recording of data on the availability of echelons, health care, currency exchange, delivery of cash and bonds, and so on²⁸.

The regional commission also received clarifications on the rules of procedure in the carriages during the trip. According to the established norm, 20-25 people with hand luggage were to be accommodated in a two-axle car. Although in some cases individual travel to Poland was allowed. It was forbidden to carry flammable substances, the uninterrupted supply of food by the chief of the echelon, including once a day hot food. A separate section of the instruction concerned the medical and sanitary characteristics of the evacuation. In particular, the following quantitative and qualitative support by medical staff was established. For a party of 200-500 people – 1 paramedic, for 500-1000 people – a paramedic and a nurse, for more than 1000 evacuees – a doctor, a paramedic and a nurse. Sanitary treatment of cars was also planned²⁹.

An important place in determining the rules of evacuation of Polish citizens was occupied by the rules of the order of admission of property and monetary savings of this category of people. The USSR government restricted the export of fur clothing and hats, gold, silver and platinum products, black caviar, pets, stamps, photographs, and works of art. It was forbidden to export furs, carpets, grand pianos and pianos, weapons, military equipment, precious metals and other items. Repatriates could exchange for zlotys no more than 1,000 rubles. The existing surplus had to be handed over to the cash desks of the State Bank with the subsequent crediting of this amount to the personal account. State loan bonds were also to be handed over at the box office. The instruction provided that the reimbursement of sums of money would take

²⁷ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 66, 67, 78, 92.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, арк. 3, 11.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, арк. 12-13, 21-22, 24.

place after the conclusion of an agreement between the governments of Poland and the USSR³⁰.

All organizational measures (echelons, personnel, transportation of people and their property to the places of loading cars, postal, telegraph and cultural and educational services, etc.) were to be carried out by the regional commission and controlled by the NKVD. The estimate was formed based on three types of costs – organizational, transport, extreme needs. At the same time, the initial financing of repatriation was entrusted to the local budget, with subsequent submission of reports to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR (through the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR) "for reimbursement from the union budget". The total estimate for evacuation measures in the Izmail region was calculated in the amount of 79 thousand rubles³¹.

Despite preparatory work and a detailed algorithm of action, the evacuation from the Danube did not begin in early 1946. Although since the beginning of that year, the Polish leadership has been particularly interested in accelerating the resettlement of its citizens as the deportation of Germans from the northwestern voivodships. Polish repatriates from the USSR had to settle in depopulated areas, so the evacuation had to be carried out on a permanent basis, despite the winter conditions³².

In a memorandum on the preparation for resettlement of former Polish citizens from the neighboring Odesa region, the head of the NKGB-MGB of the USSR in Odesa region, Colonel D. Levin, said that as of January 4, 1946, the repatriation of 2,550 people did not begin due to lack of cars³³. This fully applies to the situation in the Izmail region, because in the relevant reports and telegrams of S. Vaganov to Kyiv and Moscow repeatedly emphasized the lack of transport resources to solve the tasks³⁴.

This correspondence dates back to February 1946, when the regional commission has finally determined the required number of cars for transporting people, livestock and property. Summary data show that the Polish population subject to repatriation lived in three districts of the Izmail region – Artsyz, Borodino and Tarutyn. First of all, in the villages founded by German colonists (at least 12 settlements out of 21), which were deported by the Soviet

³⁰ Ibidem, арк. 26-29.

³¹ Ibidem, арк. 22-23, 39.

³² Цепенда І. *Українсько-польські відносини 40-50-х років XX століття: етнополітичний аналіз*, К., 2009, С. 181.

³³ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках XX століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 682, 790.

³⁴ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 45-47, 52.

Taras Vintkovskyi
 REPATRIATION OF THE POLISH POPULATION FROM THE IZMAIL REGION IN 1945-1946
 (ACCORDING TO THE STATE ARCHIVES OF THE ODESA REGION)

authorities in 1940³⁵. More than half of them lived in Tarutyn district, mostly in the villages of Maloyaroslavets, Hannivka, Borodino, Klyastnytsia. The total number of potential evacuees was estimated at 2,634, including 1,400 adults, which was higher than in December 1945, as discussed above. More information in the table³⁶:

Name of districts and villages	Adults	Children under 18 years	Children under 1 year
<u>Tarutynsky</u>			
Klyastnytsia (now Vesela Dolyna)	65	97	9
Kylm (now Pidhirne)	35	111	6
Amara (now Dolynske)	38	96	4
Katzbach (now Luzhanka)	3	59	3
Parizh (now Veseliy Kut, Artsyz district)	7	31	1
Krasne	8	16	-
Maloyaroslavets	32	192	5
<i>Total families – 397</i>	<i>08</i>	<i>602</i>	<i>28</i>
<u>Borodinsky</u>			
Hannivka	38	164	4
Borodino	12	150	2
Plachinda		5	1
Furativka (now Saratsky district)	4	52	2
Semisotka (now Saratsky district)		10	1
Lunga (no longer exists)		4	-
Saratsyka (now either Novosilka or Matildivka, Tarutyn district)		-	-

³⁵ Михайлуца М. І. Південна Бессарабія: рік радянізації і перші дні війни, Краєзнавство : науковий журнал, 2011, № 2, С. 65.

³⁶ Держархів Одеської області, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 38.

Filipivka		-	-
Hofnungstal (now Nadezhdivka, Tarutyn district)	3	12	-
Capralia		8	-
<i>Total families – 212</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>405</i>	<i>10</i>
<u>Artsyzy</u>			
Plotsk	0	8	1
Noviy Artsyz (now Vyshnyiaki)		6	-
Friedenstal (now Myrнопil)	2	53	-
Fershengenoise	5	119	2
<i>Total families – 87</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>186</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>In total – 687 families</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>1193</i>	<i>41</i>

It should be noted that the order of wagons was carried out for 2700 people, apparently also taking into account the accompanying staff and bearing in mind a certain amount of transport “for stock”. Therefore, S. Vaganov in the draft version asked the management to allocate 108 cars (2700: 25) for the needs of repatriates. And for transportation of 340 horses, 950 heads of cattle, 684 tons of property, 200 kg of fodders in addition 232 cars. A total of 340 cars were to be combined into 8 echelons. But in a telegram sent to Moscow on February 27, 1946, addressed to D. Bychenko and A. Alexandrov, the commissioner of the Soviet delegation for the Izmail region indicated an already adjusted figure of 323 cars. They were to be divided between two locations – Berezino (283 units, 92 – for people, 116 – for livestock, 75 – for property) and Artsyz (40 units, 13+16+10³⁷). Other indicators turned out to be somewhat different – 1374 tons of cargo (2 tons per family). Of these, 522 tons for 1332 horses and cattle, another 852 tons for fodder, furniture and other things³⁸.

The central government was not fully prepared to implement its commitments under the Polish-Soviet agreements in due time. After all, Moscow managed to allocate for the Izmail region only 120 cars from the capacity of the Chisinau railway³⁹, which was significantly less than the

³⁷ У підрахунки С. Ваганова вкралася помилка на одну позицію.

³⁸ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 44-45, 52.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, арк. 45.

identified needs and made it impossible to evacuate in a short period of time. The situation was complicated by the additional burden on transport costs, as a group of evacuees from Moldova also had to come to Berezino. The total number of repatriates from this point was equal to 1229 people. They were planned to be accommodated in 60 cars and sent on February 21. The second group, numbering 1,300 people, was to leave for Poland from Artsyz on February 25 in 60 carriages. In both cases, the route remained unchanged – Bessarabka – Chisinau – Ungeny – Ocnita – Sniatyn – Stanislav – Khodoriv – L'viv – Medica⁴⁰.

As we can see, the total number of repatriates from both points reached 2,529 people, 105 people less than the data prepared by the Izmail Regional Commission. Archival documents do not provide an opportunity to answer questions about the immediate causes of mathematical disagreement. At the same time, taking as a basis the formula used by S. Vaganov, we can conclude that the number of cars allocated by the government of the USSR was enough only for transportation of people (2529: 25=101 cars). The remaining 19 cars were catastrophically small for transporting livestock and property. As a result, the repatriates were delayed.

In order to help resolve the issue of transport, S. Vaganov not only consulted with the central institutions, but on February 28, 1946, sent a letter to Ivanov, an official of the USSR government, substantiating his own calculations and stating that he had asked Moscow the day before to provide an additional 200 cars⁴¹. As the families of the evacuees arrived at the departure points, who, due to winter conditions, food and medicine shortages, could not wait for a long time for the supply of railway trains, the situation could become uncontrollable.

The unsatisfactory condition of the rolling stock of the Chisinau Railway led to the fact that even the 120 cars identified by Moscow at the beginning of the spring of 1946 were not found. The repatriates from Tarutyn district were given only 40 cars (later this figure could increase to 54 units) for 111 families. 3 more families from Ferschengenois at the last moment refused to leave their place of residence. The state of the evacuation is also evidenced by the remarks of the responsible persons that the evacuated population is not provided with medicines. The Tarutyn echelon was supposed to leave on the night of March 1-2, but was most likely delayed for a day, because the telegram of the responsible employee, dated March 5, 1946, stated March 3⁴².

We assume that the outlined group of people was mentioned in S. Vaganov's telegram to D. Bychenko dated March 9, where it was reported that on March 3, 430 people (110 families) left Berezino in an echelon consisting of

⁴⁰ Ibidem, apk. 33-34.

⁴¹ Ibidem, apk. 46-47.

⁴² Ibidem, apk. 32, 55.

58 cars. After all, both the date of departure and the total number of families correlate with the above figures. An important remark of the commissioner for the Izmail region was the thesis that 1,872 people (499 families) with property remained to be sent from Berezino. Therefore, he asked Moscow and Kyiv to speed up the supply of an additional 230 cars to the station⁴³. As of March 2, an echelon of 40 cars was formed in Artsyz district, which accommodated 309 people (73 families), who set off on the same day⁴⁴.

As of April 1, 1946, A. Pavlov, Deputy Head of the NKDB-MGB Department of the Ukrainian SSR of the Izmail Region, used slightly different figures for repatriates. In the certificate prepared for the Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR S. Savchenko, he stated that 3,040 applications for departure were being processed. Of these, 1,640 adults and 1,400 minors wanted to leave the region. But 2,610 Poles (1,270 adults and 1,340 children) received appropriate certificates for the right to leave the country. The remaining 430 citizens failed to prove their Polish origin, so they have so far been refused (170 adults and 260 children), but their cases are still pending. Seven people voluntarily refused to leave after processing the documents. In the end, according to A. Pavlov, 816 repatriates (380 adults and 436 minors) left the Danube lands. Thus, the statistics of the head of the NKDB-MGB Department of the Ukrainian SSR differed in the direction of increase by 77 people from that provided by S. Vaganov. The lieutenant colonel's information about the presence of 5 evacuated Soviet agents was no less important, although he treated them as "inferior" personnel who were not even given passwords⁴⁵.

The answer of the head of the Resettlement Department under the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR D. Bychenko at the request of S. Vaganov, as well as information from A. Pavlov in the above reference, only confirmed the unreality of the resettlement action in a short time. Because they promised to provide an additional batch of cars either in the second half of March or in April. Although almost 2,000 people remained in Berezino without food⁴⁶ and with a sense of uncertainty.

The representative of the Polish delegation in Izmail, F. Yasinsky, also drew attention to the critical situation with some repatriates. In a telegram dated April 2, 1946, to the head of the Polish delegation to the Council of Ministers

⁴³ Ibidem, арк. 59, 93.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, арк. 31.

⁴⁵ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках XX століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 750.

⁴⁶ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 58, 93; *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках XX століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 750.

of the USSR, G. Volpe, he reported that “the sending of people was delayed for the second month due to the lack of carriages”. He then asked to raise the issue of allocating 250 cars. As his request was ignored, on April 8 F. Yasinsky again appealed to G. Volpe to respond to the previous telegram⁴⁷.

But this time, too, Moscow lacked efficiency. Only in mid-April did the relevant structures dare to name the next approximate dates for sending the remaining repatriates to the Medica station. Thus, on April 18, the chairman of the Izmail Regional Executive Committee, K. Ananko, sent a telegram to the chiefs of the Chisinau Railway, Colonels Gordelyan and D. Bychenko, with a request to submit 200 cars to the Berezino station in May. They were to form 3 echelons, which will continue to evacuate people with an interval of 2-3 days. D. Bychenko confirmed the specified date and volume of resources⁴⁸. Finally, on May 6⁴⁹, the last stage of transporting the Polish population home began. For example, from Berezino station at 6.30. On May 7, 1946, an echelon (47 cars) with 280 people from the Borodino district left⁵⁰.

In the case file of the State Archives of Odesa region, we did not find the final report on the completion of evacuation measures and the fate of about one and a half thousand more people who were preparing to leave. But the collection of documents, published by the joint efforts of Ukrainian and Polish historians, contains valuable information on the end of repatriation from the Izmail region. The note of the new head of the NKDB-MGB Department of the Ukrainian SSR of the Izmail region, Colonel of State Security P. Krylov, reported that 2,600 people (1,262 adults and 1,338 minors) had left for Poland. The regional commission denied entry to another 420 citizens (159 adults), whose documents continued to be checked. He set the deadline for May 9, 1946⁵¹, possibly the arrival of the last echelon in Medica that day.

The final official reports were prepared by the UVR UM of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR by mid-summer 1946. According to the head of the OVIR UM MVD of the USSR lieutenant colonel Tyshchenko from December 1945 considered applications 2921 people (786 families, 1677 adults, 1244 children under 14 years) departure from the Izmail region to Poland. Relevant institutions approved the evacuation of 2,582 people (712 families, 1,550 adults, 1,032 children under the age of 14). Of these, 2,553 former

⁴⁷ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 94, 97.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, арк. 95-96, 98.

⁴⁹ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках ХХ століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 816.

⁵⁰ *Держархів Одеської області*, ф. Р-7746, оп. 1, спр. 11, арк. 101.

⁵¹ *Польща та Україна у тридцятих – сорокових роках ХХ століття. Невідомі документи з архівів спеціальних служб*, Варшава, Київ, 2000, Том 2. Переселення поляків та українців 1944-1946, С. 816.

citizens of the USSR left in organized echelons (704 families, 1,537 adults, 1,016 children under the age of 14)⁵².

The remaining 29 people apparently got in separate groups, because they could not leave Ukraine for various reasons – illness, search for relatives, education, etc. To the category of those who were denied the right to leave (339 people), Soviet special services included not only ethnic Ukrainians, but also the so-called “accounting element from among the local Poles”, who in the opinion of the relevant structures had no legal grounds to renounce Soviet citizenship. Some of them have been the subject of operational development for the detection and liquidation of foreign agencies, interception of communication channels, etc⁵³. After the end of the evacuation measures, the governments of the Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR signed the relevant Protocol on May 6, 1947. On the same day, a government communiqué was issued stating that the evacuation was “completed in an atmosphere of mutual understanding”⁵⁴.

Thus, the repatriation of the Polish population from the Izmail region took place within the framework of national policy aimed at solving both domestic and foreign policy problems. In particular, strengthening the Kremlin’s geopolitical influence on the leadership of the Republic of Poland. At the same time, the population exchange between Poland and the USSR should not be interpreted exclusively within the framework of the formation of monoethnic border regions. After all, it also covered remote areas of the Ukrainian SSR, in particular, Izmail. Therefore, it is worth agreeing with the conclusions of a number of Ukrainian historians that the whole set of measures should be interpreted dichotomously – as a repatriation-deportation action. After all, in contrast to the population of the contact regions of the border, who were forced to leave their traditional places of residence, former citizens of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were given the opportunity to return home from the Danube. The coercion against the Poles of Galicia and other adjacent territories did not apply to the population of Izmail.

Preparatory measures in the Danube lands were carried out mostly in the second half of 1945, after the signing on July 6, 1945 of the Agreement between the governments of the USSR and Poland on the mutual evacuation of the population. The first meeting of the Izmail regional commission headed by S. Vaganov took place on December 10, 1945. According to the considered applications by December 20, 1945 the lists of those wishing to leave the territory of the USSR were formed. They included 2,634 people from three districts of the region, and this figure allows us to define the Izmail region as

⁵² *Ibidem*, C. 858.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, C. 885-886, 890.

⁵⁴ *В інтересах миру і дружби між народами. Міжнародноправова діяльність Української РСР. 1945-1972. Документи і коментарі*, К., Вища школа, 1974, С. 63-64.

one, which was home to one of the largest groups of former Polish citizens deported to the USSR since the beginning of World War II. According to the State Archives of Odesa region, they lived in 21 settlements of Tarutyn, Borodino and Artsyz districts, where they moved in 1944. Their temporary residence was mostly villages founded by German colonists, who were deported by the Soviet authorities in 1940.

The immediate start of transportation of the controlled population began in early March 1946, when the first group of people left the Danube region. The lack of carriages led to the prolongation of evacuation measures until the beginning of May 1946. Several dozen people could later leave the Izmail region individually. The total number of repatriates from various sources ranges from 2582 to 2600 people, which almost coincided with the previously approved lists. Another 400 citizens were denied the right to leave, citing their Ukrainian origin. As a result, by the summer of 1946, the relevant authorities of the Izmail region had completed the implementation of the Soviet-Polish agreement on mutual exchange of population, and most of the Polish population had been repatriated to their homeland. whom I cannot get proper clothes out of my modest salary (Lei 4,811)”⁵⁵. The former translator of the Romanian Legation in Petrograd asked compensations of Lei 21,385, after leaving the diplomatic mission along with other Romanian diplomats in January 1918. He failed to get this amount the second time around, too. The answer received was anything but encouraging: there were no funds for compensations and he was advised to wait for “more auspicious times”⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, București (AMAE), Fund 71/1914 E2, file 75, p. 457.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 458.



HASTILUDE, TOURNAMENTS, AND HERALDRY AS KEY FACTORS FOR THE RISE AND SPREAD OF KNIGHTHOOD IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE DURING THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES

Miguel Pablo SANCHO GÓMEZ*

Abstract: In this article, we try to draw a line of argument to explain the birth and development of several closely related phenomena such as tournaments, (with its important sports and social attributes), cavalry, and heraldry. Although the tournament and its variants had a marked character of military training, at the end of the period they became phenomena of social and political importance, although the competitive spirit was never lost. The growing formation of medieval noble retinues and the importance of cavalry led also to the proliferation of personal badges and emblems, which were finally ruled and organized by heraldic science. Both the blazons and individual knight disputes and / or between teams needed experienced judges and referees, so we will also mention the origin of the King of Arms and the heralds, figures in charge of such a task, and will try to illustrate the vision of the Church on such phenomena, as well as its reflection in the literary sources.

Keywords: cavalry; joust; tourney; heraldry; medieval; sports; King of Arms; heralds

1. Introduction

The quintessential expression of aristocratic leisure activities during an important part of the period were tournaments and joust games, featuring both social and sportive ceremonies with broad ramifications and close ties with key concepts such as hunts, heraldry, war and politics¹. Thus, hastilude also became a main part of such armigerous background in the West².

* Universidad Católica de Murcia, Spain. mpsanchog@ucam.edu

¹ See useful overviews in Simon Barton, *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997; Andrew Cowell, *The Medieval Warrior Aristocracy: Gifts, Violence, Performance, and the Sacred*. Boydell & Brewer, Cambridge, 2007.

² See Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III*. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 1999, p. 34; the term is referring to many kinds of martial games. The word comes from the Latin *hastiludium*, literally “lance game”. The better-known hastiludes are the tournaments, although there were also other medieval games. See Juliet Barker, *The Tournament in England: 1100–1400*. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 1986, pp. 138-139.

Nevertheless, even such facets of life were included in the much wider spectrum of medieval practices and customs. To show the involvement of aristocratic attitude with tournaments, evidence highlights the key role of warfare in shaping the image of Chivalry and its progression. Despite clerical admonition and recurring papal ban, the chivalric ethos got its main aims through tournaments and jousts. Several authors tried to insufflate Christian values and the service of God in such ceremonies, much before Ramon Llull (c. 1232- c. 1315) developed his main ideas about the topic in his *Book of the Order of Chivalry* between 1279 and 1283³. However, such attempts tended to be fruitless. Actually, the mounted fighter self-awareness goes back in time, anticipating the creation of the first Military Orders. The Knights Templar, active around 1119, grew together with the birth of chivalric consciousness but separate from the main result of its way of life and knightly thought, the tournament⁴.

2. Development of Knighthood

The word knight, from Old English *cniht* (“servant”) is a cognate of the German word *Knecht* (“bondsman”)⁵. The functional position of the knight as an armoured mounted warrior evolved in France long before it was introduced into England by the Norman conquest, and from about 800 onwards was represented in vulgar Latin by the word *caballerius* — whence all of the Romance words for it were derived, beginning with the Old French. The Old English *cniht*, which before the Conquest of 1066 had been associated with the military retainers of the English thegns, was respelled and adopted as the normal designation in the now inferior language of England as the equivalent of the Norman *chevalier* — the word presumably employed by all English knights themselves until the Thirteenth Century. In the Germanic dialects of the continent, the cognate words of the *knecht* family were by contrast attached to the inferior position represented

³ See Llull, *The Book of the Order of Chivalry / Llibre de l'Ordre de Cavalleria / Libro de la Orden de Caballeria. Introduction and translation into English and Spanish by A. Cortijo Ocaña*. John Benjamins Publishing, Philadelphia, 2015. See also Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 275-280.

⁴ For the Templars, see Terence Wise & Gerry Embleton, *Armies of the Crusades*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 1978; Alan J. Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries*. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1992; Malcolm Barber (ed.), *The Military Orders: fighting for the Faith and caring for the sick*. Routledge, London, 1994; Fernando Pozas, *La caballeria medieval y el ideal templario*. Editorial Ojeda, Barcelona, 2012; Helen Nicholson & Wayne Reynolds, *Knight Templar 1120-1312*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2004; Helen Nicholson, *The Military Orders*, In Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), “A Companion to Chivalry”, Boydell & Brewer; Woodbridge, 2019. pp. 69–84.

⁵ Friedrich Kluge, *An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language*, translated by John Francis Davis. G. Bell & Sons, London, 1981. p. 182; Heinrich Mutschmann *The Place-Names of Nottinghamshire: Their Origin and Development*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 78.

in Old French by *escuier* and in Middle English by *scuier*, and the words for 'knight' were based on the quite unrelated word *ridder*. Originally the German term depicts some kind of unfree or subjugation state, that remained later in the *ministeriales* of the Holy Roman Empire⁶.

As early as the Anglo-Saxon Ninth Century, it evolved from meaning a simple servant or humble young person, to become the household retainers. From these beginnings of the feudal man offering his service, to the modern-day image of the knight, little time passes. After 1000, we find it used to describe a rider, escorting his lord and fighting on horseback. Thus, the early knight is not a member of a specific social class and has no rank. His mission and background are primarily at a military and tactical level. Flori reconstructed the process by which the simple knights came later to be included in the theoretical 'Order' of Warriors, invented around 1030, and originally restricted to princes. The members of this societal order took up the responsibilities (at least theoretically) to protect the kingdom, the Church, and the weak that until then had been restricted to the king himself. In reality, as far as we can tell from contemporary complaints about their behaviour, most knights ignored completely this set of duties, along with those required by their common Christian faith⁷.

The word *chevalier* (*caballero* in Spanish), which appears later in France around 1100, has approximately the same military meaning⁸. Coming from the Vulgar Latin, this word will stick around amid the new social and political trends of the age, forming the core for the new armed and mounted class. The ritual and symbolic knighting ceremony appears around 1300 as consequence of ongoing social changes; the word "kighthood" came to represent the rank or dignity of a knight⁹.

The old Germanic tradition of handing weapons to the youngest men in the tribe is present in the kighthood ceremonies, when a future knight gets his

⁶ Benjamin Arnold, *German Knighthood, 1050-1300*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, pp. 53-76; Peter Coss, *The Origins and Diffusion of Chivalry*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 7-38.

⁷ See Benjamin Arnold, *German...*, pp. 100-140; Robards Brooks, *The Medieval Knight at War*. Barnes & Noble Books, London, 1997; Jean Flori, *Ricardo Corazon de Leon*. Edhasa, Barcelona, 2008, pp. 293-319; Roman J. Jarmowycz. *Cavalry from Hoof to Track*. Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, (CT.), & London, 2008, pp. 34-55; Peter Sposato & Samuel Claussen, *Chivalric Violence*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 99-118.

⁸ Joachim Bumke, *The Concept of Knighthood in the Middle Ages*. Translated by W. T. H. Jackson and Erika Jackson. (AMS Studies in the Middle Ages, number 2). AMS, New York, 1982, p. 16; Robert W. Jones, *Marshalling the Chivalric Elite for War*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry". Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 85-98.

⁹ Jean Flori, *Caballeros y caballería en la Edad Media*. Paidós, Barcelona, 2001, pp. 33-46; David Simpkin, *The Organisation of Chivalric Society*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 39-56.

chivalric outfit and gear, amongst other festivities and a solemn mass¹⁰. It was in Germany where the word *ritter* evolves from the early concepts of a mounted retainer to the fully developed concept of a knightly class reaching the nobility with full awareness of their interests and aims¹¹. The Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) with its many scenarios, multiple characters and the sheer amount of military campaigns, pitched battles, sieges and minor skirmishes, was an essential feature, not only at a political level, but also for the spreading of tournament games and the knightly class. After many generations of sharing the armies and fields together, knights from Burgundy, France, England, Spain, Scotland, the Low Countries and Germany forged common bonds and a strong commitment and camaraderie thanks to Chivalry¹².

Thus the word *miles*, with its Latin and Roman roots, was a generic term. The warrior fighters in medieval society got the label of *milites*, but progressively the word went together with the concept of chivalry, and by the Twelfth Century ended up meaning the noble knights in a broad sense.¹³

Therefore, we can glimpse three essential concepts that created the concept of knighthood: first of all, the household personnel on horseback, secondly the Germanic traditions concerning service with arms within a retinue, and finally the Christian (and to a lesser degree Roman) amalgam, working to put together all these traits. The process took place in the successor lands of the Barbarian Kingdoms in the West, where such key concepts lead us to the Aristocratic values held since then¹⁴.

3. The Tournament. Origins and Role

The first events traced back as the forerunners of the tournaments are certain ceremonies held in Frankish times; periodical mustering of feudal armies and parades in front of the Merovingian kings bore a remote resemblance with the posterior image of the tourneys. The *buhurt*, a kind of military game originated in Germany, it is also a close precedent¹⁵.

¹⁰ Joachim Bumke, *Courtly Culture: Literature and Society in the High middle Ages*. Translated by Thomas Dunlap. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991, pp. 231–233; Jean Flori, *Caballeros...*, pp. 15-26; Ralph Moffat, *Arms and Armour*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 159-186.

¹¹ Joachim Bumke, *The Concept...*, pp. 9-22.

¹² See Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War. England and France at War c. 1300 - c. 1450*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 6-36.

¹³ Jean Flori, *Ricardo...*, p. 305. Joachim Bumke, *Höfische Kultur: Literatur und Gesellschaft im hohen Mittelalter*. DTV, Munich, 1986; See also Maurice Keen, *Chivalry*. New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 102-103 and 107-113.

¹⁴ Benjamin Arnold, *German...*, pp. 22-53; William K. Kibler, *Medieval France: An Encyclopaedia*. Garland Publishing, London & New York, 1995, p. 969.

¹⁵ Games were also known as *bohört* or *béhourd*. Richard W. Barber & Juliet R. V. Barker, *Tournaments: Jousts, Chivalry and Pageants in the Middle Ages*. Woodbridge, Boydell Press,

We also have examples, which date back to Hellenistic or Late Roman times, of combat training or exercises to show skills and prowess at arms both on foot and on horseback. However, the genesis of our subject brought clear marks pointing to medieval societies and the Carolingian cultural background then predominant in North-western Europe, although the concept itself seems older¹⁶. R. Barber stated, “it harks back to the military games which Tacitus describes among the German tribes, but the exact development of these into mock warfare remains uncharted”¹⁷.

Around the year 1062, we can glimpse the first signs suggesting the early precedents of a gathering with sport and competition purposes concerning the military and riding skills, although this date and the name of the supposed “inventor” of the tourney, Godfrey of Preully, seem to be a patent fraud¹⁸.

The idea of “turning” (from the Latin *tornare*, “to turn”) fits with the prior image of a circuit of meetings all along the realms and lordships in the West, a reality well established by 1150. In the beginning, this tournament had no variations, relying exclusively on the *mêlée* concept¹⁹.

The wielding of a lance, charges with horses, and the use of stirrups and heavy armour represented the trademarks of Norman warfare, the most successful at its time, so, mounted warriors would be obviously seeking new opportunities to obtain such skills. Therefore, games and sports related to lances and riding could be interesting and useful ways of doing it²⁰. Nevertheless, although the martial characteristics are evident, we are primarily talking about mostly unadulterated sport²¹.

Our first reliable tournament dates only from the year 1127, in Wurzburg. However, it is reasonable to infer that this was a process, which started in the middle of the Eleventh Century and continued until its final form. Roger of Hoveden (fl. 1174–1201) defined *torneamentum* as “military exercises carried out,

1989; Sebastien Nadot, *Rompez les lances! Chevaliers et tournois au Moyen Age*. Editions Autrement, Paris, 2010, pp. 2-10.

¹⁶ See Katherine Welch, *The Roman arena in Late-Republican Italy: a new interpretation*, “Journal of Roman Archaeology”, 7 (1994), pp. 59-80; Tim J. Cornell, *On War and Games in the Ancient World*, in Tim J. Cornell & Thomas B. Allen (eds.), “War and Games”, Boydell Press Rochester (NJ.) & Woodbridge, 2002, pp. 37-58.

¹⁷ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, p. 160. See as well Tacitus, *Germania* I 24.

¹⁸ Noted to be a bogus. See Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp. 160 ff.

¹⁹ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p. 163; Richard W. Kaeuper, *Medieval Chivalry*, pp. 208-232.

²⁰ Joachim Bumke, *The Concept...*, pp. 22-46; David Nicolle & Angus McBride, *The Normans*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 1987; Jean Flori, *Ricardo...*, pp. 307-308.

²¹ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p. 159: “Yet tournaments must be firmly classified as sport, despite their military and political overtones, in that they very quickly became an end in themselves: although spectators of all classes were present at tournaments, they were primarily for the enjoyment of the participants”. Cf. Jean Flori, *Bohemundo de Antioquia*. Edhasa, Barcelona, 2009, pp. 25-37.

not in the knight's spirit of hostility (*nullo interveniente odio*), but solely for practice and the display of prowess (*pro solo exercitio, atque ostentatione virium*)”²². Hoveden, together with Geoffrey Chaucer (c.1343-1400) and Jean Froissart (c. 1337-c. 1405) were the essential authors for the literary development of Chivalry²³. It is necessary to remark the fruitful function played in the spreading of such new trends by some early literary characters whose stories become essential pieces in forming the base and functions of Chivalric culture; Chrétien de Troyes (fl. c. 1160–c. 1183), needs to be mentioned here²⁴.

It is possible to get awareness of the early popularity of these sporting practices. In 1091, William and Robert Rufus were camped on a beach in Normandy, besieging the famous monastery of Mont-Saint-Michel, and tournaments between besiegers and defenders were organised for entertainment during the dull moments. When the tide was low, groups of knights crossed the pickets to hold knightly competitions in the sand²⁵. Such a sportive confraternity above the belligerent measures of war brings us to the idea of a new class with bonds stronger than mere political interest.

Tournaments usually started on Mondays or Tuesdays; by doing so there was plenty of time for the different events and celebrations to end before the coming of the truce and peace of the sacred days, when fighting halted. However, we have evidence of tourneys that took place even on Sundays.

The increasing difficulty to wage baronial wars in England, due to the centralization and extended powers of the monarchs, made the tournaments in Northern France the only way to look for new riches amongst most knightly retinues²⁶. Kings, although displeased with the political ramifications that

²² See Robert Coltman Clephan, *The Tournament: Its Periods and Phases*. Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, New York, 1967, p. 247.

²³ See John Gardner, *The Life & Times of Chaucer*. Open Road Media, New York, 2010; Jean Froissart, *Cronicas. Edición a cargo de V. Cirlot y J. E. Ruiz Domenec*. Ediciones Siruela, Madrid, 1988; Richard W. Kaeuper, *Literature as Essential Evidence for Understanding Chivalry*, in Richard W. Kaeuper & Christopher Guyol, "Kings, Knights and Bankers. The Collected Articles of Richard W. Kaeuper", Brill, Leiden, 2015, pp. 204-220; Joana Bellis & Megan Leitch, *Chivalric Literature*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 241-262.

²⁴ See, for the key role of the character, Marcelle Altieri, *Les Romans de Chrétien de Troyes: Leur perspective proverbiale et gnomique*. A. G. Nizet, Paris, 1976; Jean Frappier, Raymond J. Cormier, *Chrétien de Troyes: The Man and His Work*. Ohio University Press, Athens (OH.), 1982.

²⁵ William II of England, King between 1087 and 1100; Robert III (Curthose), was the Duke of Normandy from 1087 until 1106, and unsuccessfully claimant to the throne of England. See David Crouch, *The Normans. The History of a Dynasty*. Hambledon Continuum, New York & London, 2007, pp. 136 and 164.

²⁶ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p.160; Matthew Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 104-112.

tourneys may bring, and restless because of the gatherings of numerous armed men, were often as enthusiastic, as knights themselves, about such games. In this way, already Henry I (1100-1135) liked to leave his kingdom periodically, to attend the tournament circuit in France²⁷. Soon after him, Henry, known as “the Young King”, became the most important patron of the tournament world, hand in hand with Phillip I, count of Flanders (1143-1191)²⁸.

It is in this knightly society, where chivalric fashion and behaviour flooded every aspect of Aristocratic life, in which the key figure of William Marshal appeared²⁹. Sent to the continent by his uncle, the earl of Salisbury, he joined the brilliant retinue of William of Tancarville, one of the most important Norman lords tied to the king of England and known as a “Father of Knights”³⁰. After becoming renowned in the circuit of France, he ended up in the entourage of the Young King, always surrounded himself with a large number of knights; his proverbial *larguesse* was in fact proof of his Chivalric way of life, and one of the reasons for his economic shortages and subsequent downfall.

The overall experience of William Marshal with Henry was good, although several moments of great stress and tensions arose. But the rebel son, already ill and on the verge of collapse, made amends both with his friend William and his father the old king, and died repentant and in peace, yet penniless. However, on his deathbed he gave his Crusader and pilgrim cloak to the Marshal, asking him to fulfil the frivolously made vow to visit Jerusalem. William took the duty as a personal task and accomplished the will of the Young King. This brings us a good measure of the true feelings between these two men and the chivalric code of behaviour active in the Plantagenet circles³¹. Needless to say, this case

²⁷ In the beginning kings forbade to call a tourney in England, so the knights went overseas to Normandy and France to join the circuit. Paul E. Szamach, Teresa M. Tavormina, & Thomas J. Rosenthal (eds.), *Medieval England. An Encyclopaedia*. Garland, New York, 1998, p. 178. Later, Richard I identified six sites for allowed tournaments, and gave a scale of fees by which patrons could pay for a license. The King defied openly the papal ban on tournaments (1194) because he considered such feature as a very valuable training ground for his knights, as well as a profitable source of additional income. See also Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp. 167-168.

²⁸ Matthew Strickland, *Henry the Young King, 1155-1183*. New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 2016, pp. 239-258. See also Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 93-97.

²⁹ See Georges Duby, *Guillermo el Mariscal*. Altaya, Barcelona, 1996, pp. 67-95; Richard W. Kaeuper, *Lancelot, and the Issue of Chivalric Identity*, in Richard W. Kaeuper & Christopher Guyol, “Kings, Knights and Bankers. The Collected Articles of Richard W. Kaeuper”, Brill, Leiden, 2015, pp. 221-242.

³⁰ David Crook, *William Marshal. Knighthood, War and Chivalry, 1147-1219*. Routledge, London & New York, 2002, p. 25. Prince Henry (1155 – 1183) got his famous sobriquet because his father actually crowned him king in 1170, at Westminster. See Matthew Strickland, *Henry the Young King...* pp. 34-94.

³¹ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp.164-166.

wasn't the only one: at the heyday of the tourney sport, long private retinues existed, thus enhanced the popularity of the tournament circuit. Nevertheless, the circuit could be a ruinous activity that led to bankruptcy due to the large sums spent on horses, arms and armour, as well as ransoms. On the other hand, a skilled and brave individual had the chance to climb the social ladder, finding powerful patrons and collect a small fortune from prizes and spoils. It was possible to build oneself a very strong household retinue with lesser knights.

Let's use William Marshal again as an eloquent example. Tancarville brought the young Marshal in his retinue to Northern France. Thanks to the profit won in the tournament circuit, he was able to fund his trip back to England³². After roaming Maine and attending tournaments in Le Mans and other towns from 1167 onwards, his cache and wealth had increased, allowing him to look for higher goals. Marshal found an able partner in Roger de Gaugi. Between 1177 and 1179, they captured 103 knights in just ten months, increasing their fortunes notably.

In the next century, other examples flourished and the patronage of young and promising young knights kept on unrestrained. The Hainault dynasty, in close connection with the Plantagenet house, makes a vivid picture of such Aristocratic circles with plenty of chivalric and knightly values. Count William I was renowned as the greatest tournament holders of his era³³.

Courtly politics became closely linked to the tournament circuit and Knightly literary trends, creating a kind of overall Aristocratic culture which was well understood and represented in the lordships and kingdoms from Spain to the Holy Empire and beyond³⁴.

4. Different kinds of Tournaments: evolving through time

Inside the broad term of *tournament*, we can find several different kinds of knightly sports: the first and foremost form of tournament was the *mêlée*. This consisted of a match between two teams and could involve numerous knights on each side. These matches featured rules and penalties. Carried out within a predetermined area, it was a predetermined time limit. There would have been team tactics, and as in every sport, fouls, cheats and tricks. The Count of Flanders

³² David Crouch, *The Image of Aristocracy in Britain, 1000–1300*. Routledge, London & New York, 1992, p. 99.

³³ William I, Count of Hainault (c. 1286 – 1337). See also Jean Devaux, *From the Court of Hainault to the Court of England: the example of Jean Froissart*, in Christopher Allmand (ed.), "War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France", Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2000, pp. 9-10: "over a period of some thirty years, count William proved to be one of the greatest organizers of jousts and pas d'armes in northern Europe".

³⁴ See Johannes Laudage & Yvonne Leiverkus (eds.), *Rittertum und höfische Kultur der Stauferzeit*. Böhlau Verlag, Köln, 2006; Teófilo F. Ruiz, *A King Travels: Festive Traditions in Late Medieval and Early Modern Spain*. Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2012, pp. 210 ff.

used to hold his retinue of knights until the other teams wore out, joining the match with fresh strength and thus winning easy captives and ransoms³⁵. Other times contests got out of control, becoming brawls, with extensive damage to crops, fields, villages, vineyards and other proprieties. Some forbidden weapons, especially missiles and projectiles, won universal animosity. The crossbow was the utmost despicable and infamous one, regarded as cowardly and villainous by knights.

During the Thirteenth Century, in extreme cases, there might have been up to three thousand men in a *mêlée* and it would have covered a large area. In the Fourteenth Century, tournaments took place in more confined spaces. Sometimes a wooden castle or other defensive facilities be built, with one team attacking it while the other defended.

However, the *mêlée* from older tournaments gave way to jousts. The “joust” was a single combat between two champions and progressively substituted the older style showdown of erratic and often anarchic free-for-all between two knightly groups and their squires³⁶. The term derived from Old French *tijoste*, and already by 1300, it was becoming mainstream on the continent. Much more emphasis relied on the training and development of skills, as it was pure prowess and technique that were essential for winning. Ulrich von Liechtenstein (1200-1278), Austrian knight and minnesinger of great fame, was key in the spreading of this new tournament model. Apart from his celebrated work *Frauendienst*, Ulrich also left us a large collection of other songs and poems, along with interesting information about himself. According to legend, he broke 307 lances at a famous Klosterneuburg contest, in which he remained unbeaten. Thanks to Ulrich himself, jousts were already popular and held in many kingdoms and lordships around 1250, at least in the Holy Roman Empire. It seems that the new game originated in Styria and hence spread around Europe. Around 1400 jousts became mainstream and completely replaced the *mêlée* and other older variations.

The very rules of this new growth of tourney activity made the reliance on special officials indispensable to keep the scores and watch over the increasingly more organised and improved sportive contests. Thus, we can say that with the arrival of the joust, tournaments advanced one-step further in the direction of pure sport, distancing itself from its old connection with warfare. By the end of our period, the meaning of being a jouster became far removed from that of a battlefield knight. In fact, heralds are believed to have emerged quite informally in the later Twelfth Century from the profession of itinerant *jongleurs*, and initially specialized in identifying and praising princes and leading knights in

³⁵ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p.165. We need to note that ruling tournaments meant also the ruling war, to a great effect for lessening its evils.

³⁶ Nigel Saul, *A Companion to Medieval England: 1066-1485*. Tempus, Stroud, 2005, pp. 286-287.

the context of tournaments. They were not attached to royal and princely households, and did not become a recognized profession until various dates after 1400³⁷. Nevertheless, emblematic arms — initially restricted to princes, and only extended to knights in general between about 1190 and 1250 — are more likely to have been the creation of the noble ‘armigers’ themselves, who were still regarded as the principal experts in their ownership and use until the early decades of the Fifteenth Century³⁸.

Regulations by René of Anjou, in 1434, showed the need for a King of Arms to organise and announce contest three or four months in advance. This would allow knights enough time to prepare and travel to participate. In addition, between six and twelve judges oversaw the safe progress of the different contests and the correct qualification of matches. However, new trends also meant drastic changes in the old and primitive significance of the tournament. “*As the joust developed, it came more and more to resemble a rather crude form of fencing match*”³⁹.

The third and last of the most important variations was the “passage of arms” or in French *pas d’armes*, a type of hastilude that evolved around 1380 and popular up to the 1490s. A knight, alone or with his companions, took over a certain location, usually near to crossroads or towns, sending word to any other knights travelling around that they were welcome to fight⁴⁰. We find one of the first examples of the quintessential French knight in the Marshall Jean Le Maingre, better known by his nickname *Boucicaut* (1366-1421)⁴¹. The Spanish Pero Niño (1378-1453), was also a prominent figure in this modality. The knight, or team of knights, stayed in the spot for one month, holding jousts daily with whoever wanted to clash with them⁴². Certainly, it was the final stage of chivalry and knightly values in a world turning into a completely different scenario due to

³⁷ They also seem to have had relatively little to do with the emergence of what since about 1630 have been called ‘heraldic’ arms (and other emblems), and acquired a ‘regulatory’ role only in the fifteenth century and only in a handful of countries, though they probably played a significant role in the creation of the descriptive language now called ‘blazon’ (ideally suited to their needs as tournament criers).

³⁸ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p.167.

³⁹ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p.173. See also Sidney Anglo, *How to Kill a Man at your Ease: Fencing Books and the Duelling Ethic*, in Sidney Anglo (ed.), “Chivalry in the Renaissance”, Boydell Press, Woodbridge [England] & Rochester (NY.), 1990, pp. 1-13, for the developing of medieval knight into modern duellist up to the Seventeenth Century.

⁴⁰ Richard W. Barber, *Chivalry in the Tournament and Pas d’Armes*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), “A Companion to Chivalry” Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 119-138.

⁴¹ The aforementioned “Passage of Arms” dates to 1389. See Robert Coltman Clephan, *The Medieval Tournament*, p. 32 ff.

⁴² See Noel Fallows, *Jousting in Medieval and Renaissance Iberia*. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2010, p. 230.

the emergence of new social classes, firearms and firepower, and the rise of the Modern state. *"From the pas d'armes to the duel it was a short step"*⁴³.

Since a tournament was often a celebration, there would also be dancing, feasting and drinking as well. Tournaments usually took place over three days, with the participants introduced and paraded on the first day, jousting on the second and the tournament itself on the last. There were judges, and prizes to those who had distinguished themselves. It is not clear how they managed to judge a massive mêlée and even the scoring systems varied. Generally, the highest score was for unhorsing an opponent, the second highest for breaking a lance on an opponent, and the lowest for striking the opponent's helmet. The knights usually had three charges at one another. Such a phenomena carried the flourishing of a broad genre of literature and manuals⁴⁴.

We can find very curious and interesting data concerning such events. We hear of a Robert, Lord Morley, attending a London tournament in 1340. Robert himself appeared dressed as the pope, and his retinue knights fought in the jousts wearing cardinal clothes⁴⁵.

5. Rules

Marking the perfect identification with sport, the aforementioned referees and judges worked together in order to signal winners and to keep the scores and plays in the contests. After the joust prevailed, breaking the rival's spears or lances led to high scoring, which sometimes was enough to win the day. Prearranged agreements between the participants could allow the fight to continue after unhorsing; commonly, both knights agreed to resume the match on foot, using swords, maces or clubs. In such situations, and after suffering a severe number of blows, one of the contestants would surrender. In England, and especially after Edward I Longshanks (1272-1307), blunted weapons were mandatory, but fatal accidents could still arise. Nevertheless, after surrendering, the game was over, and knights would go on to the next step (if not badly mauled) to the acts and celebrations of the tournament days, including dancing, feasting and prize giving⁴⁶.

Hard feelings or grudges occurred after heated and disputed matches, but the tournament societies tended to the contrary, that is, a cordial mood and fraternity between knights, even featuring in the statutes of such organisations as compulsory. Such was the case of the famous Round Table, in Flanders; the

⁴³ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, p. 180.

⁴⁴ Matthew Bennett, *Manuals of Warfare and Chivalry*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019 pp. 263-280.

⁴⁵ Maurice Keen, *Origins of the English Gentleman: Heraldry, Chivalry and Gentility in Medieval England, C.1300-c.1500*. Tempus, London, 2002, p. 48.

⁴⁶ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp. 170-171. Edward I regulations (*Statuta Armorum*, 1292) turned tournaments into events patronized and at the service of the Crown.

society held tournaments for three days in a mutual agreement and friendly environment⁴⁷. The lists, palisades, close ranks of knights and the tilts evoke the eternal imagery of the medieval world, as R. Barber noted, “a festival of Chivalry itself”⁴⁸.

More often than not, the whole process ended up with the negotiations for a ransom. Prospect of booty moved a large amount of the participants to gather in distant places and try their luck in order to improve their social or economic positions, which was often weak. This was the key feature that made tournaments profitable and attractive for the lesser knights, although in the same way, it could possibly lead the contestants to complete ruin. Overall, the number of participants and the figure of the errant knight, widespread in our literary sources, make us think that such a financial collapse was far from being the norm, even for the humblest of the attendants.

At the very end of our research period, in 1466, the English nobleman John Tiptoft published a detailed and precise set of rules for the penalties, prizes, scoring and rules that organised the sport thoroughly. Such a late date proves the survival of the knightly tones in Aristocracy that was on the verge of the Renaissance and how the English knight stood firmly in the mentality spectrum before transforming into the Gentleman or courtesan of later dates⁴⁹.

6. Tournaments, Literary Trends, Society and Politics

In feudal societies, one of the main characteristics of the landed nobility was the display and ostentatiousness of status. Therefore, sports and competitions, especially those related to horse riding, hunting, and falconry were common, since they offered the perfect conditions to highlight the noble and knightly virtues. Tournaments followed these steps, and soon it is possible to trace such chivalric gatherings together with other important days in the medieval world. Breeding horses and dogs suitable for aristocratic sports was a mark of distinction worn with pride at all levels and pursued with enthusiasm, not only amongst laymen⁵⁰. The French Pope Clement VI (reigned 1342-1352), “*secular in*

⁴⁷ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp. 174.

⁴⁸ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp. 177.

⁴⁹ For the later developments of tournament see Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France, and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages*. Duckworth, London, 1981, pp. 64-88; also Richard Britnell, *The Closing of the Middle Ages? England, 1471-1529*. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1997; John McClelland, *Body and Mind: Sport in Europe from the Roman Empire to the Renaissance*. Routledge, London, 2007; John A. F. Thomson, *the Transformation of Medieval England 1370-1529*. Routledge, LoLondon, 2014, pp. 93-118. See also Matthew Woodcock, *The End of Chivalry? Survivals and Revivals of the Tudor Age*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), “A Companion to Chivalry”, Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019 pp 281-300.

⁵⁰ David Crouch, *The Image... op. cit.*, pp. 232-236, for the great importance of hunting in Aristocratic society.

outlook, determined rather to rule as a prince than a pope", created a court that R. Barber defines as *"luxurious, profligate and even debauched"*. His royal palace at Avignon had the famous *Chambre du Cerf*, decorated *"with entirely secular frescoes showing the pleasures of hawking, hunting and fishing [...]"* and *"depicted aristocratic falconers"*. Such an example must be a valid one and shows us the expected behaviour tied to the membership of noble society⁵¹.

Retinues for hunting or falconry also meant retinues for hastilude sports as well. The same companions were prone and required to form part of every event of aristocratic society; due to the long time spent together and the many common activities, politics, sports and hunting merged. This way, Richard II used a tournament in London (1390) with the aim of alienating the count of Hainault from the king of France, almost with success⁵².

The armed retinues of mounted men in armour meant to continue warfare through other means. Squires and household troops present at the contests were often joining the fray, if personal issues between lords were pending, with the result of considerable ill feelings and severe political tensions in broad areas. This negative part of tournaments moved even the knightlier and enthusiastic kings to legislate and rule carefully in order to avoid such problems. During weaker reigns, the magnates and their powerful-armed men could create considerable turmoil and political instability⁵³.

As a widespread phenomenon, tournaments had inconveniencies that sometimes could get some sombre tones. Many times, injuries and wounds increased the already high level of violence in some lands. Death of rulers during matches could easily lead to instability or political turmoil. We have many examples in the sources, leading from lesser nobles to very kings. Count Baldwin VII of Flanders (1111-1119) stunned by a blow received during a tournament at Eu, and thus was unable to assist his lord, the king of France Louis VI (1108-1137), in his war against Henry I of England. Due to such wounds he contracted an illness in Abbeville that lead to his death soon after⁵⁴.

However, if the chivalric world was able to develop itself, and knighthood to become a wide and respected social phenomenon throughout Christendom, it was due to not only the military deeds or prowess at warfare or from the sport. The sense of common duty and class from a much broader cultural change

⁵¹ Richard W. Barber, *The Penguin Guide to Medieval Europe*. Penguin Books, London, 1984, pp. 54-57.

⁵² See. Christopher Gravett, *English Medieval Knight 1300-1400*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2002, p. 50.

⁵³ See Saul, *A Companion...*, p. 286: "Tournaments", during John Lackland (1199-1216) and Henry III (1216-1272) reigns *"were being used as a cover for political opposition"*. [...] *"When kingship was weak, tournaments posed a threat to royal authority"*. See also David Crouch, *The Normans...*, p. 111, who stated that tournaments were *"perfect occasions to conspiracies"*.

⁵⁴ David Crouch, *The Normans...*, p. 187.

coming from the appearance of troubadours and *jongleurs*, and to a lesser extent the minnesinger in Germany: a new lay literary class for the first time in many years.

Bertrand de Born (c. 1140 – c. 1215) was key in the development of courtly themes in England, France and the Low Countries. The style and its first adherents were indeed originally from Provence, and had Occitan backgrounds. The new songs became popular and helped the tournament themes to be known. Perhaps some of them did not even belong to the lower nobility classes, and we know that in the Empire many knight-singers were of servile origin. A large part of these characters travelled continuously, going to many cities and courts, thus lending their services to whomever wanted to listen or pay them. In this way, their art spread quickly along the western castles and palaces. Giraut de Salignac (exact *floruit* unknown) and Aimeric de Peguilhan (c. 1170 – c. 1230) were other important troubadours. The latter, although from merchant stock, was held in high esteem and later very influential.

The music and songs developed in this way became one more part of the sports circuit. Tournaments soon developed social ramifications and could mark anniversaries, celebrations, political gains and even agreements and marriages as well. After returning victorious from France in the autumn of 1347, Edward III spent nearly the whole of the following year celebrating tournaments, six in total. The same situation came up three years earlier, when the king was waging war successfully on the continent (in Brittany). The king then celebrated tournaments from 19th to 25th of January in 1344⁵⁵.

Tournaments were also solemn occasions when a fighter could be dubbed a knight. We know of many contests in which gallant participants were getting knightly status due to their brave performances or prowess. Barons, counts, kings and even emperors were able to knight contestants if they felt pleased by their worthy behaviour or skill at arms. In this way, Emperor Sigismund dubbed a butcher's son a knight because of his gallant deeds. Many a patrician from the privileged and rich *Richerzēche* class from the German towns were joining the crusades against pagans in Lithuania, or attending the tournaments, because their bigger wish was to become knights and thus ennoble their families. Weddings and other religious ceremonies could also include the dubbing of knights. The other occasions when a warrior could get knightly status was the much prestigious ordering in the battlefield. Thus, the Flemish noble and diplomat Gillebert de Lannoy (1386-1462), at the service of Burgundy, got the high honour this way in Poland, dubbed by the Teutonic Knight Ruffe von Pallen. In addition,

⁵⁵ Hugh E. L. Collins, *The Order of the Garter. Chivalry and Politics in Late Medieval England 1348-1461*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 12; Richard W. Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince*. Viking, London, 1978, pp. 42-43. See also Juliet Vale, *Edward III and Chivalry: Chivalric Society and its Context, 1270-1350*. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 1983.

the most glorious death was confined to battle; being killed in a tournament always brought tragic connotations, but falling while defending God, one's lord, the country or Chivalry meant eternal glory and respect. One of many examples is that of the French Geoffroi de Charny, killed at the battle of Poitiers, while carrying the king's sovereign banner, the *Oriflamme*⁵⁶.

However, war was always war. The inclusion of some of each of these sets of duties in most of the lists of ideal qualities and behaviours recommended for knights or noble men-of-arms in the forty-six treatises composed in the various vernacular tongues of Latin Europe before the 1490s failed to have any significant influence on the real cultural ideals of many noble knights, who continued to admire only valour, prowess, wealth and high social rank, trustworthiness in dealings with fellow noblemen, and a willingness to do whatever was necessary to increase and defend their personal and lineal 'honour'.

7. Heraldry and Tournaments

Something resembling heraldry begins to be noticeable soon after 1100, probably following the direct stimulus of the tournament⁵⁷. This is because the earliest heraldry is that associated with the persons of counts and other great magnates, as the way tournament developed in the Eleventh Century show, with nobles leading teams of knights on to the field (the aforementioned *mêlée*). The task for a count's team was to protect their lord from capture, so it was of the utmost importance to know where he was. Heraldry assisted in identifying and rallying to him. This theory of the origins of heraldry makes sense because the lords were prone to hang heraldic covers on his horse thus getting more noticeable⁵⁸.

Although we glimpse common knights carrying uniform equipment that identified them as belonging to a lord's company in the 1150s and 1160s, the only

⁵⁶ Lannoy was one of the first members of the Golden Fleece, inaugurated by the duke Phillip the Good in 1430. See also Malcolm Vale, *War and...*, pp. 33-63; Richard Vaughan, *Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy*. Boydell Press, London & New York, 2002, pp. 29-98; for Charny, Steven Muhlberger, *Jousts and Tournaments: Charny and Chivalric Sport in the Fourteenth Century France*. Chivalry Bookself, Union City, 2003. Battle took place 19th September 1356. It was a disaster for the French. Cf. Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years...*, p. 42; Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*, pp. 284-288. His homonymous son fought as a crusader at another disaster, Nicopolis (1396).

⁵⁷ Maurice Keen, *The Origins...*, pp. 11-13: "Tournament practice seems almost certainly to have been important in forming the rules that governed the ways in which a right to a prisoner should be established" [...]. See also Robert W. Jones, *Heraldry and Heralds*, in Richard W. Jones, Peter Coss (eds.), "A Companion to Chivalry", Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2019, pp. 139-158.

⁵⁸ Paul E. Szamach, Teresa M. Tavormina, & Thomas J. Rosenthal (eds.), *Medieval England. An...* p. 354. Nigel Saul, *A companion...*, pp. 131-133; Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years...*, p. 50.

individuals with early heraldry identified were the lords themselves⁵⁹. We need to say that tournament celebrations were far more frequent than all-out wars or big level military campaigns, not to say pitched battles, so it is very likely to find heraldic origins there.

The appearance of specialist heralds during the Thirteenth Century, no doubt assisted the fragmentation of the older parage-based heraldry into more individualised and narrower lineages of shields. Herald's began working within tournaments, and later nationally, compiling directories of arms, which must have generally demonstrated the bad practice of sharing arms. As knights began to receive the privilege of arms around 1250, the capacity for confusion must have become an irritant to these emerging professionals⁶⁰.

The antiquity of lineage was at the heart of the idea of nobility. If there was ever a way of making such a power tangible, it was heraldry. A coat of arms deliberately evoked the inheritance of privilege and wealth that descended with the lineage⁶¹. After some time, heralds and their works became famous and used all over Christendom, as in the case of the Dutch Claes Heynen (c. 1345-1414) with his famous *Gelre Armorial*.

The surcoats, far from being mere identification devices for tournaments and battlefield, were much more. Common Law in England show a myriad of examples of how coats of arms linked with surnames, and indeed to rights to lands, demesnes, manors and holdings. Bequests and inheritances came with the obligation to bear the family's arms and take the surname. If a family already had a coat of arms, ruling courts asked to sum up, sharing or splitting, both arms. When a nobleman was donating such a precious item, as M. Keen put it, "*He was doing more, and much more, than putting on a uniform that would identify him, useful though it would be for that purpose. He was making simultaneously a very public statement about his place and associations in the chivalrous world, in circumstances which in that martial and chivalrous world were deemed especially significant*"⁶².

Let's bring William Marshal up again as an eloquent example. He was a simple knight as a youth, just dubbed, with no banner, using the arms of his lord, Tancarville, as a junior member of his retinue. Until 1180, he would not use his own coat of arms in a tourney, and even then, it was based closely in the arms of his second lord, the Young King⁶³. His arms also featured a lion. The lion was an important symbol taken from the coat of arms of the very king, Henry II (1154-1189)⁶⁴.

⁵⁹ David Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility. Constructing Aristocracy in England and France, 900-1300*. Pearson Education Limited, Edinburgh, 2005, pp. 156-157.

⁶⁰ David Crouch, *The Birth...*, p. 160; see also Maurice Keen, *The Origins...*, pp. 25-42.

⁶¹ David Crouch, *The Birth...*, p. 161.

⁶² Maurice Keen, *The Origins...*, p. 42.

⁶³ David Crouch, *The Image...*, p. 178.

⁶⁴ David Crouch, *William...*, p. 47.

In the Fourteenth Century and on, coats of arms kept their importance and became increasingly subject to law, courts and rules, because the service of arms in the gentry maintained its roll well after 1500, especially in England and Spain (with the lesser nobility class in the latter known as *hidalgos*). Therefore, the art featuring arms and heraldic gear became a successful way to maintain unity in an armigerous class menaced by social changes and the new challenges brought by the first signs of the Modern world⁶⁵.

8. Hastilude, Christianity, and the Church

It was not long after the first reports of the tournaments and knightly gatherings all over the lands that leading figures from the Western Church in Rome, England, France and the Holy Empire started to complain about the new social developments, defined by some contemporary authors as a true craze⁶⁶. Sometimes comparisons aroused between the mood of a rugby club, where players and fans drink together after a match to remember the highlights, and the conversations and sharing of experiences that the knights did in the drinking parties after the tournaments. The French knight and writer Jean de Bueil (1406-1477), and the very William Marshal offer such examples⁶⁷.

The Clerical establishment frowned upon such fervour and passion. As R. Barber put it, *“Neither pope nor king welcomed the armed gatherings”* [...] but *“it provided an outlet for the exercise of knightly prowess which could no longer be expended in the old way in a society that was becoming more orderly and subject to restraints”*. Therefore, the outcome was *“a grudging toleration to the new sport”*⁶⁸.

But in the time of The Crusades, and with big challenges from within the Church in the form of heretical movements, the clergy could find no satisfaction at all in such order of things: *“Yet the Church attitude was still guarded: it encouraged knighthood, but only in order to control and tame the warrior instinct”*⁶⁹.

One of the first measures made by Innocent II (1130-1143) was a complete ban of tournaments, although it was widely ignored. He repeated his anathema to that “un-Christian sport” at the Lateran council of 1139, and Alexander III did the same at the Lateran council of 1179. Eugene III (1145-1153) also harshly criticised the tournaments in the synod of Reims (1148), but all to no avail. Theoretically, a fallen knight in the circuit had no right to be buried

⁶⁵ See Steven Slater, *The History and Meaning of Heraldry: An Illustrated Reference to Classic Symbols and Their Language*. Southwater, London, 2004; Maurice Keen, *The Origins...*, pp. 87-143.

⁶⁶ David Crouch, *The Image...*, p. 174; Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*, pp. 73-80.

⁶⁷ See. Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years...*, p. 43; David Crouch, *William...*, pp. 35-36.

⁶⁸ Richard W. Barber, *The Knight...*, pp. 161-162.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 215.

in holy ground, but even such a radical measure was circumvented. Tournaments were deeply rooted in the chivalric world, spreading even to the Holy Land and the Byzantine Empire⁷⁰.

However, the world of the knight was also a world of repentance, remorse and regret after the faults⁷¹. After all, the dubbing of a knight always took place inside a church or other nearby Christian building; it was accompanied with vigils in prayer and a mass, and the very weapons were turned sacred that way: "*at the ceremony of his dubbing his sword had been blessed so that, with the approval of the Church thus clearly implied it might become a sword for justice*"⁷². It's possible to find progressively numerous cases where the devotion, religious feelings and Christian charity appeared in close connection with chivalric societies and even knightly orders. One remarkable situation in Fourteenth Century England comes offered by the ambitious and thoughtful plans of King Edward III (1327-1377)⁷³.

Such plans crystallised in the Order of the Garter. To equal the number of 26 members (including the king) with the idea of Christian charity, 26 royal pensioners (Alms knights) were recruited; such poor knights ate and lived in the facilities of the Garter at Windsor, and in turn attended religious services and prayed at the masses for the souls of the deceased companions. The origins of such men were in the wars of the king, especially in France: injury, old age or financial ruin due to the payment of ransoms brought them to a helpless state, so Edward III in gratitude installed them at St. George College⁷⁴. Collegiate churches with canons, vicars and priests were the idea of both Edward III and King John II in France, for their projects concerning new chivalric orders. Nevertheless, contrarily to the Garter, the Order of the Star suffered greatly due to the decimation of its members at the battle of Poitiers (1356) and vanished thereafter⁷⁵. The enhancement of the Chivalric Orders numbers among the measures taken by Edward III in England; king created offices, seals, clerks, ushers, bureaucracy and ceremony to strengthen the identity and union of the Order and its sense of membership⁷⁶.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p.161: tournaments held at Antioch in 1156; Kyriakidis, *Warfare in Late Byzantium*, p. 57 points out to the celebration of tournaments in Fourteenth Century Constantinople, although probably the phenomenon was not widespread as in the Latin West.

⁷¹ Jean Flori, *Ricardo...*, p. 362.

⁷² Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years...*, pp. 41-42.

⁷³ Ian Mortimer, *The Perfect King. The Life of Edward III, Father of the English Nation*. Vintage, London, 2008.

⁷⁴ Hugh A. F. Collins, *The Order...*, pp. 9, 13, 20-21, 29.

⁷⁵ The French idea went back to 1344; probably the English, in close relation then with Castile and visiting the country for crusading in 1343, got some glimpses of the project after witnessing the "Order of the Band" created by king Alfonso XI (1312-1350).

⁷⁶ Hugh A. F. Collins, *The Order...*, p. 30. See also D'Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, *The Knights of the Crown: The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe, 1325-1520*. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2000.

Burgundy, France, Spain, England, the Holy Empire and even Hungary were taking these same steps in the Fifteenth Century, when the Chivalric Orders developed not so much as a sport club, but as a means of enhancing the progression of absolute power of monarchs, striving together with the aim of developing the strongest and most centralised countries. "*Chivalry was coming to mean life in the public service under the ruler's direction*"⁷⁷.

In the same way, popular saints like St. Michael, St. George, St. Denis, St. Demetrius, Santiago (in Spain), and Edward the Confessor (in England), had strong links with both war, Chivalry and Tournaments throughout the medieval period⁷⁸.

9. Conclusions

With this paper, we have tried to offer a clear framework of the main characteristics of knightly sports and games in the western medieval world. It is clear that Chivalry had strong links to the aforementioned sports and show the aristocratic status and noble way of life. Tournaments often worked as training grounds and substitutes for wars, but always showed clear sportive conditions. As time went on and rules and tourneys got increasingly more organised and detailed, the sportive component became bigger and more important. At the end of the Fifteenth Century, tournaments became social ceremonies full of pageantry and completely divorced from the idea of warfare and the true style of fighting of the later heavy cavalry.

We need to note that to a great effect, the ruling of tournaments also meant the ruling of war; heralds, Kings of Arms and knightly behaviour, although in no way universally upheld or respected, tended to create a more uniformed and balanced way of waging war. Monarchs went to great lengths to lessen the evils suffered by the civil population in both towns and country, and a general awareness of such misdemeanours raised the first ideas of which things shouldn't feature in war.

Lastly, we must mention the very knightly and chivalric mentality. Fame, recognition, glory and a sense of occasion were the essential features of Aristocratic thought. Even if reckless or temerarious, the willingness to fight and achieve great deeds were the ultimate meaning of a knight's existence. Hastilude sports proved the suitable background for the development, training and

⁷⁷ See. Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years...*, p. 45; see also Peter Coss & Maurice Keen (eds.), *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England*. Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2002, p. 209 ff.; Thomas A. Green (ed.), *Martial Arts of the World: An Encyclopedia*. ABC-Clío, Oxford, 2004, 384 ff., 390 ff.

⁷⁸ See Andri Vauchez, *Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 530; Andrea Ruddick, *English Identity and Political Culture in the Fourteenth Century*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 289 ff.

expression of that particular way of life, an essential feature of the long gone medieval world in the West.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN DISPUTE ABOUT THE 1906 TRIAL OF DANIEL FLICKINGER WILBERFORCE FOR CANNIBALISM

T.O. SMITH*

Abstract: The accusation of cannibalism against the African born, American educated, Church of the United Brethren in Christ missionary, and Paramount Chief of the Imperri in Sierra Leone, Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce, has long fascinated scholars from multiple academic disciplines including anthropology, colonial and postcolonial literature, history, and missiology. Despite such attention, the current paper contemplates a hitherto unconsidered aspect of the 1906 Wilberforce trial: his status as a naturalised American citizen. In this context, the Wilberforce trial quickly became the centre of an Anglo-American fracas concerning both its location and its perception of fairness towards a foreign national, which thereby challenged the dignity of British colonial rule in Sierra Leone. This paper therefore focusses upon the high-policy sensitivities within London, which went all the way to the very top of the British Foreign Office, as the British establishment wrestled with American perceptions of British fair play, justice, and colonialism, during the early years of the twentieth century.

Keywords: Lord Elgin; Raymond Dougherty; Sir Edward Grey; Leslie Probyn; Whitelaw Reid; Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce; cannibalism; Sierra Leone

I

In 1905, the Sierra Leonean missionary, Chief of the Imperri, and naturalized American citizen, Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce was arrested and charged with murder and cannibalism by British colonial authorities in Sierra Leone. He was detained in Moyamba, while the case against him was duly investigated, corroborated, and prepared for trial. In the meantime, the American Vice-Consul in Sierra Leone, having apprised himself of the arrest of an American citizen, contacted the American embassy in London with criticisms against the British arrangements for the trial.¹ These claims were forcefully and officially presented to the British Foreign Office by the American

* Huntington University, USA. tsmith@huntington.edu

¹ The National Archives [hereafter TNA], Public Record Office, Kew, London, Foreign Office [hereafter FO] papers, 367/15/12-35, Copy of Governor's Fiat concerning Rex vs. D.F. Wilberforce, Probyn to the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, 9 January 1906; Dougherty to Reid, 30 January 1906.

Ambassador, which necessitated a formal British response from the very top of the Foreign Office and were duly brought to the attention of the newly elected Liberal Government's Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. Thus, began a Foreign Office led operation to 'repudiate' the American narrative against the credibility of the Wilberforce trial and to protect British colonial institutions against an international accusation of foul play.²

The strange career of Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce, and in particular the accusations against the missionary leader and his subsequent trials for cannibalism have attracted much academic fascination and debate. Wilberforce was born in 1857 in Sierra Leone and travelled to the United States in 1871. He 'graduated at the Dayton, Ohio, High School in 1878, married Miss Lizzie Harris (American)' and undertook his Church of the United Brethren in Christ ordination, before returning to Sierra Leone as a missionary. In 1887 he became the head of a church school and in 1895 he was made the Superintendent of the Imperri Mission, which was an appointment he held, in tandem with his subsequent acquisition of the position of the Paramount Chief of the Imperri in 1899 following the Hut Tax war of 1898, until he stepped down as superintendent in 1903 due to a number of intrinsic conflicts between his missionary leadership and district chiefship duties.³ In 1905 Wilberforce was accused of polygamy in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and in 1906 he was tried by the British colonial authorities for cannibalism. A separate cannibal charge was brought against him in 1912-13 for his alleged involvement in similar human leopard secret society activity, which despite Wilberforce's acquittal, resulted in his ejection from Sierra Leone to Liberia.⁴

Secret societies in Sierra Leone enacted ritualised murders, wherein the perpetrators disguised one of themselves as a leopard (or other powerful animal) in order to injure their victim and obtain the blood, organs and fat needed for 'medicine' and power. As early as 1915, the barrister Captain K.J. Beatty devoted an entire chapter of his study *Human Leopards: An Account of the Trials of Human Leopards Before the Special Commission Court; With A Note on Sierra Leone, Past and Present*, to a trial in 1912-13 concerning a cannibal murder near

² Ibidem, Reid to Grey, 14 February 1906; Minute by Hurst, undated; Minute by Barrington, undated; Minute by Grey, undated.

³ Ibidem, Dougherty to Reid, 30 January 1906; A. Whitmer, *Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce*, in H.L. Gates Jr, and E. Brooks-Higginbottom, (Eds.), "The African American National Biography: Volume 8" (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 277-278; H.R. Cherry, *Foreign Mission Work Begins Again*, in P.R. Fettes (Ed.), "Trials and Triumphs: A History of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ" (Huntington: Church of the United Brethren in Christ Department of Church Services, 1984), p. 319-321.

⁴ G. Griffiths, *The other Mr Wilberforce: role conflict and colonial governance in Sierra Leone 1878-1913*, in "African Identities", vol. 7, no. 4, November 2009, p. 442-446; A. Whitmer, *God's Interpreters: Protestant Missionaries, African Converts, and Conceptions of Race in the United States, 1830-1910* (University of Virginia: PhD thesis, 2008) p. 189.

Yandehun on October 17, 1909, and although Beatty did not name Wilberforce as the defendant in this chapter, numerous pertinent details suggested that this analysis of the trial was a narrative of the second Wilberforce case.⁵ The intricacies of the second trial were later revisited, expanded upon and updated by Christine Whyte in an excellent essay in Harald Fischer-Tine's 2016 edited collection *Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on The Verge of a Nervous Breakdown*.⁶

Christopher Fyfe helpfully described, in his 1962 book *A History of Sierra Leone*, the continued indigenous agency of human alligator and leopard communities throughout the British colonial period in Sierra Leone. In a specific reference to Wilberforce, Fyfe mentioned a curious incident in 1890 that highlighted Wilberforce's interest in local affairs, wherein the Christian missionary allegedly appeared to use the traditional witch-finders the Tongo Players to investigate, condemn, and burn alive, approximately 30 human leopards including their chief, who were deemed responsible for the murder of one of Wilberforce's servants.⁷

But was the 1890 incident the product of a later fabrication by political elements in the local community to slander Wilberforce following his assumption of the Imperri chiefship? Arthur Abraham's 1978 book *Mende Government and Politics Under Colonial Rule: a historical study of political change in Sierra Leone 1890-1937* detailed Wilberforce's political ascendancy to become the Paramount Chief of the Imperri in 1899 with the approval and assistance of the British Governor Sir Frederic Cardew and his successor Sir Charles King-Harman. Wilberforce's political authority was certainly the product of colonial rule and not universal local support, which became readily apparent when both the fear of colonial reprisals following the 1898 Hut Tax war and Wilberforce's popularity gradually subsided in tandem.⁸

In a 2009 article in *African Identities*, Gareth Griffiths revisited Wilberforce's political identity and wove together a detailed and nuanced assessment of his conflicting roles as a local-indigenous and colonial chief (his approach towards cannibalism, polygamy, and colonial governance), his American missionary activity (his alleged blending of Christian and African practices), and his ensuing clash with church, local-indigenous, and colonial

⁵ K.J. Beatty, *Human Leopards: An Account of the Trials of Human Leopards Before the Special Commission Court; With A Note on Sierra Leone, Past and Present* (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd, 1915), p. 3-4, 23-24, 61-70.

⁶ C. Whyte, *The Strangest Problem: Daniel Wilberforce, the Human Leopards Panic and the Special Court in Sierra Leone*, in H. Fischer-Tine, (Ed.), "Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on The Verge of a Nervous Breakdown", (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 345-368.

⁷ C. Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 442, 491, 555.

⁸ A. Abraham, *Mende Government and Politics Under Colonial Rule: A historical study of political change in Sierra Leone* (Freetown: Sierra Leone University Press, 1978), p. 179, 182, 194, 245-246.

authorities adjacent to the 1905-6 and 1912-13 trials.⁹ These issues were returned to in two chapters of a 2015 study by Peggy Brock, Norman Etherington, Gareth Griffiths, and Jacqueline Van Gent, *Indigenous Evangelists and Questions of Authority in the British Empire 1750-1940*, which provided an interesting comparative missiological analysis to the *modus operandi* of Wilberforce and other homegrown Christian leaders.¹⁰

The missiological aspect of Wilberforce's career has also been explored in detail by the historian Andrew Witmer. First, in his 2008 doctoral thesis *God's Interpreters: Protestant Missionaries, African Converts, and Conceptions of Race in the United States, 1830-1910*, which thoughtfully provided many further biographical and comparative contextual details that have been hitherto missing from the Wilberforce canon.¹¹ Second, in the production of a 2014 article in *Church History*, the same author raised important historical questions concerning the dynamics of race and Christian missionary activity.¹²

It should also be noted that outside of colonial and post-colonial studies, Paul Richards has produced a compelling anthropological analysis of cannibalism and witchcraft at work within Sierra Leone with special reference to the dubious accusations attributed to Wilberforce's Imperri chiefdom. This essay in John Knight's 2001 edited collection *Natural Enemies: People-wildlife conflicts in anthropological perspective* deftly considers the wider symbolism and socio-cultural interplay at work within Sierra Leone concerning human chimpanzee, crocodile and leopard murders.¹³

Although the forementioned studies all provide an excellent analysis of Wilberforce's missionary and political careers, along with his alleged fall from grace into the well-detailed but doubtful accusations of cannibalism and polygamy, which surrounded his 1905-6 and 1912-13 trials in Sierra Leone, there has been a paucity of interest in the diplomatic repercussions concerning the arrest, imprisonment and trial of an American citizen by the British colonial authorities. This paper therefore attempts to redress this balance. It considers the diplomatic dimensions at work within the British Foreign Office following a detailed complaint from the American Ambassador in London, Whitelaw Reid, and the American Vice-Consul in Sierra Leone, Raymond Dougherty,

⁹ Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 435-449.

¹⁰ P. Brock, N. Etherington, G. Griffiths, and J. Van Gent, *Indigenous Evangelists and Questions of Authority in the British Empire 1750-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), chapters 4 and 9.

¹¹ Witmer, *op. cit.*

¹² A. Witmer, *Agency, Race, and Christianity in the Strange Career of Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce*, in "Church History", vol. 83, no. 4 (December 2014), p. 884-923.

¹³ P. Richards, *Chimpanzees as political animals in Sierra Leone*, in J. Knight, (Ed.), "Natural Enemies: People-wildlife conflicts in anthropological perspective", (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 78-103.

concerning the arrangements for Wilberforce's 1906 trial.¹⁴ In doing so, the Wilberforce story becomes not solely a study of British colonial society, politics, race and missionary activity, but also an important case study of how senior British government politicians and Foreign Office officials in London acted to preserve the international mystique of British fair play, justice, and its civilising mission, against serious American accusations otherwise.

II

On 14 February 1906, Whitelaw Reid wrote to Sir Edward Grey about the arrest of one Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce and presented the British Foreign Secretary with his concerns about the local British arrangements for Wilberforce's impending trial being held at Bonthe rather than the capital of the colony at Freetown. Reid asserted that Wilberforce could be disadvantaged by the trial taking place at Bonthe for two reasons: first, the distance from the United States consulate, for the American defendant, of a trial taking place outside of the capital of the colony; and second, the unfavourable nature of the local population to the defendant within the Bonthe locality. The American Ambassador thereby pressed Grey for 'as fair a trial as possible'.¹⁵

Along with his covering letter to the Foreign Secretary, Reid presented Grey with a lengthy and detailed report of the Wilberforce case to the Ambassador from the American Vice Consul in Sierra Leone, Raymond Dougherty, along with numerous supporting correspondence. The size of the Vice Consul's statement and the copies of the additional ancillary documentation were not auspicious. In his account, Dougherty emphasized that correspondence with the American State Department had already established Wilberforce's status was that of 'a naturalized American citizen' with the defendant having achieved this 'in 1878' and therefore that he, the Vice Consul, had been duly instructed by the American Government to petition for the trial to be moved from Bonthe to Freetown. Dougherty was clearly doubtful about the case against Wilberforce, which he regarded as indicative of 'native Mahommenden chiefs' seeking to dispose of a 'Christian civilized chief'. Thus, Wilberforce had been 'maliciously' accused of 'cannibalism' despite the defendant's previous history of assisting the British 'in putting down cannibalism'. The Vice Consul opined that 'a false accusation' of this kind could easily be achieved in Sierra Leone as the local British authorities regularly 'granted a full pardon' to confessions from the resident population which often led to the identification of other culprits. In addition, Dougherty contended that the same British officials considered the local chiefs to be entirely aware of

¹⁴ TNA FO 367/15/12-35, Reid to Grey, 14 February 1906; Dougherty to Reid, 30 January 1906.

¹⁵ Ibidem, Reid to Grey, 14 February 1906.

the cannibal activities undertaken within their districts and therefore they were normally the ones to be 'tried and hanged, while the real criminals go free'.¹⁶

The American State Department in Washington D.C. and the Vice Consul in Sierra Leone thereby considered it imperative for the United States to secure the removal of the Wilberforce trial away from 'the influences of native law' in Bonthe to the more beneficial location of Freetown. After all, 'it will be much more difficult to secure an unprejudiced jury at Bonthe'. Indeed, Dougherty was suspicious that the British authorities in Sierra Leone had already tried to undertake the trial at Bonthe 'without due consultation' of the local statutes. In December 1905, his initial involvement in the Wilberforce case had revealed that as the defendant had been designated a 'native' the trial had to be held under the auspices of the 'Protectorate Court' system, which had 'no jurisdiction over aliens' and thereby necessitated a 'trial without jury'. This would have excluded Wilberforce from the highest possible standards that the Sierra Leone Supreme Court accorded to foreign nationals, a situation which had similarly befallen another 'American citizen'.¹⁷

Despite the initial hearings for the trial being undertaken in the 'Circuit Court', the Governor had already opted to move the trial away from local to colonial jurisprudence. Was the Vice Consul's continued vehemence towards the trial being held at Bonthe due to the inconvenience for Dougherty of the trial location not being in the capital of the colony, or his desire to achieve a fair trial? Dougherty's objections to the logistics for the Wilberforce trial seemed to muddy the report. In addition, at the end of his report, the Vice Consul appeared to add a further objection to the British logistics for the trial. Dougherty reiterated his earlier theme of the clash of civilizations inherent in the Wilberforce case, as noted above, as he raised with the Ambassador wider scurrilous rumours circulating within the colony about the nature of the Wilberforce trial, which could harm 'the cause of religion and the enlightenment'. These were high stakes. After all, if Wilberforce was found not guilty then this would greatly 'encourage those who were trying to uplift the African from his paganism and ignorance'.¹⁸

Attached to the long communique from Dougherty to Reid were various copies of additional documents indicative of Dougherty's strenuous endeavours on behalf of Wilberforce to secure arrangements for the trial in Freetown. These included: correspondence from the State Department in Washington D.C.; numerous despatches to and from the British Governor Leslie Probyn; and communications with the Sierra Leone Chief Justice Sir

¹⁶ Ibidem, Dougherty to Reid, 30 January 1906.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

Crampton Smyly.¹⁹ Two of the letters from Probyn to Dougherty added to the intrigue surrounding the trial. First, Dougherty had received an unequivocal confirmation from Probyn that as Wilberforce had ‘resigned his position as Chief of the Imperri’, the Governor had already moved the trial ‘from the Circuit Court to the Colony’.²⁰ Second, Dougherty had been instructed by Probyn, due to the logistics of sending ‘witnesses’ to Freetown, it had already been established in 1905 that the Sierra Leone Supreme Court could from time-to-time sit in Bonthe under a Supreme Court judge. In the same letter, Probyn directly addressed the matters raised in Dougherty’s previous correspondence concerning the Vice Consul’s duty to inform ‘the American Ambassador in London’ of the logistics and location of the trial of an American citizen. Probyn clearly stated: ‘it will be a matter of indifference to the American Ambassador in London whether the trial takes place before the Supreme Court at Bonthe or in Freetown, and that the trial in either case is before a jury and in each case the judge possesses the highest legal qualifications’.²¹

The reaction in the British Foreign Office to Reid’s letter, Dougherty’s report, and the supporting documentation was solemn. Cecil Hurst, the Assistant Legal Advisor, noted the ‘grave aspersions on the administration of justice in a British Protectorate which I hardly think ... Reid was justified in communicating to us as they stand’. Sir Eric Barrington, the Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa, agreed that it would best if Reid ‘had omitted the latter’s [Dougherty’s] offensive insinuations regarding the administration of justice in Sierra Leone’. But another official noted, as Reid had ‘not omitted the offensive insinuations made by the American Vice Consul’, the matter had to be considered as being ‘officially’ submitted to the Foreign Office and therefore they would need the Colonial Office ‘to authorise us to repudiate such statements’ as they could not now ‘be left unanswered’. The Foreign Secretary, Grey, agreed with the need to obtain adequate direction of how to proceed from the Colonial Office.²²

Three days after his initial letter to Reid, Dougherty sent another communique, which reiterated a number of the points from his January letter including the ‘tendency in the [colonial] Government here to ignore the rightful privileges of American citizens with respect to trial by jury in the Supreme

¹⁹ Ibidem, Dougherty to the Acting Governor, 9 December 1905; Peirce to American Consul Sierra Leone, 5 January 1906; Dougherty to Governor, 6 January 1906; Probyn to Dougherty, 8 January 1906; Copy of Governor’s Fiat concerning Rex vs. D.F. Wilberforce, Probyn to the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, 9 January 1906; Dougherty to Smyly, 24 January 1906; Dougherty to Probyn, 24 January 1906; Smyly to Dougherty, 25 January 1906; Probyn to Dougherty, 25 January 1906; Dougherty to Probyn, 27 January 1906; Probyn to Dougherty, 27 January 1906.

²⁰ Ibidem, Probyn to Dougherty, 8 January 1906.

²¹ Ibidem, Probyn to Dougherty, 27 January 1906.

²² Ibidem, Minute by Hurst, undated; Minute by Barrington, undated; Minute by C.K., undated; Minute by Grey, undated.

Court' and that Wilberforce was, in fact, the originator of the reporting 'of the crime to the English Government'. Dougherty also raised further circumstances for consideration by the Ambassador, concerning the administration of British justice: 'About a year ago eight chiefs were hanged for cannibalism in Freetown. While it cannot be said that all were innocent, neither does it appear that all were guilty.' Reid duly forwarded the entire letter to Grey.²³ A Foreign Office official drew specific attention on the file minutes to the Vice Consul's new claim that Wilberforce had made the initial report to the colonial authorities and the 'specific charges against the administration of justice in the colony' concerning the eight chiefs 'hanged for cannibalism'. Similarly, Barrington noted how 'irregular' it was for Reid to send Dougherty's report directly on to the Foreign Secretary devoid of 'any observation of his own'. It was therefore concluded by another official that: 'It becomes all the more necessary to take some notice of them [the criticisms] by refuting them'. Grey attached his initials to this final point.²⁴

A subsequent draft despatch to the Colonial Office for the attention of Lord Elgin was drawn up by Barrington upon instruction from Grey. It drew the Secretary of State for the Colonies' attention to the two letters from Reid, which highlighted that 'an American citizen' had been accused of 'cannibalism' in Sierra Leone, and the 'exception' taken 'by the American Vice Consul ... under instructions from his Government' to the case being heard in Bonthe instead of Freetown. Lord Elgin was specifically asked by Barrington what sort of answer should be conveyed to Reid concerning Dougherty's censures of 'the administration of justice in Sierra Leone'. After all, 'Such statements in an official communication from the representative of a friendly power should not in Sir Edward Grey's opinion be allowed to pass unchallenged'. Grey thereby sought Elgin's approval for the Foreign Office to able 'to repudiate' these charges 'in general terms without entering into a discussion of details'.²⁵

The Colonial Office reply on 13 March 1906 notified the Foreign Office that Lord Elgin agreed with Grey's suggested mode of a repudiation and furnished the Foreign Office with three brief telegrams between the Colonial Office and the colonial authorities in Sierra Leone, which established that Bonthe was the best location for the intended trial due to a 'majority of witnesses living in [the] neighbourhood'.²⁶ The reaction in the Foreign Office seemed muted. It appeared best to 'wait for a fuller report' and also to attain 'a statement that the allegations are untrue'. This was a position that Grey agreed

²³ TNA FO 367/15/36-41, Dougherty to Reid, 2 February 1906; Reid to Grey, 21 February 1906.

²⁴ Ibidem, Minute by W.E., 23 February 1906; Minute by Barrington, undated; Minute by C.K., undated; Minute by Grey, undated.

²⁵ Ibidem, FO Draft to the Colonial Office [hereafter CO], Barrington, 5 March 1906.

²⁶ TNA FO 367/15/41-46, CO to FO, 13 March 1906; Elgin to Probyn, 7 March 1906; Sierra Leone to Elgin, 8 March 1906; Probyn to Elgin, 9 March 1906.

with.²⁷ Barrington thereby apprised the Colonial Office, on 22 March 1906, of the Foreign Office's decision to await further information from the colonial regime in Sierra Leone before replying to Reid.²⁸

A more detailed report from Probyn to Lord Elgin concerning the Wilberforce case was forwarded by the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office on 12 April 1906. In the Governor's opinion although the evidence against the defendant appeared to be unsubstantial the colonial Attorney General possessed other details which made 'it desirable that the case should proceed'. Probyn directly refuted what he ascribed as Dougherty's presumed 'axiom that the Executive are especially anxious to secure a conviction'. Probyn was reluctant to become embroiled in the legal question as to whether or not Wilberforce was a 'native' but that on the surface it may be problematic if the 'chief of a native tribe was not a native'. Thus, as soon as Wilberforce tendered his resignation of his chieftom the Governor had expedited arrangements for the trial to take place in the Supreme Court. However, Probyn also claimed that Dougherty and Wilberforce's attorney had only ever asked for the case to be heard 'in the Supreme Court' and thereafter the Governor detailed why it was necessary for this to take place at Bonthe rather than Freetown where an 'impartial jury' could easily be found from a higher 'percentage of Europeans on the jury [in Bonthe] than ... at Freetown' as well as a fair number of 'educated Sierra Leoneans'.²⁹

The Foreign Office, however, did 'not' consider Probyn's communication 'a very satisfactory report'. It was contended that although the Governor had made 'a fairly good case for holding the trial at Bonthe', his present understanding that both Dougherty and Wilberforce's own lawyer had never 'asked for anything more than that the trial ... take place at the Supreme Court' appeared to ignore Probyn's own prior statements on the matter, which were contained within the enclosures to Reid's first approach to the Foreign Office. Furthermore, the Governor's report appeared to ignore Dougherty's assertions about the dubious nature of the British 'administration of justice in the colony', and as a result the Foreign Office had 'no material with which to refute them'. It was therefore proposed that a carefully selected extract from the Governor's report should be shared with Reid along with a covering letter from the Foreign Office. Two different conclusions to the communicate were drawn up by the Foreign Office; and the Colonial Office was asked to consider which best represented the current situation.³⁰

²⁷ Ibidem, Minute by W.E., 14 March 1906; Minute by Barrington, undated; Minute by C.K., undated; Minute by Grey, undated.

²⁸ Ibidem, FO Draft to CO, Barrington, 22 March 1906.

²⁹ TNA FO 367/15/47-56, CO to FO, 12 April 1906; Probyn to Elgin, 23 March 1906.

³⁰ Ibidem, Minute by Barrington, undated; Minute by W.E., 18 April 1906; Minute by Grey, undated; Minute by W.E., undated.

Thus, this resulted in a letter being drawn up from Grey to Reid which not only included the relevant extract from Probyn's report but also edited out the Governor's faux pas regarding the requests for the case to be held in the Supreme Court and nothing more. Furthermore, in the first half of the draft, Grey pressed that the Ambassador would undoubtedly 'recognise that there were good grounds for holding the trial at Bonthe' and that Dougherty's qualms concerning 'the difficulty of securing a fair jury there are unfounded'. This latter point was then edited further in the original draft to emphasise that 'the difficulty of securing an impartial jury there were unfounded'. These small corrections seemed diplomatically most telling. The first, the inclusion of 'impartial' rather than 'fair' appeared to highlight the neutral nature of British justice. The second, the modification of 'are' to 'were' moved the subject under discussion into the past tense. In the second half of the letter, Grey firmly challenged Dougherty's criticisms, which had been included as enclosures to both of Reid's correspondence to the Foreign Office, concerning 'the judicial administration of the Colony'. The Foreign Secretary thereby apprised the American Ambassador that Lord Elgin, in his official position as the British Colonial Secretary, had notified him that Dougherty's assertions were found to be 'entirely unjustified'.³¹

Did the Foreign Office rebuttal of the American Ambassador succeed? The Colonial Office later instructed the Foreign Office, on 16 July 1906, that the Wilberforce trial had subsequently taken place and 'resulted in an acquittal'.³² But in the archival records, between this letter on behalf of Lord Elgin to Sir Edward Grey and Grey's previous letter to the American Ambassador in London, no further correspondence from Reid upon this matter is contained within the Foreign Office file records. To this end, the final entry in the Foreign Office files about the 1906 Wilberforce case for cannibalism appeared to be a brief letter from Grey to the Reid, which duly notified the American Ambassador about Wilberforce's successful discharge from the colonial justice system.³³

III

In conclusion, the circumstances surrounding the Wilberforce trials will no doubt continue to fascinate scholars. What the Foreign Office narrative hopefully now adds to this debate is not a further discussion about the dubious allegations of cannibalism, polygamy, and the syncretism of African and Christian ideologies surrounding Wilberforce's missionary and chiefship duties in Sierra Leone, but an understanding of the international dynamics at work alongside the 1906 trial.

³¹ Ibidem, FO Draft to Reid, W.E. on behalf of Grey, 26 April 1906.

³² TNA FO 367/15/57-59, CO to FO, 17 July 1906.

³³ Ibidem, Grey to Reid, 19 July 1906.

Indeed, it is clearly apparent in the Foreign Office papers from the 1906 case that both senior Foreign Office civil servants and senior British Liberal Government cabinet ministers (Grey at the Foreign Office and Elgin at the Colonial Office) were deeply concerned about American accusations of foul play against the administration of British justice, towards a naturalized American citizen, and the mystique of the Western civilising mission in Sierra Leone. Despite the forthright nature of some of the American Vice Consul's claims, and perhaps his somewhat overfocussed interest upon the case being held at Freetown rather than Bonthe, the greater realization in the Foreign Office debate seemed to be one of how vulnerable the British Empire appeared to be to denunciations from an apparently friendly nation state; accusations that needed to be rebuffed. After all, this was a British political establishment still reeling from the domestic public relations disaster of the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and a newly ascendant Liberal Government that had partially won a significant electoral majority in early 1906 by directly challenging the brutality of the previous Conservative Government's imperial system.³⁴ In this context, the Foreign Office rebuttal of April 1906 to the American Ambassador in London and the apparent lack of any response appeared to indicate that Britain had on this occasion successfully headed off any lingering American concerns about British imperial foul play in Sierra Leone regarding the 1906 trial of Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce for cannibalism.

³⁴ R. Hyam, *The British Empire in the Edwardian Era*, in J.M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, (Eds.), "The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 50-55.

THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY AND COMMUNIST ROMANIA

Gavin BOWD*

Abstract: The British Labour Party is not normally associated with Eastern Europe, and even less so with Romania. However, as archival sources show, after the Second World War, Britain's governing party did place hopes in Romanian social democracy, which were dashed by the onset of the Cold War. With détente, and its own return to power, Labour would endeavour to cultivate political and economic exchanges with the regime in Bucharest, culminating in Ceauşescu's State Visit of 1978. However, the roads to socialism followed by British Labour and Romanian communists diverged considerably. More importantly, their relations were over-determined by Cold War realities.

Keywords: Britain, Romania, communism, social-democracy

In his recent work on the British Labour Party's key role in the reconstruction of the Socialist International at the start of the Cold War, Ettore Costa contends: 'British socialists imagined Europe crossed by two invisible lines – the Iron Curtain and the Olive Line – creating three spaces – Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe. Only Northern Europe was fit for socialism'¹. Such a pessimistic, even patronising, view of the potential for socialism in Eastern Europe can help explain Labour's weak engagement with socialist parties that were already in steep decline before the Second World War. However, the Labour Party archives, and especially the papers of its first post-war International Secretary, Denis Healey, permit a more nuanced view of Labour's relations with Romania, which is a gap in Costa's study. The fall of the Iron Curtain dashed sincere hopes of continuing social-democratic influence in Romania, while détente offered possibilities of cultivating political, and especially economic, ties between London and Bucharest. Indeed, the Labour Party's vocation as a party of government – in contrast with its tiny rival, the Communist Party of Great Britain – meant that geopolitics and business ultimately trumped ideology on both sides.

* University of St Andrews, Scotland, United Kingdom. gpb@st-andrews.ac.uk

¹ Ettore Costa, *The Labour Party, Denis Healey and the International Socialist Movement. Rebuilding the Socialist International during the Cold War, 1945-1951*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018, p. 103.

Labour and the End of Romanian Social Democracy

In March 1946, an Extraordinary Congress of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR) decided by a massive majority to figure on a joint list with the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) at the forthcoming elections. During this meeting, Șerban Voinea, party general secretary and leader of the pro-communist faction, produced a faked photostat copy of a letter allegedly written to veteran social democrat Titel Petrescu by the Peasant and National Liberal parties offering a large sum of money in return for arranging for the PSDR to refuse the common list and fight the elections independently. Unable to make himself heard in the uproar, Petrescu and his supporters left the party to form the Independent Social Democratic Party (PSDI). Immediately after this victory for the leadership faction of Lothar Rădăceanu, Ștefan Voitec and Șerban Voinea, Petrescu wrote to the secretariat of the British Labour Party, enclosing the memorandum he had addressed to the country, where he denounced the 'fraudulent manoeuvres' used to manipulate the delegates. The PSDR Congress, wrote Petrescu, 'concluded a process begun some time ago within this vigorous political organism by certain influences foreign to the party which, acting in accordance with a well-established plan, pursued its liquidation'. Opposing any imposed agreement on collaboration in the elections, his party, 'with the exception of certain detestable members', would 'fight alone in defence of the principles of liberty and Social Democracy'. In foreign affairs, the PSDI affirmed its 'friendship for our great Eastern neighbour and our friendship with Labour England and American democracy'².

Despite this, the Labour Party's official fraternal party remained the PSDR. At the international socialist conferences held that year in Bournemouth and Clacton-on-Sea, Romania was represented by Șerban Voinea. In November 1946, on the eve of elections in which the PSDR would stand in alliance with the PCR, Petrescu wrote to Denis Healey to express 'the bitter disappointment we feel of the unfair attitude adopted by the British Labour Party towards our Party'. He had written on several occasions to the Party's General Secretary Morgan Phillips, giving a full account of the state of the socialist movement in Romania, but he and his PSDI comrades were 'disgusted when we found out that despite your decisions, the Governmental Communistic faction – which is just an annexe of the CP of Rumania, fully controlled by them -, although not being invited, joined the conference and was accepted'. It was therefore disappointing that such an attitude was adopted by the Labour Party, 'which we consider to be the moral centre and support of the International Socialist Movement and from which we seek moral help in our fight to carry on under extreme conditions'³.

In late November 1946, Petrescu therefore gave Adrian Holman, Britain's political representative in Bucharest, two letters on the recent elections

² Centre for Labour History, Manchester (henceforth CLH), LP/ID/DH, Box 4/16.

³ CLH: LP/ID/DH Box 9/06.

to forward to Healey⁴. Petrescu's negative assessment of these elections, which saw a crushing victory for the National Democratic Bloc and the virtual elimination of the PSDI and other remnants of the 'historic parties', was echoed by Holman's own report to Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Despite his familiarity with the corrupt electoral practices of pre-war Romania, it had not occurred to Holman that 'the provisions of the Electoral law could be turned and twisted in such a crude and shameless fashion by any self-respecting Government'. It soon became clear that their policy of falsifying the lists of voters by all conceivable means would eliminate the necessity of anything but an overwhelming display of force and intimidation on election day, and that the elections 'were being won before they were even held'. Nevertheless, Holman also reported to Attlee that this massive fraud had not been completely successful: 'in spite of the success attending the falsification of the voting it has come as a considerable shock to the Government that they had far less support than they thought among what they regarded as reliable henchmen in the Army, Government Departments and factories'⁵.

That said, if the Labour Party and the Foreign Office were made aware of the relentless asphyxiation of democracy in post-war Romania, they had little sympathy for Petrescu. The International Department had the ear of the PSDR's representative in Paris, Nuselovici Moldavanu. In November 1946, Moldavanu sent a letter defending the freedom of the elections and attacking Dinu Brătianu and Iuliu Maniu. He also brought to Healey's attention a pre-war speech that 'proved' Maniu's sympathy for Hitler, Mussolini and the Iron Guard. As for Petrescu, he opined: 'he is a typical case of the "impossibilist" – an unfortunate case of a lack of political perspective from a lawyer drunk on words, whose vanity is manipulated by the most ardent enemies of socialism'⁶.

The Labour government seemed to concur. On 23 December 1946, Christopher Mayhew, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Healey:

Petrescu is an ineffective old man whose following is small and largely composed of intellectual bourgeoisie, while Rădăceanu's Party has a mass following of workers and peasants, and is the only considerable non-communist group in the Government. We can cool off towards Petrescu, and develop relations with Rădăceanu. However repugnant, this seems to me to be the only

⁴ Cf Virgiliu Țirău, *Alegeri fără opțiune. Primele scrutinuri parlamentare din Centrul și Estul Europei după al doilea război mondial*, Editura Eikon, București, 2005.

⁵ CLH, LP/ID/DH Box 4/17.; cf Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, Adrian Pop, *Sovietizarea României. Percepții anglo-americane (1944-1947)*, Iconica, București, 1993.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

policy which will further British interests in Rumania at the present time.

Rather optimistically, Mayhew concluded: 'in Rumania our support might enable the Social Democrats to open a door to the West, to increase their popular backing, and to wean themselves away from the Communists'⁷.

Relations with the PSDR therefore continued. In February 1947, Healey wrote to Moldavanu that it was 'quite likely' that the Labour Party would send a delegation to its conference in Bucharest if it received an invitation. There was also talk of inviting Ștefan Voitec, now minister of education⁸. However, Moldavanu did not hide from Healey the desperate and deteriorating situation in Romania. In March 1947, Healey mentioned to Mayhew the PSDR's representative's report on a recent visit to his home country:

He tells me the economic situation is now desperate; the drought has brought severe famine, infant mortality is 50%, and medical supplies are almost wholly lacking. There is a great danger of pogroms and a peasant revolt – not a political revolution, but rather a *jacquerie*. Tension between the Socialists and Communists has been growing; Radaceanu led a movement to break with the Communist Party and to offer a place in the party but for the time being this movement is checked by the general danger.⁹

Titel Petrescu also kept the Labour Party abreast of developments. In May 1947, there was a wave of arrests of political opponents, including social democrats. A month later, he sent an 'SOS' to Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Air and President of the Labour Party:

We socialist parties of the small countries and the unhappier ones from the political point of view, turn towards you parties of Western Europe as our sole protectors. (...) The independent social democratic party suffers hard persecutions. We have no right to issue our papers, our clubs have been requisitioned and devastated, our partisans persecuted, maltreated, imprisoned and dismissed from their services.¹⁰

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ CLH, LP/ID/DH Box 9/07.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ CLH, LP/ID/DH Box 4/17.

However, if this dire situation was confirmed by Morgan Phillips after his visit to Romania in early June 1947, no protection was forthcoming. Later that month, Healey wrote to Richard Jokel, European Correspondent of the Dutch social-democratic newspaper *Het Vrije Volk*:

The situation is in many ways like that in Hungary. The majority of the old Socialists remain loyal to the Government Party, but extremely discontented with its leadership, and this discontent may grow, to the benefit of Petrescu. Petrescu and his followers have been driven into a fanatical anti-Communism, too extreme to favour their chances of recovering political influence so long as Russia dominates the scene, directly or indirectly.

For Healey, the main reason why the Russians had tolerated coalition governments in some East European countries was that they found it easier and cheaper to exert influence through governments with at least a modicum of popular support than through Communist Party dictatorships which require continuous military backing. It was possible that Romania would shortly become the exception which proved this rule: 'the unpopularity of the government is now so universal that consolidation of a single party state might prove to be an administrative saving'¹¹. However, Healey concluded, if the Soviet Union accepted the Marshall Plan in good faith, the trend towards greater rigidity in Eastern Europe might be inhibited.

There therefore remained grounds for optimism. Healey told Jokel that he deemed the recent Socialist International conference in Zurich a success, which had addressed the German problem in a way that did not embarrass the East European parties present. In September, Healey told Mayhew that he found 'at once depressing and encouraging' a memorandum on the Romanian trade union movement by John Bennett. The First Secretary for Information at the British Legation outlined the 'trickery' used by the communists to eliminate opponents on factory committees, but concluded: 'it is likely that the Social Democratic Party will maintain about a 25% hold after the elections have been held'¹².

However, illusions on the future of Romanian social democracy were dashed in the remaining months of 1947. The 18th Congress of the PSDR convened at the start of October to ratify the party's fusion with the PCR. According to Adrian Holman, during the two weeks previous to the opening of the Congress 'care had been taken to reject those delegates whose loyalty to fusion was uncertain'. A 'remarkable' feature of the Congress was the presence

¹¹ CLH, LP/ID/DH Box 9/06.

¹² *Ibidem*.

throughout of Gheorghe Vasilichi, a member of the PCR's Central Committee, whose Secretary made a detailed report of the proceedings. The Labour Party was represented by the trade unionist James Crawford, who delivered a factual account of the Labour Party's activities, 'which unfortunately also made no direct mention of fusion, and must therefore have disappointed many independent Socialists who were hoping for a word of encouragement'. Holman concluded his report with scathing remarks on Romanian politics:

Without wishing to betray any optimism, I regard most Roumanians, and particularly their leaders, as opportunists of the worst variety. They change their colours to save their skins, and when present conditions alter sufficiently to provide security, I should never be surprised to see the Rădăceanus and Voitecs of this land with their colourful past, conveniently forgetting, without a blush, and disclaiming responsibility for their declarations and beliefs of the past in pursuit, for their personal interests, of some new ideal or doctrine. Recent Roumanian history shows how short-lived regimes and Party understandings can be.¹³

The future of anti-communist social democracy in Romania looked very bleak. For those who had stayed with Petrescu, their worst fears and suspicions had been proven right. From the safety of Vienna, Iancu Zissu wrote to Morgan Phillips: 'A "unity" was finally accomplished, but not with our Party. The governmental "socialists", in accordance with their principles and plans, which we have always denounced, joined the Rumanian Communist Party, which means practically, that they have disbanded their own Party'. Zissu also deplored the behaviour of his British counterparts: 'The attitude of your Party not only provoked much astonishment amongst the public opinion of our Country, but also destroyed the good faith of many old socialists and faithful socialists from Rumania and the other East European countries, in the so called international socialistic solidarity'. The PSDI therefore asked Labour to 'recognise officially and formally that our Party is the only socialistic Party in Rumania'¹⁴.

It was also the turn for PSDR leaders to express their alarm and sense of betrayal. On 2 November 1947, from Bern, Șerban Voinea wrote to Denis Healey: 'The manner in which the "negotiations" are proceeding and the rapidness of the decisions concerning the fusion of our party with the communist party, leave us in no doubt that in Romania there is being prepared total ideological abdication by our party and its absorption, pure and simple, by the

¹³ CLH, LP/ID/DH, Box 9/07.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

communist party¹⁵. Indeed, ten days later, the central committees of the PSDR and PCR agreed formally to a fusion.

Later that month, Adam Watson of the Foreign Office conveyed to Healey Voinea's urgent request to have a general exchange of views: 'He wants to talk about the best means of strengthening the Roumanian Socialist Party which he says is in the process of liquidation. This might not appear to concern the United Kingdom, but if the Communists were successful in Roumania the same process would inevitably be repeated in Hungary and after that in Czechoslovakia and Poland'¹⁶. It was decided to get John Bennett to visit Voinea in Bern. In the meantime, there was the question of whether Petrescu could follow other social democrats into exile. On 2 December 1947, Watson reported to Healey his opinion that the leader of the PSDI was 'not the type of man to leave his country, even if he could at this stage, however great the personal risks staying on in Rumania may be. As I explained to you, it would be most unwise, after the accusations of Western Legations helping Maniu's friends to escape, for Holman to raise the question with [him]'¹⁷. Indeed, till the end, Petrescu seemed a nuisance. On 10 December 1947, Healey wrote to Nuselovici Moldavanu that, after the creation of the Romanian Workers Party, 'a further complication now likely to arise is that Petrescu's Party may demand admission to future International Socialist Conferences on the grounds that it is the only Socialist Party in Rumania'¹⁸.

Consistently, Healey and others had underestimated the rapidity and brutality with which the Soviet Union and its subordinate fraternal parties would extend control over Eastern Europe, not to mention the willingness of a substantial number of social democrats to merge with their dominant communist partners. By the end of 1947, King Michael of Romania had abdicated. In May 1948, Titel Petrescu was arrested and sentenced to hard labour for life. After seven years imprisonment, he was released, but only when he signed, under duress, a letter recognising his crimes and errors¹⁹. Published in *Scântea* on 18 December 1955, the letter was then translated for the pro-communist *British-Rumanian Bulletin*. Petrescu died soon afterwards.

In the meantime, the governing Labour Party's links with Romanian social democracy were exploited in the trials that followed the imposition of the Romanian People's Republic. The Labour Party archives contain transcripts of the trial for espionage of employees of the British Press Information Office, arrested in 1949 after the departure of John Bennett. Bennett's subversive role

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Cf Mioara Anton, Laurențiu Constantiniu, *Guvernați și guvernanți. Scrisori către putere (1945-1965)*, Polirom, Iași, 2014, p. 231.

was confirmed by the witness Gardony Stefan: 'One of his principal aims was to break the unity of the Working-Class Front and secondly to avoid the fusion of the two political parties'²⁰.

By this time, even the left of the Labour Party had given up on a 'third way' between communism and US capitalism. The Party rallied to Atlanticism and expelled from its ranks the MPs John Platts-Mills and D. N. Pritt, who were prominent members of the British-Rumanian Friendship Association (Pritt being its President). In 1951, in Frankfurt, a resolutely anti-communist and anti-Soviet line was confirmed at the founding conference of the Socialist International. According to Ettore Costa, after the Iron Curtain fell, Eastern European socialists 'could wear three masks: the exile, the martyr and the traitor'²¹. As for the exiled remnants of Romanian social democracy, the French socialists of the SFIO failed to unite them as part of a new *Bureau international socialiste*, though Iancu Zissu would become a founding member of the Romanian National Committee.

Labour returns to Romania

From the late 1950s onwards, the Bucharest regime took a 'national turn' that asserted its relative autonomy within the world communist movement. It began to cultivate diplomatic, political and economic ties with western governments. It also made overtures to non-communist movements, including parties of the Socialist International, which were now approaching electoral victory after years of right-wing domination. A thaw in British-Romanian relations was signalled with visits to Romania by delegations of mayors and parliamentarians that included Labour representatives. Labour visitors could still be left-wing mavericks, for example, in August 1962, veteran pro-Soviet MP Konni Zilliacus and peace campaigner Sidney Silverman (whose Jewish parents had migrated from Iași). But, in 1964, the Labour Party of Harold Wilson was closing in on power after thirteen years in opposition. In June of that year, Patrick Gordon Walker, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, visited Bucharest, where he met with prime minister Ion Maurer. The forward march of western social democracy was confirmed four months later by the narrow victory of Harold Wilson. His Labour government, faced with economic crisis, was also attracted by the developing markets of Comecon countries, including Romania. Already in December 1964, Tony Benn, the new Postmaster General, received Silviu Brucan to discuss cooperation between the BBC and Romanian radio and television.

The year 1967 confirmed the independent stance adopted by the revived PCR under the leadership of Nicolae Ceaușescu. Bucharest had recognised the Federal Republic of Germany, remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and refused to condemn Israel during the Six Days War. It was in keeping with this

²⁰ CLH, LP/ID/DH, Box 9/07.

²¹ Ettore Costa, *op.cit.*, p. 274.

new orientation that, in October, the Romanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for the Labour Party to send a delegation to Romania. The invitation was considered and accepted by its National Executive Committee.

The invitation arrived at a time when, four years after coming to power, the Harold Wilson government was widely accused of having betrayed its electoral promises. Britain's economic performance had worsened, the balance of payments deficit remained unbridgeable, and a prime minister who prided himself on his fiscal expertise devalued the pound in November 1967. London and Bucharest therefore had a mutual interest in developing exchanges, especially in the domain of trade.

In January 1968, Tony Benn, now Minister of Technology, received a visit by Ilie Verdeț, the Romanian First Deputy Premier. Benn noted in his diary: 'After all the warnings about this dark, swarthy, mysterious man of whom the British Embassy in Bucharest knew practically nothing, I found a most agreeable person of about forty-six who had never been outside a Communist country in his life'²².

Preparations for the Labour delegation began. In February 1968, Sir John Chadwick, UK ambassador to Bucharest, informed Gwyn Morgan, head of the Labour Party Overseas Department, that President de Gaulle was due there on a State Visit on 15 May, 'which may well be the sensation of the year and is likely to detract from the (anyway limited) public attention given to your visit to Rumania'. There also remained the painful legacy of the elimination of Romanian social democracy in the late 1940s. In March, H.F.T. Smith of the Foreign Office wrote to Chadwick that the delegation were 'particularly interested to contact members of the former Social Democrat Party in Rumania and intend to press for this, though I am sure that they would not wish to insist in particular cases where it might cause the individual to get into trouble'. It would be useful if the Ambassador could advise the delegation whether 'any of the genuine Social Democrats, such as Ilie Dumitriu, Alexandru Dumitriu, Tudor Ionescu or Ion Mirescu (who was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment in 1953), are still alive and kicking. We understand that some were released from prison in the early sixties following pressure from the British Labour Party'. On the eve of the Labour delegation's departure, Gwyn Morgan was lobbied by anti-communist émigrés in Britain. Morgan thanked Ion Rațiu for sending him a copy of his brochure on Bessarabia: 'I have read it with interest'.

A high-powered Labour delegation was led by Jennie Lee, Minister for the Arts. It was composed of Joe Gormley, General Secretary of the North-

²² Ruth Winstone (ed.), Tony Benn, *Office Without Power. Diaries 1968-72*, 1988, p. 21; cf Mihai Retegan, *Ambasadorii Majestății sale în România, 1964-1970*, Editura RAO, București, 2016.

Western area of the National Union of Mineworkers, Peggy Herbison MP, a former Minister of Social Security, Frank Lane, President of the National Union of Railwaymen, and Gwyn Morgan. The delegates had received a 'Briefing on Rumania' which informed them that 'despite the flexibility of its foreign policy, Rumania has been the tightest of all East European regimes'.

The Labour Party delegation was in Romania from 23-31 May 1968, arriving a week after President De Gaulle's tumultuous State Visit. On their return, they reported that 'the courtesy and kindness and hospitality which was shown to the delegation both in Bucharest and in other parts of the country was outstanding'. On the morning after arrival, the delegation visited the Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, where they were welcomed by its First Vice-President Mihnea Gheorghiu. He was 'one of the most fascinating people whom we met on the delegation. He is both a politician and a scholar of distinction whom everyone in Romania expects to advance rapidly in government and Party circles. Mr Gheorghiu has just completed his fourteenth translation of Shakespeare's plays into Romanian'. There followed a meeting with Nicolae Ceaușescu that lasted three hours rather than the scheduled one: 'Initially focussed on technological co-operation, with particular reference to the computer industry. Ceaușescu made a great deal of the fact that Romania wanted to buy only the latest equipment. As an example he announced that he had just clinched a deal with President de Gaulle (whose visit to Romania preceded ours by a few days) to purchase third-generation computers from France'. However, the atmosphere grew tenser when discussion turned to foreign policy, with Ceaușescu accusing the Wilson government of supporting the US bombing of North Vietnam. Jennie Lee told the President that he had 'misunderstood the Labour Party point of view. The Prime Minister had said from the outset that neither side could hope to obtain a military conclusion of conflict in Vietnam'. There were also 'heated exchanges' on the rights and role of trade unions, after which Ceaușescu 'admitted that in cases of dispute between the trade unions and the government, the trade unions recognised that their role was subordinate to the Party and to the government and that they were just one factor contributing to the national economic framework'. Joe Gormley and Frank Lane emphasised that 'this was not their concept of trade unionism'. The delegation was also unconvinced by parliamentary democracy in Communist Romania. After their meeting with Ștefan Voitec, the only ex-PSDR leader encountered on this trip, they concluded that the Grand National Assembly still had 'a long way to go before becoming a genuine parliamentary assembly in our sense'.

The next few days of the visit were spent in visiting the Black Sea. One of the impressive aspects of their visit was the inspection of the great steel works which the Romanians were in the process of constructing at Galați. They also visited oil installations in Ploiești which were formerly owned by Shell. The delegation's report made a critical assessment of the internal situation:

As far as conditions inside Romania are concerned, the predominance of the Communist Party, which has a membership of one and a half million out of a population of twenty million, is evident everywhere. It is clear that some liberalising reforms are taking place but these are slight and of marginal significance at the moment. The development of the Romanian economy with the priority being given to industrial production, agricultural modernisation and the attraction of foreign tourists is clearly still having an effect on the production of consumer goods. We saw no evidence of real poverty in the African or Asian sense but an almost total lack of consumer goods of any quality in the shops.

They concluded on the rapidly evolving international situation: 'the Romanians are still very worried about the defence of their newfound independence from the Soviet Union and were very concerned at reports of Soviet troop movements on the Czech border which occurred during our stay'²³.

On 3 June 1968, Tony Benn flew to Bucharest, where he was met by dignitaries led by Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, Chairman of the Science Research Committee, and Sir John Chadwick. Benn was unimpressed by his country's diplomats: 'The Embassy staff were typical of a British Embassy beleaguered in a Communist country, still fighting the Cold War hard'²⁴. The following day, Benn was reunited with Ilie Verdet to discuss the sale of computer technology:

Our talks on computers developed into a general discussion about the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export] embargo and we said that it was in the British interest to develop as much independence as we could from the United States in the technical field. (...) there was nothing the Rumanians could get from the French that they couldn't get from us, and get it quicker, with a higher quality of technology and less dependence on America.²⁵

After visiting a semi-conductor factory at Baneasa, the British minister noted: 'The Rumanians are pretty tough negotiators and this, I think, is one of their strengths. They are using their customer power in a way we don't always do in Britain'²⁶. After giving a lecture at the University of Bucharest on technology and politics, Benn discussed the future with Verdet: "If I came back to Rumania

²³ CLH, LP/ID/54/8.

²⁴ Tony Benn, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 75.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 75-76.

in twenty years what difference would I find?’ I asked. Verdeş was reluctant to forecast, certainly in that sort of circle – he probably felt I was trying to get at him. He thought the role of the Party would still be an important one²⁷.

Benn then flew to Constanța and had dinner with the Mayor in the Casino Restaurant. On his way back, he noticed a flicker of dissent from his interpreter Dragos who ‘said he thought there should be two political parties in Rumania. He greatly admired the English. He was the son of a peasant and thought that collectivisation had gone too fast’²⁸. In Bucharest, Benn met with Ceaușescu, Maurer and Bîrlădeanu. He thought it would be a twenty-minute courtesy call but he was there for two and a quarter hours. Ceaușescu greeted the Labour minister and told him how much he enjoyed talking with Jennie Lee. But then said ‘he wanted concrete results, and raised the whole question of computers and the need for a third generation. I explained the whole problem all over again, that this was of fundamental interests in the UK, that Rumanian independence and ours were not so very different, that we did not intend to be let down or scooped by others.’²⁹.

The long interview took a philosophical turn, discussing two roads to socialism. Benn cross-examined him about central planning. They then got onto the possibility of a dialogue between the Labour and Communist Parties: ‘I said that during the Cold War, we hadn’t had the opportunities for talks like this and I suggested that he might apply for the general secretaryship of the Labour Party, at which he laughed. They were saying that we had more or less sold out to private ownership’³⁰. Ceaușescu ‘contributed vigorously. He was strongly in favour of the acceptance of free will, he thought the withering away of the state would be very welcome though he didn’t quite see the withering away of the Party. I discussed with him the possibility of us all becoming redundant’³¹.

Benn was optimistic that a technology deal could be struck with Bucharest, but Cold War developments scuppered it. On 1 August, Benn noted that the Americans were ‘icy cold’³². Weeks later, the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia stiffened American opposition. Indeed, the Czechoslovakian crisis showed the limits to Britain and Romania’s room for manoeuvre in the wider context of the superpower confrontation. But it did not put an end to efforts to promote trade in technology. On 24 November 1969, Harold Wilson gave a dinner in the honour of Ion Maurer. The Labour Prime Minister declared: ‘Many of our opportunities for co-operation have emerged in the technological

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 79.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 80.

³⁰ *Ibidem.*, p. 80.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 80.

³² *Ibidem.*, p. 95.

field, particularly in the assembly and manufacture of aircraft³³. In the elections of 1970, Wilson was defeated by the Conservative Edward Heath. But the British-Romanian rapprochement would continue under a right-wing government, sowing the seeds for a State Visit in 1978 when Labour was back in power³⁴.

Détente and decline

The rapprochement between the Labour Party and Communist Romania also followed less official channels. In 1972, Stan Newens, a left-wing Labour backbench MP, published a pamphlet entitled *The Case Against NATO*. Soon after its appearance, Newens was asked by a Romanian diplomat in London whether he would be prepared to edit a selection of the speeches of Nicolae Ceaușescu. In his memoirs, Newens justified this cooperation with the Bucharest regime:

Ceaușescu had rehabilitated Romanian Communists, who had been condemned and executed by an earlier Stalinist regime. He had opposed the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and rejected the Brezhnev doctrine of the Soviet Commonwealth which justified intervention into the affairs of the People's Democracies. He supported the creation of nuclear free-zones in the Balkans and elsewhere. It seemed to me that it was worthwhile to make these policies better known in Britain to demonstrate that the Soviet bloc was not entirely monolithic.³⁵

Newens claimed to have no illusions about single party states. However, he took the view that 'encouragement of dissident views within the Soviet camp could lead to a freer exchange of ideas across the divide and perhaps lead to an improvement in human rights all around'³⁶. The book appeared in December 1972. Newens also insisted that he had neither sought nor accepted payment for his work.

Newens was then invited to meet Ceaușescu. He had a preliminary meeting with the Romanian chargé d'affaires in London, who disapproved of his proposed questions. In response, Newens returned the air tickets. The Romanian diplomat backed down. When the Labour MP arrived in Romania, in August 1973 his hosts had a programme of visits for him: 'a tour of Bucharest, a trip to the Folk Museum, a meeting with the Director of Culture and the Press at the

³³ CHL, CP/CENT/INT/30/02.

³⁴ Cf Mioara Anton, Gavin Bowd, 'Peak Dictatorship: Ceaușescu's State Visit to Britain, June 1978', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 97, 4, 2018, pp. 664-690.

³⁵ Arthur Stanley Newens. *In Quest of a Fairer Society. My Life and Politics*, The Memoir Club, Washington, 2013, p. 179.

³⁶ *Ibidem.*, p. 179.

Foreign Office, a walk around the National assembly, where my questions about opposition drew an expected blank.³⁷ Newens was then driven through the country to Constanza and to Neptun, where Ceausescu was staying: 'There I was installed in a luxury holiday flat while my attendants went off to a hotel. I was disturbed by this distinction and wedged a chair against the door of my bedroom, so that no one could enter without waking me, just in case putting me on my own had an ulterior purpose'³⁸.

On the following day, 11 August 1973, the British visitor had an interview with the President, in the presence of Cornel Burtica, secretary of the PCR. Newens refrained from referring to Romania as a dictatorship or to Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, the executed Communist leader whom Ceaușescu had rehabilitated, but 'ranged freely over all the other issues I had wanted to raise'³⁹. Their meeting was mentioned in news bulletins, and a version of the interview was published in London by the Labour Cooperative Society. Newens was aware of the growing cult of Ceaușescu, observing that he was 'treated with deference, like a royal personality and was surrounded by flatterers and hangers-on'⁴⁰. However, forty years on, Newens did not regret his actions:

Over the years, particularly after Ceaușescu's fall, I have been subjected to considerable vilification about my contacts with the Romanian President and accused of servile praise for the Romanian regime. I make no apology for my efforts to make known the distinctive approach of Romanian under Ceaușescu to the armed rivalry between East and West. Harold Wilson, Jim Callaghan, Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon and other leaders were anxious to establish links with Ceaușescu.⁴¹

Relations between Labour and Bucharest continued at leadership level. In June 1977, General Secretary Ron Haywood led a delegation that included prominent trades-unionists Alex Kitson and Sam McCluskie, John Cartwright MP, and Jenny Little, Labour's International Secretary. They were received by Ceaușescu, Ilie Verdet and Ghizela Vass. According to a joint communique, their exchange of views with the PCR leaders 'reflected the complexity of the present'⁴². There was no public mention of human rights. 1977 also saw the first serious labour challenge to the Communist regime, with coal miners' strikes in the Jiu Valley, which were followed by repression. In 15 August 1980, Horia

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 181.

³⁸ *Ibidem.*, p. 181.

³⁹ *Ibidem.*, p. 181.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 182.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 182.

⁴² CLH, LP/ID Box 53/16.

Georgescu, General Secretary of the British-Romanian Association, raised with Jenny Little the issue of growing human rights abuses in Romania. He enclosed a report and press releases by Amnesty International concerning the persecution in Romania of independent trade unionists and other political or religious dissenters. Little replied to Georgescu: 'The Labour Party has on numerous occasions taken up the issue of Human Rights with the Romanian Authorities and you may rest assured that we will continue to do this on every appropriate occasion'⁴³.

A year later, Little visited Romania accompanied by Joan Lestor MP. The Labour archives also record Little being invited to lunch by Romania's Ambassador in November 1982⁴⁴. In 1985, Labour leader Neil Kinnock thanked Vasile Gliga for his invitation to send a delegation to Romania, which did not come to pass. The last document concerning Communist Romania is dated 6 January 1986, in which Jenny Little thanked Ambassador Gliga for his Christmas present and wished him a happy and prosperous new year⁴⁵.

Conclusion

The already intermittent relations between the Labour Party – far from power since 1979 – and Communist Romania appear to be non-existent by December 1989. The State Visit of 1978 was now a distant memory. In fact, it did not even feature in the memoirs of David Owen and James Callaghan, Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister at the time. We do not yet know what, if anything, Tony Benn noted in his unpublished diary, twenty years after his conversation with Ilie Verdeț about the future. Instead, in the settling of accounts that followed the Revolution, it was Stan Newens who bore the brunt of media attacks for his brief links with Ceaușescu. Perhaps Adrian Holman's remark on 'short-lived regimes and Party understandings' was proven right. The communist regime which had devoured Labour's Romanian comrades was now an uncomfortable reminder of the compromises of power and illusions of détente. Meanwhile, a new PSD, under the leadership of ex-communist Ion Iliescu, would successfully apply to join the Socialist International.

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ CHL, LP/ID Box 58/4.

⁴⁵ CHL, LP/ID Box 145.

RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND ROMANIA: THE IMPACT OF THE EU AND RUSSIA'S POLICY

Iryna MAKSYMENKO*

Abstract: The article explores the Ukraine-Romania relationship evolution focusing on the impact of the European Union and the Russian Federation policy. Since 1992 when the diplomatic relations have been established it has been transformed from the problematic and inconsistent up to the “best friends” and allies in the Wider Black Sea region. Among the factors that have influenced the dialogue of Kyiv and Bucharest the EU enlargement to the East and Russian strategy towards Ukraine and the Black Sea are considered as the most potent. Regarding the EU neighbourhood policy instruments, the soft and sensitive issues of the bilateral relations are covered by the cross-border cooperation that is gradually improving and warming-up the interstate and communities’ connection. At the same time Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggressive policy in the Black Sea region was an impetus that made Ukraine and Romania to work out the strategic alliance and joint actions to ensure security and defence of the two countries and the region as whole. Summing up the previous experience and current priorities of Ukraine and Romania, the obstacles and windows of opportunity for fulfilling the strategic relationship with the real content are identified.

Keywords: Ukraine; Romania; the European Union; Russia; cooperation; security

Introduction

The proclamation of Ukraine’s independence in July 1991 can be considered as a result of the systemic changes in Europe (unification of two German Republics, and Democratic revolutions in the Eastern European States) and the Soviet Union as well. These events stimulated the national public and political movement of Ukrainians striving for their freedom and independence. The first peaceful public protest, the so-called “Revolution on granite” or the first “Maidan” (October 1990) as well as the subsequent mass rallies and protests (“the Orange Revolution” in 2004, and “the Euromaidan” in 2013-2014) have demonstrated that people of Ukraine even after centuries of

* Department of International Relations, “I. I. Mechnikov” National University, Odessa, Ukraine. maksymenko.irynd@onu.edu.ua

Russian imperial and Soviet domination still preserved the commitment to the European values: democracy, dignity, equality, justice and liberties combined with their belonging to Europe and the European identity. Therefore, Ukraine was the first of the Soviet republics who proclaimed the course for the restoration of close contacts with European countries and the accession to the European regional integration processes.

This idea of being part of Europe has furthermore been implemented in the fundamental principles of the foreign policy of Ukraine set forth in the documents of the independent Ukrainian state. They noted the efforts of Ukraine to build up friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with neighboring countries, and participate in international and regional organisations, contribute to the strengthening security and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Eastern European countries hold a specific place in this context, as neighbors that belong to the same region, making security indivisible for them. As Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, to survive as an independent state Ukraine has to become part of Central Europe and share links to NATO and the EU¹. On another side, independent Ukraine is highly important for the national and regional security of Eastern European States². Polish officials stressed several times that there is a strong belief independent, democratic and secure Poland is not able to exist without independent, democratic and secure Ukraine³. This idea strained extremely in the context of 2014 Russian policy towards Ukraine when Ukraine turned to be a forefront of the struggle on the margin of the democratic world with the so-called "Russian world".

Despite some controversial issues within Ukrainian-Romanian relations that caused inertia and misunderstandings, the EU enlargement to the East has served as a tool stimulating fruitful dialogue and interaction. Furthermore, Russia's aggressive reaction to the regional cooperation under the auspice of the EU and NATO and the following annexation of Crimea made Romania and Ukraine to revise their relations due to the growing military tension of the Kremlin in the Black Sea region. And the task how to reframing relations between Ukraine and neighboring countries, mostly Romania and Poland combined with identifying strategies for further interaction at bilateral and

¹ Збігнев Бжезінський, *Велика шахівниця* [Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Great Chessboard*], Львів – Івано-Франківськ, 2000. р. 121.

² Збігнев Бжезінський, *Вирішальна роль України на пострадянському просторі* [Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Ukraine's Crucial Role in the Post-Soviet Space*], in *Політика і час*, 1997, nr. 9. р. 23-26; Степан Рудницький, *Українська справа зі становища політичної географії* [Stepan Rudnytsky, *The Ukrainian Cause Against the Background of Political Geography*] Берлін, 1923. passim.

³ Леонід Губерський (ред.), *Україна в постбіполярній системі міжнародних відносин* [Leonid Gubersky (ed.), *Ukraine in the Post-Bipolar System of International Relations*], К, 2008. р. 282-288.

regional levels, including the EU and NATO, in order to ensure regional security is extremely acute.

Therefore the main objective of the paper is to explore the role of the European Union neighbourhood policy instruments and the Russian Federation policy as an agent of relations between Ukraine and Romania. The main hypothesis is that while the cooperation of Kyiv and Bucharest remains poor both the EU and Russia in different ways have got them moving closer to each other and working together on the strategic relationship.

This paper examines relations between Ukraine and Romania since the declaration of Ukraine's independence in 1991. The first part analyzes the evolution of bilateral relations. Subsequent sections scrutinize how the European Union and Russia influence Kyiv - Bucharest relations. Finally, the author concludes that the Ukraine-Romania relationship has been empowered by the EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy as well as Russia's aggressive policy in the Black Sea region. However there is still to do a lot by both Ukraine and Romania to achieve real good neighbourhood and strategic relations.

Current state of bilateral relations

Relations between Ukraine and Romania after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence were contradictory, uneven, and episodic. On the one hand, Romania recognized Ukraine's independence on January 8, 1992, and established diplomatic relations on February 1 of that year. On the other hand, the signing of basic agreements for the development of bilateral relations took place much later and was due to both the domestic political situation and the economic crisis in the countries, as well as the international circumstances. Ukraine faced the key tasks of settling disputes with Russia over the ownership of the Crimean peninsula, the Black Sea Fleet, and the nuclear arsenal that Ukraine inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the serious economic crisis has led to the search for financially strong partners – the United States and the EU mostly.

At the same time, the development of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the states on the Western border was one of the fundamental priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. Ukraine immediately recognized the strategic partnership with Romania as one of the important tasks of its foreign policy. This approach was determined by the long common state border, residence of national minorities in the two countries, the existence of significant trade and economic cooperation potential, as well as historical contacts between them. Indeed, in the Middle Ages and Modern times, the parties had cultural and educational ties, dynastic marriages; Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian People's Republic (1918) maintained diplomatic relations with the Romanian leaders. Additional impetus for the development of relations was to be, firstly, the common strategic aspirations for the European Union and

NATO integration, and secondly, the convergence of interests in political and economic cooperation in the Danube and the Black Sea regions. However, in practice, neither Ukraine nor Romania paid much attention to bilateral relations for a long time.

Negative perceptions of Ukraine as a “shadow of Russia” that was deemed to be a major threat to Romania and regional instability were widespread in Romania during the 1990s. This attitude fueled radical sentiments in Romania, which considered it appropriate to reconsider the issue of “lost territories” – the regions that were part of Greater Romania during 1918-1940 and were later annexed to the USSR. However, Bucharest's efforts to integrate into NATO and the EU have had a positive impact on the dynamics of Ukrainian-Romanian relations and the development of the legal framework for bilateral relations. Thus, since 1995, Romanian leaders have demonstrated more constructively and pragmatically approach to the relations with Ukraine⁴. And in 1997 Kyiv and Bucharest finally signed the Treaty on Principles of Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation. The Meeting of Ukrainian and Romanian Presidents followed by the signing of this agreement was the only official visit of Leonid Kuchma to Romania during the 1990s. Also, the President of Romania only once visited Ukraine in May 1999. Following these positive moods, the parties have succeeded in regional cooperation (establishing of BSEC in 1998, the Euroregions “Lower Danube” in 1998, and “Upper Prut” in 2000). As a candidate country for the EU and NATO, Romania was forced to close all disputed territories' issues, reaffirming the inviolability of the existing border with Ukraine and signing the Agreement on the Ukrainian-Romanian State Border Regime, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on Border Issues in 2003.

The number of summits has increased after 2005, but since 2008 the Ukrainian and Romanian presidents have had almost no interactions. Intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary contacts are characterized by a low intensity throughout Ukraine's independence. Political dialogue intensified after the election of Petro Poroshenko as the President of Ukraine. Both the leaders conducted official visits and held several meetings during international events and summits. Thus, on March 17, 2015, the first visit of the President of Romania K. Iohannis to Ukraine took place in seven years. During Poroshenko's visit to Bucharest in April 2016, a joint agreement was signed on patrolling the state border between Romania and Ukraine to combat corruption and smuggling, on cooperation in the field of military transportation, etc. The

⁴ Орислава Пантьо, Практичні аспекти євроінтеграції: румунсько-німецькі відносини – досвід для України [Oryslava Pantyo, Practical Aspects of European Integration: Romanian-German Relations - an Experience for Ukraine] in Діана Кінкес (ред.) *Румунсько-українські відносини. Історія і сучасність*. 246-249. Сату-Маре: Editura Muzeului Sătmărean. p. 3.

number of visits and contacts at the level of Ministries of Foreign Affairs has increased as well. All in all, Ukraine and Romania reached an agreement on many issues managing interstate relations. Among the priorities of bilateral and regional interaction are security cooperation, infrastructure, and education. At the same time, the current state of bilateral relations can be illustrated by the words of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, who noted that today Ukraine is actually rebuilding a constructive dialogue and good neighborly relations with Romania⁵.

Indeed, Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and backing of rebel units in the eastern Ukraine have improved the dynamics of bilateral relations. Romania has set a goal to reset relations with Ukraine and has actively supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state at the international level. During a meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta noted that as of today, "Ukraine and Romania are not only neighbors but also friends. Romania supports both the territorial integrity and the European path of Ukraine"⁶. Ponta also stressed the readiness to share the experience of European integration, noting that if Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania are together, they will become stronger⁷. As a result, Romania became the first country to ratify the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and called on other European Union countries to do the same promptly. In his turn, Foreign Minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba emphasized the importance of formally launching a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Romania, which will not only strengthen both countries but also contribute to the security, stability, and prosperity of the wider region⁸.

In addition to the political dimension, there is an active economic cooperation development. During the period 2015-2020, the volume of goods turnover increased significantly - from 569.9 million US dollars in 2015 to 1.76

⁵ Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the Verkhovna Rada on the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine. President of Ukraine official website. 20 October 2020. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/poslannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-do-verho-64717> (15-07-2021).

⁶ Румунський прем'єр мріє про членство України в ЄС в 2019 році [The Romanian Prime Minister Dreams of Ukraine's Membership in the EU in 2019]. 02.10.2014. Retrieved from <https://www.segodnya.ua/ua/politics/rumynskiy-premer-mechtaet-o-chlenstve-ukrainy-v-es-v-2019-godu-557293.html> (15-07-2021).

⁷ Румунія готова допомогти Україні уникнути помилок на шляху до ЄС [Romania Is Ready to Help Ukraine Avoid Mistakes on the Way to the EU]. 02.10.2014. Retrieved from <https://tsn.ua/politika/rumuniya-mozhe-stati-mostom-dlya-ukrayini-ta-moldovi-na-yih-shlyahu-do-yes-poroshenko-371845.html> (15-07-2021)

⁸ Україна і Румунія планують відкрити нові пункти пропуску на кордоні [Ukraine and Romania Map Out to Open New Border Crossings]. 24.04.2021. Retrieved from <https://www.slovoudilo.ua/2021/04/24/novyna/polityka/ukrayina-rumuniya-planuyut-vidkryty-novi-punkty-propusku-kordoni> (15-07-2021)

billion US dollars in 2020. Although the level of economic interaction has not yet meet the potential of both countries due to the imperfect commodity structure of mutual trade, which is dominated by goods with low added value (ferrous metals, ores, mineral fuels, oil, and its refining products). The levels of trade in services (1.0% and 0.4% of total exports and imports of services, respectively, as of 2020) and investment cooperation remain extremely low. The latter was even affected by negative trends in 2020: Ukraine lost 2.8 million US dollars of direct investment from Romania⁹. Economic issues of interstate relations have significant but still untapped potential due to the lack of a strategy for Ukraine and Romania collaboration in the fields of trade, investment, energy, and transport, as well as cross-border cooperation. Institutional cooperation between the parties is also unsatisfactory: the Ukrainian-Romanian Joint Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and the Romanian-Ukrainian Bilateral Chamber of Commerce met for the last time in 2017, and important agreements on cooperation between banking institutions, development of business infrastructure and special services have not found practical implementation. Additional attention needs to be paid to the setting-up of cooperation in the field of transit cargo flows, tourism and fishing industry in the Danube basin¹⁰.

Energy cooperation is one of the most promising areas of bilateral cooperation and strengthening regional security. Romania is one of the suppliers of oil and gas products to Ukraine with the potential for further energy cooperation (joint projects for hydrocarbons production on the Black Sea shelf, foreign investment, projects for the extraction of gas hydrates, and alternative energy). Ukraine has also offered Romania to build interconnectors between the gas transmission systems of the two countries, which will allow Romania to use Ukrainian gas storage facilities.

The parties have made some progress on cross-border cooperation within the “Lower Danube”, “Upper Prut”, and “Carpathian” Euroregions. In particular, small border traffic was introduced, new crossing points were opened at the border, direct railway connection Kyiv - Bucharest was resumed, transport connection between Ukraine and Romania in the Danube Delta was

⁹ *Співпраця між Україною та Європою: прямі інвестиції та зовнішня торгівля у 2020 році* [Cooperation Between Ukraine and Europe: Direct Investment and Foreign Trade in 2020]. 20.01.2021. Retrieved from <https://www.slovodilo.ua/2021/01/20/infografika/finansy/spivpracya-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-yevropyu-pryami-investytsiyi-ta-zovnishnya-torhivlya-2020-roczj> (15-07-2021)

¹⁰ Тетяна Зосименко, *Україна-Румунія. Економічна взаємодія між Україною та Румунією відбувається переважно у площині макроекономічної дипломатії* [Ukraine-Romania. Economic Cooperation Between Ukraine and Romania Takes Place Mainly in the Field of Macroeconomic Diplomacy]. 25.01.2021. Retrieved from <http://prismua.org/ukraine-romania-2/> (15-07-2021)

gradually established, and projects for construction of new bridges were discussed¹¹.

Another evidence of the dynamic development of partnerships can be considered a constructive dialogue to resolve disputes over the Law of Ukraine “On Education”, intensive exchange of delegations, joint cultural events and bilateral projects in science and education, humanitarian aid to eastern regions of Ukraine affected by the armed conflict with Russia.

Therefore, today both countries are extremely interested in a renewal of relations between Kyiv and Bucharest. As the former Ambassador of Romania to Ukraine Traian Laurentiu Hristea noted Ukraine and Romania are “doomed to cooperation and neighborhood”¹². According to a 2015 survey, 41% of Romanians have a positive attitude towards Ukraine, but 48% of Romanians said they had “negative feelings about Ukraine”. The main argument for the negative attitude was the country’s division into pro-European and pro-Russian parts, the insufficient level of European identity. At the same time, 30% of Ukrainian respondents perceive Romania positively, 58% neutrally and only 7% negatively¹³. Thus, European integration has contributed to the peaceful settlement of the contradictions between Ukraine and Romania. And the threat of Russia’s aggressive policy has created additional incentives to reorganise relations, strengthen the security component, given that Ukraine and Romania are neighboring countries, and security for one is a matter of security for another.

The EU impact on Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation

EU integration has been a priority for Romania and Ukraine since the early 1990s. However, for a long time, Kyiv and Bucharest did not aim to cooperate in the Eurointegration field. But as a member of the European Union, Romania has begun to pay more attention to its eastern neighbors using the full potential of the EU instruments to cooperate and communicate with new democracies in the eastern border of the European Union, and promote stability and prosperity of these states for the security of the region and Europe

¹¹ Порошенко у Румунії домовився про імпорт газу і 750 тисяч євро допомоги [Poroshenko in Romania Agreed on Gas Import and 750 Thousand Euros of Aid]. 21.04.2016. Retrieved from <http://tsn.ua/groshi/poroshenko-u-rumuniyi-domovivsyia-pro-import-gazu-i-750-tisyach-yevro-dopomogi-635501.html> (15-07-2021)

¹² Інтернет-конференція Й. В. Пана Траян Лауренціу-Христия [Internat Conference of H.E. Traian Laurentiu Hristea]. 05.02.2007. Retrieved from <https://maidan.org.ua/arch/pressk/1178094330.html> (15-07-2021)

¹³ Сергій Солодкий, Іляна Ракеру, Аудит зовнішньої політики: Україна – Румунія [Foreign policy audit: Ukraine - Romania]. Київ, Інститут світової політики, 2016. р. 28-30.

as a whole¹⁴. Therefore, Romania has actively supported the development of the Black Sea Synergy, a separate ENP initiative, as a framework for multilateral projects, including the creation of a security and confidence zone in the Black Sea region. In addition, Bucharest was one of the initiators and developers of the EU Strategy for the Danube region. It also contributed to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program as a platform for developing bilateral relations, strengthening political and economic ties and adapting partner countries to EU standards. It should be noted that Ukraine and Romania were rather critical of the EaP due to the lack of membership prospects for the countries included in the EaP program and its limited funding. At the same time, the basis of cooperation between Ukraine and Romania is the EU Neighborhood Policy and the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, which are a set of tools for implementing programs of closer cross-border cooperation with neighboring countries.

Cross-border cooperation (CBC) by covering issues of national minorities, development of border areas, use of the potential of the Black Sea and the Danube basin is among the key fields of dialogue between Kyiv and Bucharest. Attention to this issue is determined by the following factors. First, many border regions of Romania (Suceava, Botosani, Satu-Mare, Maramures and Tulcea) and Ukraine (Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa and Chernivtsi) of a total of 100,840 km² and 7.9 million residents are interested in CBC. Secondly, Ukraine and Romania still have some contradictions regarding common borders, national minorities, the consistent and mutually beneficial solution of which is one of the priorities of cross-border cooperation. Third, the bordering regions of Ukraine and Romania hold, on one hand, serious problems in terms of transport infrastructure development, which hinder economic development and people-to-people contacts. And from another, they have the significant resource potential being part of TEN-T Network, TRACECA and “Black Sea transport circle” project, and therefore an important link in the development of transmodal transport and economic, transit and tourism industries throughout Europe.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the introduction of the local border traffic between Ukraine and Romania have created additional conditions for deepening various aspects of the CBC. Thus, since 2014, Kyiv and Bucharest have achieved some success in this direction: new agreements on cross-border cooperation have been signed; the local border traffic was introduced; new crossing points on the Ukrainian-Romanian border have been opened (“Orlivka-Isaccea” and “Izmail-Tulcea”), and some of them are going to be opened soon (“Krasnopilsk-Vikovu de Sus”, “Diakivtsi-Rakovets” and

¹⁴ Ірина Максименко, *Відносини України та Румунії в контексті регіональних ініціатив ЄС [Ukraine-Romania Relations in the context of the EU Regional Initiatives]*, in *International and Political Studies*, 2019, Vol. 24, Is. 32. p. 138-139.

“Shepit-Izvoarele Sucevei”) or still negotiating (“Bila Tserkva - Sighetu Marmatiei” and “Bila Krynytsia – Climaui”).

In addition, new CBC programs under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument were implemented: “Joint Operational Programme Romania – Ukraine for 2014-2020”, “Black Sea Basin Programme for 2014-2020” and “Joint Operational Programme Hungary – Slovakia – Romania – Ukraine for 2014-2020”. They were aimed at achieving more balanced partnerships and contributions, homogeneity of project and program participants, greater convergence between projects, and more efficient use of funding and increased added value of CBC. During 2014-2020, almost 60 projects on environmental issues (mainly related to the prevention of natural and man-made disasters and emergency management), road infrastructure and mobility development, and “people-to-people” contacts have been approved in the frame of the Joint Operational Programme Romania – Ukraine. Among the projects one can mention the following: “EASTAVERT – The prevention and protection against floods in the upper Siret and Prut River Basins, through the implementation of a modern monitoring system with automatic stations”, “Clean River”, “CBCConnect-Trans – Development of intermodal cross-border communication along the route Isakcea-Orlivka-Izmail-Tulcea”, as well as “CBC-SAFETY – Prevention and Fight against Organized Crime and Police Cooperation through Cross-Border Centers on the Romania-Ukraine Border”. A new program “Interreg NEXT Romania-Ukraine Program for 2021-2027” is currently elaborating. According to preliminary discussions, the parties agreed to continue cooperation in the fields related to protection and preservation of nature and climate change adaptation, and disaster risk management, smart and intermodal infrastructure for sustainable mobility, social development (education, health and social inclusion, culture), digital connectivity, border management, civic society cooperation¹⁵.

At the same time, interaction in the framework of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, the Black Sea Synergy, the Eastern Partnership programs and the “Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin Program 2021-2027” remains an important area of further cooperation between Ukraine and Romania. Analyzing the priorities of these programs, it can be stated that they aim at overcoming common problems that have worsened or become threatening due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In particular, the impact of Covid-19 on economics for 2020 is estimated to be significant in the countries and has caused a decline of trade, investments, tourism, cultural and entertainment activities. Pandemic also has had a negative effect on social contacts and development. That demands to pay more attention to improving the quality of the roads, to

¹⁵ Territorial analysis Interreg NEXT Romania-Ukraine 2021-2027. Retrieved from https://ro-ua.net/images/Territorial_analysis_Romania-Ukraine_Programme_2021-2027.pdf (15-07-2021)

elaborating the project of mutual beneficial use of the airports and sea and river ports in both countries aiming to build smart and intermodal infrastructure for sustainable mobility. The better connections between regions of Ukraine and Romania are also important due to the security issues mainly related to border cross management and control, including harmonisation of procedures by both sides, acquisition of modern high-tech equipment for border surveillance and control (cameras, drones, communication means, and vehicles), joint training and patrolling. The digital connectivity and social development projects are also among the top priority issues. The objectives of these fields should focus on measures having a cross-border dimension to better include minorities and building mutual trust and confidence at the local and regional level, digitalization and online communication to enable equal access to education and the labour market as well as exchanges of best practice for the efficient delivery of public services, and enhancing the role of culture and sustainable tourism. Diverse ethnic and cultural traditions are a favorable basis for the development of ethnic, rural, gastronomic tourism, which have become very popular in many European countries in recent years.

Russian factor of Ukraine-Romania security dialogue after 2014

Russia's militarization of the Crimean peninsula and its efforts to transform the Black Sea into the "Russian Lake" has infringed the balance of power in the region, which, according to Klaus Iohannis, has caused concern and facilitated to maintain an atmosphere of insecurity¹⁶. The Kremlin's actions turned to be an impetus that changed the priorities of Ukraine and Romania, regarding both the bilateral cooperation and the interaction to strengthen national and regional security. In addition, Romania's attitudes toward Ukraine and Ukraine's attitudes toward Romania have changed. Prior to the events of 2014, Romania did not fully believe in the invariability of Ukraine's pro-European strategy, considering it the promoter of Russia's foreign policy in the Black Sea region due to the extension of the agreement on Russia's Black Sea Fleet stationing in Sevastopol¹⁷. But the resolute struggle of the Ukrainian people for their freedom and territory demonstrated the high level of civic

¹⁶ Надія Константінова, «Ми маємо підготувати наш союз до викликів сьогодення та завтрашнього дня» – Столтенберг [“We Must Prepare Our Union for the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow” - Stoltenberg]. 10.05.2021. Retrieved from <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/my-mayemo-pidhotuvaty-nash-soyus-do-vyklykiv/31248210.html> (15-07-2021)

¹⁷ Артем Филиппенко, Трансформация Причерноморья. В кого превращается Румыния из «идеального врага» Украины [Transformation of the Black Sea Region. To whom is Romania Becoming from the “Ideal Enemy” of Ukraine]. 21.09.2017. Retrieved from <https://www.dsnews.ua/world/transformatsiya-prichernomorya-2-rumyniya-iz-glavnogo-vraga--21082017220000> (15-07-2021)

consciousness of Ukrainians, their love of independence and, therefore, the importance of developing security cooperation between the two states.

Romania's geographical proximity to the illegally annexed and militarized Crimea, the threat of Russian warships using the Danube to control missile defense sites in Romania, an important component of Romania's and NATO defense capabilities, and the promotion of the "Novorossiya" project, which poses a threat to Romanian national minorities in Ukraine and Moldova, all this exacerbates the sense of danger for Bucharest. Thus, at the beginning of 2015, 66% of Romanian citizens negatively perceived Russia and 64% of respondents considered the war in Ukraine a threat to Romania. It is worth noting that Russia perceived sharply the deployment of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense site in Romania in 2016. President Vladimir Putin declared that this system poses threats to Russia; therefore, the Kremlin will be forced to think about neutralizing them¹⁸. Russia's militarization of Crimea, according to Romanian Vice Admiral Alexandru Mirsu, poses a threat to Romania's national security and means that its entire coastline is within range of Russia's long-range surface-to-surface missiles¹⁹.

Romania's National Defense Strategy states that the actions of the Russian Federation contribute to the deterioration of the security situation and stability in the region²⁰. And the Kremlin's policies, which are directly involved in arming militants in eastern Ukraine and do not use its influence on separatists to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, are a source of additional risks and threats.

Therefore, Ukraine and Romania have expressed a common interest in developing cooperation in order to ensure regional and, consequently, national security. Bucharest immediately condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine, recognizing the illegality of the actions of the "green men" who have annexed Crimea. Romania also supported Ukraine in preventing further occupation of the territory, especially in the Odesa region²¹. Both a neighbor and a member state of the OSCE, EU and NATO, Romania provides Ukraine

¹⁸ Polina Sinovets, Iryna Maksymenko, *The Baltic-Black Sea Region in Great Powers' Relations: the Hard Power Aspect*, in Olga Bogdanova, Andrey Makarychev (Eds.), *Baltic-Black Sea Regionalisms. Patchworks and Networks at Europe's Eastern Margins*, Springer, 2020. p. 77.

¹⁹ Артем Филипенко, *op. cit.*

²⁰ *National Defense Strategy 2020-2024. Together for a Safe and Prosperous Romania in a World Marked by New Challenges*. The Official website of the President of Romania. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/National_Defence_Strategy_2020_2024.pdf (15-07-2021)

²¹ Iulian Chifu, *Relațiile româno-ucrainene în epoca nevoii Parteneriatului Strategic*. Retrieved from <http://revistapolis.ro/relatiile-romano-ucrainene-in-epoca-nevoii-parteneriatului-strategic/> (15-07-2021)

with financial and technical assistance to prevent the economic crisis, implement structural reforms and strengthen its defense capabilities. As a member of the OSCE, Romania participates in the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Eastern Ukraine. Within the EU, Romania has consistently advocated the importance of maintaining sanctions against Russia as long as Ukraine's sovereignty remains threatened, i.e. the Minsk agreements are not fully implemented, or if the situation in the region continues to aggravate²².

The Transnistrian issue remains an important issue for the EU, as well as for Ukraine and Romania. Both Kyiv and Bucharest believe that a peaceful settlement of the conflict is crucial for the European integration of the Republic of Moldova and regional security and stability. Therefore, Romania and Ukraine border agencies are actively involved in joint operations with Moldova, coordinated by the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). Among the successful examples of cooperation in this area are the operations "Navigator" (April 2017) and "Orion" (September 2018 - January 2019) to combat the illegal movement of firearms, explosives, chemicals, biological, nuclear and radioactive materials across the Ukrainian-Moldovan state border²³ as well as the EUBAM Annual Task Force Tobacco meetings in Odesa and successfully completed the Joint Border Control Operation (JBCO) "SCORPION" on the Ukrainian-Moldovan state border²⁴. Nevertheless, the core preposition for the conflict resolution, as the two countries believe, is a substitution of the Russian troops with international peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone.

However, Kyiv and Bucharest are most actively developing cooperation, according to Sergiy Gerasymchuk, "under the NATO umbrella"²⁵. Thus, Romania was the first to apply the term "military aggression" in NATO

²² Румунія підтримує санкції проти Росії до повного виконання Мінських угод – президент Йоханніс [Romania Supports Sanctions Against Russia Until Full Implementation of the Minsk Agreements - President Iohannis], 17.03.15 Retrieved from <https://www.unian.ua/politics/1056431-rumuniya-pidtrimue-sanktsiji-proti-rosiji-dopovnego-vikonannya-minskih-ugod-prezidentyohannis.htm> (15-07-2021)

²³ Операцію «Навігатор» успішно завершено [Operation "Navigator" Completed Successfully], 21.07.2017. Retrieved from <https://snriu.gov.ua/news/operatsiyu-navigator-uspishno-zaversheno> (15-07-2021); Numerous weapons confiscated during the EU-coordinated Joint Operation "ORION", 17.07.2019. Retrieved from <https://eubam.org/newsroom/numerous-weapons-confiscated-during-the-eu-coordinated-joint-operation-orion/> (15-07-2021)

²⁴ EUBAM Annual Task Force Tobacco fosters cooperation in fighting cigarettes smuggling, 08.11.2019. Retrieved from <https://eubam.org/newsroom/eubam-annual-task-force-tobacco-fosters-cooperation-in-fighting-cigarettes-smuggling/> (15-07-2021)

²⁵ Sergiy Gerasymchuk, *The Relations between Ukraine and Romania: Old and New Perceptions. Cooperation Outlooks*. 09.01.2017. Retrieved from <http://prismua.org/en/relations-ukraine-romania-old-new-perceptions-cooperation-outlooks/> (15-07-2021)

statements with regard to Russia's military action against Ukraine, contributes to the NATO-Ukraine Trust Fund on Cyber Security²⁶. Bucharest also initiates projects on the regular military cooperation, a joint patrol force of border guards from Ukraine, Romania and Turkey, and strengthening "soft security" instruments (fighting against corruption and organized crime, cyber security, information security, energy and economic independence from Russia).

On a bilateral level, Ukraine and Romania signed an Agreement to boost military and other forms of cooperation in 2014 and an Agreement on cooperation in the military and technical field in 2020 to simplify procedures for the purchase of military equipment and non-lethal weapons. These documents created the basis for a real breakthrough in security cooperation between Ukraine and Romania. Since 2018, the states conduct the annual joint military exercises "Riverine" in the Danube Delta. The purpose of these exercises is to work out joint actions of multinational tactical groups of navies and border services of the two countries to ensure the safety of civilian shipping, carrying out rescue operations, and maintain security on the Danube River. Ukraine is also participating in NATO exercises in the Black Sea, including "Platinum Eagle" and PASSEX. Joint exercises with Romania and other NATO member states are an opportunity for Ukraine to synchronize operations in the Danube Delta and maintain stability in the Black Sea region, train forces and increase the interoperability of navies. Ultimately, this will help to boost the implementation of NATO standards in Ukraine, bringing it closer to the strategic goal of full membership in the Alliance, but as for now, it is an opportunity to be part of collective security in the region²⁷.

A promising area of security cooperation between Ukraine and Romania is regional cooperation aiming to restore the security balance and effectively counter Russia's efforts to destabilize the situation on the eastern borders of the EU and NATO or to create an Anti-access/Area denial "bubble" (A2/AD) in the Black Sea region. At the summit of the Crimean Platform in Kyiv on August 23, 2021, the Prime Minister of Romania Florin Kitsu stressed the seriousness of the challenges and threats in the Black Sea region. Therefore, "we must work together to find effective solutions", he concluded²⁸. For that

²⁶ Iryna Maksymenko, Yuliia Maystrenko, *The South-Eastern Europe and Western Balkans in the Ukrainian Foreign Policy*, in Igor Koval, Olga Brusylovska, Volodymyr Dubovyk (Eds.) *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine*, Odessa, 2017. p. 210-211.

²⁷ Руслан Рудомський, «Riverine-2018»: для чого Україна з Румунією «москітний флот» тренувала [“Riverine-2018”: Why for Ukraine and Romania “Mosquito Fleet” Trained]. 7.09.2018. Retrieved from <https://www.depo.ua/rus/war/riverine-2018-dlya-chogo-ukrayina-z-rumuniyeyu-moskitniy-flot-trenuvala-20180907833717> (15-07-2021)

²⁸ Румыния поддерживает стремление Украины стать членом ЕС и НАТО – премьер [Romania Supports Ukraine's Aspirations to Become a Member of the EU and NATO - Prime Minister], 23.08.2021. Retrieved from <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2021/08/23/7126922/> (15-07-2021)

reason, Bucharest initiated the invitation of Ukraine to the 2020 Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum in Bucharest, the Poland-Romania-Turkey tripartite group and the summit of the multilateral group “Bucharest 9” in 2021. Issues of security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, cooperation at regional and multilateral levels with a focus on common security and economic interests, strengthening the presence of NATO forces on the eastern flank from the Baltic to the Black Sea were discussed during these events. According to Dmytro Kuleba, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the invitation of Ukraine is a political signal and a concrete action to support Ukraine in a difficult time²⁹.

Conclusion

Ukrainian-Romanian relations were complex and uneven, complicated by persistent stereotypes and problems of a historical and ethnic nature. Neither Ukraine nor Romania has developed a holistic vision of interstate relations and, consequently, a comprehensive approach to solving sensitive issues.

Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007 created additional opportunities and mechanisms for intensifying Ukrainian-Romanian interstate cooperation. Today, bilateral relations are developing within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy and other initiatives of the European Union, which meet the interests of both countries. Ukraine and Romania are interested in implementing cross-border projects in priority areas, including economic and transport infrastructure development, strengthening energy security, environmental protection, education, culture and tourism. The main obstacles for effective CBC are the diversity and difference of economic development level and interests of the Romanian and Ukrainian local authorities and communities, the lack of border crossing points, old transport infrastructure, limited financial resources, and lack of coordination, information sharing and mutual awareness of each other.

At the same time, the common threat of Russia's aggressive policy gave a boost to the first change in the mutual perception of both nations and the understanding that they have common interests and priorities, which are easier to realize by joint actions. That contributed to the intensification of constructive political dialogue, proclaiming the “reset” and strengthening of bilateral cooperation. Given that the Kremlin's policy towards Ukraine and, accordingly, the threat to the national security of both countries will not change in the coming years, further security and defense bilateral cooperation of Ukraine and Romania, and within the EU and NATO, along with support for Ukraine's participation in regional initiatives (Intermarium, Bucharest 9, the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) and the EU Rapid Reaction Force Battle Group (HELBROC), etc.) is a top priority. At the highest level, mutual

²⁹ Надія Константінова, *op. cit.*

interest in the development of strategic cooperation and the existing of the prospects of deepening cooperation was confirmed. Both Kyiv and Bucharest expressed interests to intensify interaction in the field of information and cyber security, soft issues and enhanced interoperability, cooperation between the Ukrainian and Romanian navies as well as internal reforms necessary to fulfill Ukraine's obligations under the Association Agreement with the EU and NATO membership.

The mutually declared desire of both countries for strategic partnership should be embodied with the practical steps aimed at strengthening trust and deepening bilateral cooperation. In particular, Ukraine and Romania should organize an active exchange of reform experience between Romanian and Ukrainian defence institutions, expand opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, especially in military exercises, support and take an active part in Romania and Ukraine's initiatives to coordinate foreign policy efforts in the Wider Black Sea region, to invest more in infrastructure development, expand cooperation in the educational, tourism and cultural fields aiming to increase mutual awareness and trust besides.

It's apparent that the prospects of Ukrainian-Romanian relations will depend, firstly, on Ukraine's success in reforms and the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU and, secondly, the political will of the leaders of two countries to overcome the traditional contradictions that can remain the hindrance for equal partnership relationship. However, active participation of Ukrainian state in the regional and European and Euroatlantic projects supported by Romania will serve to give an additional impetus for the modernization of Ukraine's security and defence soon and stabilize the situation in the Black Sea region.

PAGES OF ROMANIAN HISTORY IN THE WORKS OF ANDREI LYZLOV

Augustin GURITĂ*

Abstract: Andrey Lyzlov, a career soldier and member of the Russian elite, was one of the first Russian historians. He was the author of *The Scythian History*, completed in 1692, a fairly vast controversial work which circulated in manuscript form, at first confined to the Muscovite elite with the purpose of urging its members to campaign against the Khanate of Crimea and the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the failed campaigns he himself had taken part in. The information he collected is gathered from various Russian and foreign sources and historical works, such as chronicles, chronographs, versions of the history of Kazan, Polish-Lithuanian chronicles and others. *The Scythian History* includes, among others, several fragments regarding the history of the medieval Romanian space. It is not necessarily unknown information, but it is relevant and important that Lyzlov chose and used it to exemplify the anti-Islamic struggle waged by Orthodox principles in Eastern Europe. In this article we have highlighted and analyzed these fragments, bringing to the attention of our historiography the existence of this information in a late Russian chronicle which had an obvious purpose of propaganda.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire; Russian Empire; Tatars; propaganda; Moldavia

Five years ago, while looking up information on several texts that circulated in Romanian territories in the eighteenth century (thought to have had Russian origins and that were mostly copied or translated during periods of Russian military occupation), I came across the name of a character who lived and wrote at the same time as the great chronicler Miron Costin. To my knowledge, he is rarely mentioned in our historiography. He is Andrei Lyzlov, considered the first Russian 'historian', despite the fact that he was not interested in what, at the time, was the 'method'. For various reasons, throughout time, his work was not known in international languages (as far as I know, Russian chronicles¹, which will concern the forthcoming lines, have not yet been

* "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iași, Romania. augustingurita@yahoo.com

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translated), but it was mentioned in various studies and articles, especially those dedicated to the way in which the discourse against the adepts of Islam, especially Turks and Tatars, was constructed in 17th-18th century Russia. Besides the research of Russian specialists² – historians, philologists, philosophers etc. –, the most important contribution is still a doctoral thesis in philosophy by David Hari Das defended in 1991 at the University of Washington: *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture: a Study of Andrei Lyzlov's History of the Scythians*³, unpublished in book form, to this day, but cited by those interested in the topic. The dissertation is available for consultation due to the advantages of the digital world, through which the boundaries of space and time are cancelled and quick access to works that would have otherwise been inaccessible is facilitated.

Andrei Lyzlov was born around 1655⁴; his family owned property in Moscow and Putyvl; his father, Ivan Fedorovitch, held various positions throughout his life, but for the better part of it he was employee of the Russian patriarchal administration, climbing as far as chief of chancery for appointments. Andrei entered the service of the imperial court at 15 and is attested as a 'stolnik' in 1677⁵; he took part in various military confrontations. In 1677-1678, he participated as *rostmister*, commanded by Prince Vasili Golitsyn⁶ (to whom he is presumed to have been related), in the regiment of the Russian army in Cehrin, the Russian-Turkish war of 1676-1681. After the signing of the Bahcisarai Treaty (January 3, 1681), he joined his father, for a while, in guarding the garrisons of

¹ Андрей Лызлов, *Скифская история*, ответственный редактор доктор исторических наук Е. В. Чистякова, подготовка текста, комментарии и аннотированный список имен А. П. Богданов, Москва, Издательство «Наука», 1990. This critical edition of the *Scythian History* was copied after the most complete manuscript, the one kept at the State Historical Museum in Moscow, the Synod Collection.

² V.: Е. В. Чистякова, «Скифская история» А. И. Лызлова и труды польских историков XVI—XVII вв., in „Труды Отдела древнерусской литературы”, p. 348–357; eadem, *Русский историк А.И. Лызлов и его книга «Скифская история»*, in „Вестник истории мировой культуры”, nr. 1, 1961, p. 117–127; eadem, *Об авторе «Скифской истории» А.И. Лызлове*, in *Вопросы социально-экономической истории и источниковедения периода феодализма в России*, Москва, 1961, p. 284–289 А. П. Богданов, А. И. Гладкий, *Лызлов Андрей Иванович*, in *Словарь книжников и книжности Древней Руси*, вып. 3, XVII в., часть 2: И–О, Санкт-Петербург, 1993, p. 305–309.

³ David H. Das, *History writing and late Muscovite court culture: a study of Andrei Lyzlov's History of the Scythians*, University of Washington, Seattle, 1991 (available at the address: digital.lib.washington.edu).

⁴ Jan Hennings, *Andrei Ivanovich Lyzlov*, in *Christian-Muslim Relations A Bibliographical History*, vol. 8, *Northern and Eastern Europe (1600-1700)*, edited by David Thomas and John Chesworth, with Clinton Bennett, Lejla Demiri, Martha Frederiks, Stanisław Grodz, Douglas Pratt, Leiden-Bosoton, 2016, p. 951–959.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 951.

⁶ On his personality, see.: Lindsey A. J. Hughes, *Russia and the West: The Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer, Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643–1714)*, Newtonville, 1984.

South-Eastern cities for the voyevode⁷. He also fought in the Crimea campaigns in 1687-1689. During preparations for the Azov campaign, Lyzlov was charged with collecting cereals in the Voronej area to stock the troops. Afterwards he returned to Moscow, where he was appointed chancery officer. He was sent to collect grains for the second Azov campaign once more. In 1696 he sold his Moscow home, and the following year he is attested as being seriously ill. The exact date of his passing is unknown⁸. In-between these participations to various military actions, Andrei Lyzlov translated and wrote, having very good knowledge of Polish, as well as Latin (comparatively rudimentary, according to specialists). His participation in various military campaigns against the Tatars facilitated his knowledge of the enemy, in a way; even under these circumstances, his main sources were foreign texts⁹.

Living in the proximity of the diplomatic chancery, the centre of Russian contacts with Europe, Lyzlov had the opportunity of obtaining important books at a time when, besides Golitsyn, the institution was headed by Artemon Matveev, whose son Andrei, future ambassador in London, studied Greek and Latin with Nicholas Milescu. There's a hypothesis according to which Andrei Lyzlov played an important part in saving the Russian Patriarchy; Simon Polotzki asked tsar Feodor to found the Russian Papal institution, headed by deposed patriarch Nikon who was going to be charged with the care of four subordinated patriarchies, among which one in Novgorod, where patriarch Joachim was to be sent¹⁰. He allegedly held counsel with his boyars and then asked Lyzlov to write a critique of Polotzki, whose plan was not carried out, after all.

Andrei Lyzlov was a good translator. His first translations were from the Polish, starting with a few excerpts from *The Chronicle of Poland, Lithuania, Samogithia* printed in 1582 by Maciej Strykowski¹¹. This happened in 1682; four years later he translated part of Szymon Starowolsk's work on *The Turkish Emperor's Court and his Residence in Constantinople* (*Dwór cesarza tureckiego i rezydencja jego w Konstantynopolu*), after the first 1646 Cracow edition. Part of these excerpts, alongside others, translated from the works of Marcin Cromer (*De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum libri XXX*), Andrzej Taranowski, Marcin Bielski (*Kronika swata*), Alessandro Guagnini (*Kronika Sarmacyey Europejskiej*) circulated during the campaigns of 1676 and 1681 amongst the highest circles of the Russian elite. These translations, together with other products of counter-reformation such as

⁷ Jan Hennings, *op. cit.*, p. 951.

⁸ He probably died of a heart attack. (*ibidem*, p. 952).

⁹ R. D. Crews, *For Prophet and tsar. Islam and empire in Russia and Central Asia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2009, p. 35.

¹⁰ David H. Das, *op. cit.*, p. 6–7.

¹¹ Idem, *The margin is the message. Andrej Lyzlov's translation of Strykowski's Kronika*, in „Europa Orientalis”, 5, 1986, p. 345–350.

Cesare Baronio's *Ecclesiastic Annals* or Giovanni Bottero's *Relationi universali*¹², corroborated with Russian sources such as chronicles, chronographs, versions of the history of Kazan, *The Book of Imperial Genealogical Ranks* (*Степенная книга царского родословия*), *The Lives of Saints* (written by Metropolitan Demetrius of Rostov) etc., accompanied by personal comments, gathered and materialized in his main work¹³, *Skifskaiia istoriia* (*The Scythian History*)¹⁴, published in 1692, a quite vast polemical work which circulated in manuscript form¹⁵, at first confined to the Muscovite elite with the purpose of urging its members to campaign against the Khanate of Crimea and the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the failed campaigns he himself had taken part in¹⁶. For the first time in this cultural space,

¹² Brian L. Davies, *The Prisoner's Tale: Russian Captivity Narratives and Changing Muscovite Perceptions of the Ottoman-Tatar Dar-al-Islam*, in *Eurasian Slavery, Ransom and Abolition in World History, 1200–1860*, edited by Cristoph Witzernath, Routledge, 2016, p. 292.

¹³ Regarding Lyslov's sources, see.: David H. Das, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 31–53, and idem (by David Das), *History Writing and the Quest for Fame in Late Muscovy: Andrei Lyzlov's History of the Scythians*, in „The Russian Review”, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), p. 502–509.

¹⁴ Full title: Скифская история содержащая в себе: о названии Скифии, и границах ея, и народах скифийских монгаллах и прочих, и о амазонах мужественных женах их, и коих времен и якового ради случая татары прозвашася и от отеческих своих мест в наши страны приидоша, и яковыя народы во оных странах быша, и идеже ныне татарове обитают. И о начале и умножении Золотыя орды и о царех бывших тамо. О Казанской орде и царех их. О Перекопской или Крымской орде и царех их. О Махомете прелестнике азарянском и о прелести вымышленной от него. О начале турков и о салтанах их. От разных иностранных историков, паче же от российских верных историй и повестей, от Андрея Лызлова прилежными труды сложена и написана лета от Сотворения Света 7200-го, а от Рождества Христова 1692-го. Разделяется же в четыре части, к тому приложена повесть о поведении и жителстве в Константинополе султанов турецких, еже преведена а от славенополского языка в славенороссийский язык им же, Андреем Лызловым / ‘Scythian history, containing [content]: about the name of Scythia and its borders, and the Scythian, Mongol and other peoples, and about the Amazons their manlike wives, and about when and why they were called Tatars and how they came from their homeland to our lands, and which peoples live in their lands, and where the Tatars live now. And about the origins and expansion of the Golden Horde and about their previous tsars. About the Kazan Horde and their tsars. About the Perekop, or Crimean, Horde and their tsars. About Muḥammad the Hagarite charmer and about the seduction masterminded by him. About the origin of the Turks and their sultans. From various foreign historians, especially from true Russian histories and narratives, an assiduous work compiled and written by Andrei Lyzlov in the year of the creation of the world 7200, or of the birth of Christ 1692. It is divided into four parts, to which is appended the narrative about the conduct and life of the Turkish sultans in Constantinople, which was translated from the Polish Slavic language into the Russian Slavic language also by him, Andrei Lyzlov’ (translated by Jan Hennings, *op. cit.*, p. 953).

¹⁵ Over 30 manuscripts of the *Scythian History* have survived up to this date (Jan Hennings, *op. cit.*, p. 957)

¹⁶ David H. Das, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 61.

the author uses marginal notes¹⁷, thus imitating the Polish sources¹⁸, showing each time where the piece of information was taken from; at the same time, he compares various variants to provide the most credible data and he does not hesitate to state his own opinion; in many cases, in order to justify the 'propaganda', he makes interesting changes. The stolnik's outer sources and some of his inside ones are easily identifiable through his references, but some of the Muscovite sources were very difficult or impossible to trace with precision as they were found in manuscripts at the time. Lyzlov fights a real 'battle' to persuade his readers by resorting to the authority of the sources; he also compares several similar pieces of information critically¹⁹ etc., saying that in order to justify certain things he had to work hard and pay attention while reading many historical accounts. He is not always completely faithful to his sources, however, at least in the cases where he is trying to make a point. This is why researchers from several generations made the claim that he failed to move on from the providentialism specific to his type of literature²⁰, despite others claiming the contrary.

With four large books divided into 20 chapters²¹, the Russian stolnik's work comprises data on the Scythians' legendary origins, the Amazons etc., moving on to the Tatars, particularly the Golden Horde and the Russians' fights against them in Kazan and Astrakhan, then the Tatar settlements on the rivers flowing into the Black Sea²². An important part of his work is dedicated to the history of the Ottoman Empire from its origins to the end of the sixteenth century²³. The Fall of Constantinople and the ulterior conquests of the Turks are important pages of his compilation²⁴. On several occasions, Lyzlov attributes the Turks' success to the Christian troops' lack of unity²⁵; he accuses the leaders of the Ottoman Empire's neighbouring states of envy, greed, and laziness, sins

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 129.

¹⁸ Idem, *History Writing and the Quest for Fame in Late Muscovy*, p. 504; Paul Bushkovich, *Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia*, in L. Steindorff (ed), *Religion und Integration im Moskauer Russland: Konzepte und Praktiken, Potentiale und Grenzen 14.–17. Jahrhundert*, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010, p.136–137.

¹⁹ David H. Das, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 136.

²⁰ Idem, *History Writing and the Quest for Fame in Late Muscovy*, p. 505.

²¹ Jan Hennings, *op. cit.*, p. 951–952.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 954.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ This work by Andrei Lyzlov was the secondary source for the different variants of the *History of the Fall of Tsargrad under the Turks*. In his compilation he melted Nestor Iskander's tale (М. Н. Сперанский, *Из истории русско-славянских литературных связей*, Москва, 1960, p. 222, note 23, *apud* Constantin Ciobanu, *Sursele literare ale programelor iconografice din pictura medievală murală moldavă*, Chişinău, 2005, p. 59, in manuscript form, available at istoria-artei.ro). Lyzlov is also responsible for the replacement of the name Tsargrad with Constantinople in seventeenth century Russia (Е. В. Чистякова, «Скифская история» А. И. Лызлова и труды польских историков XVI—XVII вв., p. 348–352).

²⁵ David H. Das, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 78–81.

which would contribute to the Ottoman's success: 'Oh, evil envy, which leads Christian princes onto wrong paths!'²⁶, the author asks rhetorically... He then makes important modifications where the text could serve the work's purpose. Guagnini asked: 'Where is the Kingdom of Hungary, that golden apple which bloomed and now lays in the swamp? Where are the Moldavians bordering Poland? They're all sunk in treacherous silence, as in a trap.'²⁷ Lyzlov paraphrases the text by saying: 'Where are the countless Christian peoples? All killed by the pagans due to their lack of understanding, they made peace with the heathens in exchange for war and are thus defeating the Christians by taking them by surprise.'²⁸ All these arguments of his, based on different examples, had the main purpose of convincing the reader of the necessity of the fight against the Turks and the Tatars²⁹.

The Christendom-Islam conflict is present everywhere, treated from the perspective of a specific rhetoric. As highlighted by Jan Hennings³⁰, Lyzlov critiques the way in which Christians were treated within the Ottoman Empire, particularly the fact that some were forced to become Muslims. Not at all surprisingly, in order to justify the expansionist policy of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, Andrei Lyzlov's history was printed in four editions, three in Moscow and one in Sankt Petersburg, those of 1776 and 1787 being edited by Nikolai Novikov. The author brought through these the necessary arguments for a pan-orthodox (or even pan-slavic, in a budding stage) battle against the two 'pagan' entities. The information translated and included in this chronicle are useful for the author to justify the fight, which is why he borrows data from the above-mentioned authors and presents facts of the lives of those who warred with the Turks or the Tatars, also putting events that occurred years apart side by side; he thus provides examples of princes that defended the Christian cause around which a common solidarity had to form to serve the fight led by the tsars at the time. There was also a time when they were pressured to start a war against the Turks. Lyzlov certainly knew about the letter received by Vasili Golitsyn from Innocent Likudius³¹ which included the idea that there was no better time than the present to see the tsar on the throne in Constantinople; that would have stopped the Turks from approaching further. In the Balkans, the clerics were suggesting the idea of the third Rome and the project of an imminent reconquering of 'Constantine's City'³².

As shown by David H. Das, archimandrite Isaiah from the Athonite monastery of St. Paul brought the letters of former patriarch Dionysus of

²⁶ Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

²⁷ David H. Das, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 19, 81.

²⁸ Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 277–278.

²⁹ David Das, *History Writing and the Quest for Fame in Late Muscovy*, p. 506.

³⁰ Jan Hennings, *op. cit.*, p. 954.

³¹ David H. Das, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 92–93.

³² *Ibidem*.

Constantinople, Serbian archbishop Arseny and Wallachian prince Șerban Cantacuzino to Moscow in 1688³³. The Russians were accused by the patriarch that they didn't fight the Antichrist; 'Moscow sleeps!' Archimandrite Ignatius Rimski-Korsakov had delivered a speech in 1687, on the eve of the campaigns, in which he discussed (Pseudo-) Methodius of Patara's prophecy that the Slavs will be the ones to save Constantinople³⁴.

It is in this sort of environment that Lyzlov drafted his 'chronicle'. He was trying to prove, however, that the succession of historical events led to a favourable end to the Christian-pagan fight headed, of course, by the Russian sovereigns. He does not stick to this argument, however, but goes on to say that this *holy war* is part of the old dispute between the civilized sedentary peoples and the savage nomadic Scythians, peoples of the steppe. He also proposes 'glory'³⁵ as a reward for participants in military campaigns against Muslims³⁶. This 'glory' becomes the new value within the Muscovite aristocracy, opposing the old tradition of hereditary honours³⁷, a reflection of the Polish influence on the Russian elite, as underlined by David Hari Das³⁸. Thus, at this time, also due to Lyzlov's work, military meritocracy had started to ensure access and integration into society's upper crust.

This is something all Christian princes should have participated in, but the suggestion seemed to be that the war be led by Moscow. Many times, however, it can be clearly seen that Orthodoxy was the only one that could be associated with the Christian religion. In the 376 pages of his book, the word 'Christian', ascribed to different peoples, prices, armies or persons, is mentioned approximately 500 times while the word 'pagan' (*nozan*) almost 250 times.

Guagnini, for instance, wrote that 'the time when, through the will of God, the Ottoman state will fall, is undoubtedly near – may God grant that it come to pass during the reign of our most Illustrious Polish king that the Wallachians with their lances, the Spanish with their spears, the Russians with theirs, the Slovaks with their swords, the Podolyans with their spears and all the Christian peoples will raise arms against the Muslim dog'³⁹... Lyzlov's texts is substantially altered: 'it is undoubtedly worth believing that the moment of the fall of the pagan Ottoman rule is near; may this moment happen under the favourable reign of the most illustrious and powerful faithful sovereigns of ours (,благополучного царствования пресветлейших и державнейших

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 93.

³⁴ *Ibidem*. Andrei Lyzlov praises the cousins of Slavs, Bulgarians, for winning their glory through wars (Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 18).

³⁵ David Das, *History Writing and the Quest for Fame in Late Muscovy*, p. 506–507.

³⁶ *Idem*, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 149.

³⁷ *Idem*, *History Writing and the Quest for Fame in Late Muscovy*, p. 507.

³⁸ *Idem*, *History Writing and Late Muscovite Court Culture*, p. 19.

³⁹ Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 277, p. 302.

благочестивых наших государей”). And when they are inspired by the Holy Ghost [...] they will prepare various arms and gather many Christian troops and have treaties with the neighbouring Christian states to attack the insatiable Muslim dogs⁴⁰. The words which describe the sultans are among the harshest and Lyzlov insists that he portray them as the worst of people each time he mentions them, even comparing them to certain animals. When the Ottomans happen to fight non-Christian peoples, he deems it God’s work: ‘And afterwards, to give the Christians some respite, God brought an enemy upon him, the tsar of Persia, Usankasan, who gathered a great army and started a great war against them’⁴¹.

The issue of the fights with Tatars is the first of the ones recounted by the chronicler, who emphasizes the importance of Ivan III’s battles with the Golden Horde. Among the different events recorded by Lyzlov on Tatar raids or Turkish attacks there are a few well-fitting episodes connected to Stephen the Great’s rule; nothing on the voyevode’s family is mentioned, the dates of his reign or his relatives. The Moldavian ruler is, like other princes mentioned here, one of those who faced the enemies of Christendom. The first information is in part borrowed from Strykowski, who had Cromer’s chronicle as his first source, in its turn based on Dlugosz’s Annals, and it covers the Tatars’ incursion into Moldavia, placed in 6976 (1468). There are a few differences to the original source, too; they are of course, in favour of Christians, as well: ‘They crossed the Don, they split the army in three and fought Lithuania, Podolya and the Moldavians. And then they crushed those from Lithuania, Podolya, and Volyn in the fight, but the Moldavians defeated the Tatars three times, for few of them ran away and then the son of the Tatar chieftain was caught and brought to the voyevode Stephen. The tsar sent for Stephen, promising to stop the fight in order to free his son, Islen⁴². And Stephen, before the messengers, ordered that the (khan’s) son be cut in three⁴³ and he impaled the messengers on wooden stakes, leaving one of them there, but he ordered that he too, have his lips, ears and nose cut off⁴⁴ and this is how he released him so that he tell the khan about it all’⁴⁵. This is probably what a ‘orthodox’ prince was supposed to do, for the gesture is also emphasized in the next account, where the similar attitude of the great knyaz Ivan III is mentioned: ‘After that, the rule of the Golden Horde was given to the khan called Ahmed and he sent his messengers to the great knyaz John

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 278–279.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 223.

⁴² Islen or Islam; it is one of the few sources which nominally attest the khan’s son.

⁴³ Dlugosz mentions four (*Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt. Portret în cronică*, book printed with the blessing of His Eminence Pimen, Archbishop of Suceava and Rădăuți, The Holy Monastery of Putna, 2004, p. 162).

⁴⁴ His nose only or the nose and ears in the other sources, respectively (v. *ibidem*, p. 109, 162, 224.).

⁴⁵ Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 41–42.

Vasilievitch of Moscow and entire Russia according to the custom of khans in the Horde, with a kerchief⁴⁶, to ask for tribute. And the great knyaz spat on it and stepped on it and ordered that all messengers be killed, only sending one back to the tsar⁴⁷.

Arguments to support the Russians' invincibility in their conflicts with Tatars were the prophecies of metropolitan Jonah of Moscow and Jonah of Novgorod. For the Russian-Tatar relations, the account is almost exclusively based on *The Book of the Genealogy of Kingly Ranks* (*Степенная книга царского родословия*) and it ends towards the end of the sixteenth century. It is followed by the account of conflicts with the other enemies of the Christian world, the Turks; for each sultan a generous compilation was put together⁴⁸ in which the success and resilience of certain Christian princes was underlined, first and foremost, as well as the greed and unkindness of the Ottoman leaders. However, the Christians' lack of unity is deemed by Lyzlov the main cause of the Turks' success: 'sultan Mehmet, paying mind to the Christians' lack of unity, did not forsake his plans and so, the third year after he occupied Constantinople, sent a great army into the country of Wallachia, forcing Peter, voyevode of Wallachia and Moldavia, to pay him 2000 pieces of gold yearly⁴⁹; he then continues by saying that the following year sultan Mehmet left Constantinople with a numerous army boarded on 60 rowing ships, taking 300 great canons made from the bells of Constantinople⁵⁰. The various incursions of the Turks are presented chronologically, as well as pope Pius II's plan to gather the Christian troops to face the Muslim threat. The incursion into Moldavia from 1475 is also recounted, with parts of the text taken from Cromer and Strykowski: 'Still, he was constantly thinking how to harm the Christians, he took the Wallachian voyevode named Radolu (Radu) on his side, against Stephen, the Moldavians' voyevode, provoking him. In the year 6983 <1475>, he sent his army there, the Turks and Tatars, 120 thousand, wanting to defeat Stephen. But that Stephen was a fearless warrior and a strong man-at-arms, who barely had 14 thousand soldiers with him, most of them peasants, but with a skilled leader, they showed great valour. And that numerous Turkish army was eventually defeated at the river Barlod'⁵¹.

The issue of the Black Sea fortresses also features among the Russian chronicler's topics: 'He surrounded it, getting very close to the citadel, which was defended by Stephen the voyevode of Moldavians, who killed the Turks in

⁴⁶ The khan's 'kerchief', that is, his tamgha.

⁴⁷ Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴⁸ Brian J. Boeck, *The Improbable Case of the Seventeenth-Century Super Editor. Re-Considering Andrei Lyzlov's History of the Scythians*, in „Canadian-American Slavic Studies”, 49, 2015, 2–3, p. 234–252.

⁴⁹ Андрей Лызлов, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 223–224.

narrow places, not daring to have a proper battle. Still, the Turks took that fortress. But shortly after the Turks left, voyevode Stephen won it again, killing the Turks left behind.⁵² Among these accounts, Lyzlov also briefly adds descriptions of other battles. The battle of Războieni is also recounted⁵³, after the two followers of Dlugosz.

After compiling all of the above, Lyzlov's conclusion shows who fought the Ottomans best: 'Even if the Christians had many resounding victories over the Turks, they were defeated most of the time. Not only villages and fortresses, but entire countries and regions fell under their rule, even more under Mohammed the lawless, who much wanted the bloodshed and the death of those faithful to God. For they agreed and made bounds with vows that their pashas should crush the Christian name completely, for only one wanted to be ruler of all the world and did not want to hear of another ruler such as he. He did not want to be friends with the great knyaz Ivan Vasilievici, upon hearing of his great grace, valour and his victories over neighbouring rulers, and in the year 6990 <1482>, sent over his messengers in peace and understanding, with many gifts'⁵⁴.

After the death of Mehmet II, sultan Bayezid's first endeavour, also recorded by Lyzlov, was the Moldavian campaign: 'When Bayezid thus found peace on his domain, in that year 6992 he raised a great army and started upon Moldavia and Bessarabia on sea and land, wishing to avenge his father's shame begotten by Stephen, voyevode of Moldavia, under the White Fortress, and from the Christian army'⁵⁵. The issue of the Danube and sea fortresses is also mentioned several times, followed by the account of the killing of the Turks at the end of November 1498⁵⁶.

After the feats of Selim I, Lyzlov dedicated 30 pages to the rule of Suleyman. Others are reserved to the events from the beginning of the eighth decade of the sixteenth century, mainly cited from Bottero. Bogdan Lăpușneanu and Ioan Vodă take their turn at the heart of the tale... Selim II and Murad III end the accounts of these conflicts. *The Scythian History* ends with a compilation on *The Court of the Turkish Emperor and His Residence in Constantinople* in 23 chapters. The excerpts related to the age of Stephen the Great are annexed at the end of these lines.

Andrei Lyzlov's chronicle is not, in fact, a source of unadulterated information for the history it references, but a highly embellished one in order to awaken the pride and interest of those it was written for... Fascinating, perhaps, in its day, this 'conglomerate' of sources must be regarded through the lens of the age it belongs to, in order to better understand the choice of words and dates

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 224.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 225.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 227.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 229.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 230–231.

for a maximum of persuasiveness, all with the clear purpose of legitimizing a new interpretation of an empire's mission. In its integrity, with its original parts, with compiled pages or with carefully modified information, the Muscovite chronicle from the end of the seventeenth century not only indicates a *forma mentis* particular to that world, but also shows, through the successive multiplications and printings, that it was embraced and that it constituted veritable legitimising material for the fight of the 'noble' for a cause deemed nobler than they themselves, one that would bring them 'glory'.

REVIEW

Clark, Roland, *Religious Reform and Sectarianism in Interwar Romania: The Limits of Orthodoxy and Nation-Building*, Bloomsbury Academic, London and New York, 2021. ix + 222 pp. Notes. Bibliography

During the past few years, there has been a growing scholarly interest in the subject of sectarianism and religious renewal both in Romania and in the Balkans.¹ To this literature, Roland Clark adds a valuable contribution by providing a stimulating story about Romania's religious life in the decade following the First World War.

What is probably one of the greatest achievements of the author's approach is that he sets the interwar history of the newly expanded Greater Romania within an alternative framework: instead of the dominant narrative focused on leaders, institutions and elites, he focuses on religious minorities in their struggle with the majority and state authorities. Clark investigates in particular religious renewal movements and their difficult relationship with the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the nation-state, as well as religious revival currents within the ROC itself. The source material upon which he built his narrative is comprised of an impressive array of primary sources such as missionary books and pamphlets, sermons, religious brochures and textbooks, church newspapers and magazines, along many others such as archives, periodicals and secondary sources. This diversity of material and its balanced interpretation supports adequately Clark's aim to provide a novel approach to the history of the Romanian Orthodox Church and the relations it had with the other religious communities.

From the introduction, Clark comes across as a knowledgeable researcher of interwar Romania, situating his main actor – Romanian Orthodoxy – upon a larger historical, political and intellectual background, while also drawing parallels between Romania and other Eastern Orthodox countries such as Russia, Serbia,

¹ It is noteworthy to recall at least some of the latest titles: Michelson, Paul E. 'The History of Romanian Evangelicals 1918–1989: A Bibliographical Excursus'. *Arhiva Moldaviae* 9 (2017): 191–234; *Omul evanghelic: O explorare a comunităților protestante românești*, ed. Dorin Dobrinu and Dănuț Mănăstireanu. Iași: Polirom, 2018; Kapáló, James A. *Inochentism and Orthodox Christianity: Religious Dissent in the Russian and Romanian Borderlands*. London: Routledge, 2019; *Orthodox Christian Renewal Movements in Eastern Europe*, ed. Djurić Milovanović, Aleksandra, Radić, Radmila. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017; and also a number of studies by Ionuț Biliuță: 'Periphery as Center? The Fate of the Transylvanian Orthodox Church in the Romanian Patriarchy'. In *Discourse and Counter-Discourse in Cultural and Intellectual History*, edited by Carmen Andraș and Cornel Sigmirean, 378–93. Sibiu: Astra Museum, 2014; 'Rejuvenating Orthodox Missionarism among the Laymen: The Romanian Orthodox Fellowship in Transylvania'. *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai. Theologia Orthodoxa* 62, no. 2 (2017): 21–38.

Greece, and Bulgaria. The author thus avoided the classic traps of either isolating his subject from the overall social changes or from non-expert readers. The book is structured in three parts, with three, four and two chapters respectively, and follows an analytical focus along well-chosen dimensions: (1) the state of the Romanian Orthodox Christianity in face of modernity, the formation of the nation-state and the reorganization of the church governance after 1918, (2) ROC's relations with its Others - Roman and Greek Catholics, Protestant „Repenter” (*Pocăiți*) denominations, and (3) renewal movements inside the ROC under the form of two parachurch organizations, the Lord's Army (*Oastea Domnului*) in Transylvania and the Stork's Nest (*Cuibul cu Barză*) in Bucharest.

Chapter One starts by looking at how the Orthodox faith was lived in the villages, taught in schools, and practiced through rituals and collective worship. Clark is looking out for changes in the role of the priests, preaching, Orthodox Biblical Studies in the early XXth century and up until the interwar period. And here the author points to an interesting fact that deserves to be highlighted since it constituted a key allegation used by the leaders of the ROC against Protestantism: „Ironically, most of the leading Orthodox voices in inter-war Romania had all been schooled in Western theological faculties abroad. (...) No matter how often Orthodox leaders complained that Repenters were bringing Western ideas into their Church, *they* were the ones whose theology had been profoundly shaped by Western learning.” (p. 33) Clark herein cites and then deals throughout the book with such leading hierarchs of the interwar period who had studied in Western Catholic or Protestant theological faculties, like Miron Cristea, Nicolae Bălan, Gala Galaction, Vartolomeu Stănescu, Irineu Mihălcescu, Iuliu Scriban, Ioan Popescu-Mălăești, where they were influenced by Western Christianity. One such case is discussed in Chapter Two, that of the Bishop of Râmnicul Noului Severin, Vartolomeu Stănescu, who had studied theology, law and sociology at the Sorbonne. Stănescu advocated for Social Christianity, a renewal movement that called for a more socially engaged church, by organizing and encouraging the parish priests to get closer to the people. By conviction or by strategic choice (Clark seems to favour the latter), Stănescu turned into a supporter of the fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael in the 1930s, but eventually ended by resigning his post after he was put on trial for corruption. Another case discussed in this chapter is dedicated to the student movement in Bucharest associated with the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), an international organization promoting sport and humanitarian work in a Christian spirit. Being close to Protestant circles, the YMCA eventually came into conflict with its antisemitic counterpart, the National Union of Christian Students in Romania (*Uniunea Națională a Studenților Creștini din România*), which accused them of being agents of foreign Protestant propaganda. Chapter Three considers the difficult process of establishing a patriarchate in Greater Romania under the leadership of the ROC in the Old Kingdom. Clark shows the tensions and frustrations behind the combination of church-building and state-building,

instrumented by the ROC in alliance with the National Liberal Party, in the former's successful efforts to (1) integrate the other Orthodox churches from the newly acquired provinces into a single administration following its leadership and (2) to prevail over the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches in the 1923 Constitution. Two expressions of dissatisfaction with the official Orthodox Church and the new state are the focus of Chapter Four, which looks briefly into Inochentism and Old Calendarism (*Stilism*), both movements developing in Bessarabia, before and after the First World War, one of a monastic millenarian sort and the other one grounded on the rejection of the Gregorian calendar introduced by the ROC in 1924.

Part Two concentrates on the ROC's approach to its Others, starting with Greek and Roman Catholics, moving on to six of the most important Repenter denominations and eventually ending with the anti-Repenter activities which saw Church and state at work in combating what they perceived to be as a common threat. Chapter Five examines the ROC's mutually embittered relationship with Greek and Roman Catholicism, especially in the context of the debates and negotiations over the signing of the concordat between the Romanian state and the Vatican, which came about in 1927. Clark argues that while for Catholics the concordat was about securing a necessary legal framework for their rights in the face of Romanian nationalism and accusations of being an instrument of foreign propaganda (p. 95-96), for the Orthodox it was not only about their dominant status in the nation-state, but about the definition of Romanian-ness in religious terms as well (p. -99). Chapter Six looks into six Protestant Repenter denominations – Baptists, Brethren (*Creștini după Evanghelie*), Nazarenes, Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Bible Students (or Jehova's Witnesses) – documenting each group's historical background, doctrinal differences, and their activity in 1920s Romania. The chapter is particularly interesting because it presents the discrepancy between the concern and distrust of the authorities and the ROC's anxiety regarding the spread of the Repenters, on the one hand, and their very small number, on the other: there were only 0.3 per cent Baptists, 0.08 per cent Seventh-Day Adventists, and 0.04 per cent „other religions and sects” of the 18 million people living in Romania according to the 1930 census (p. 6-7). As Clark writes, „The spectre of Repenters appeared constantly in Orthodox writings from the 1920s, giving the impression that they were to be found knocking on doors in every village and town” (p. 101). Chapter Seven explores in a particularly original way, drawing on a series of missionary writings, archival sources, diaries, and periodicals, another type of Orthodox response to Repenter Christianity, an institutional one: the appointment of anti-sectarian missionary priests and the encouragement of lay missionary work in general. As Clark notes, although this approach came as a strategy of dealing with the Other, it challenged Romanian Orthodoxy to look inward too, to see how it might become more active and attractive at grassroots level.

One of the most striking parts of these anti-sectarian efforts documented by Clark throughout his work is the manner in which policemen and gendarmes abused their power when dealing with Repenters, sometimes in alliance with the ROC and backed by the inconsistent legislation guaranteeing the former's rights: „Repenters were frequently beaten, arrested, tortured and even killed by the authorities, often at the instigation of missionaries or parish priests. Anti-Repenter activities involved close cooperation between the Church and the state, which saw Repenters as a common threat. Both Church and state embraced the Orthodoxist doctrine that to be Romanian was to be Orthodox, and persecuted Repenters accordingly” (p. 138).

Part Three deals with two renewal movements started from within the ROC, The Lord's Army and the Stork's Nest. Chapter Eight follows the story of the priest Iosif Trifa, the founder of the newspaper *Lumina satelor*, around which revolved the Lord's Army, established as a temperance movement in the Transylvanian city of Sibiu, in 1923. Trifa was initially called into action by Nicolae Bălan, the Metropolitan of Transylvania, who had studied in Protestant and Catholic institutions abroad, and wanted to strengthen the ROC in the new province and to ignite the faith among believers. The author evidences how Trifa not only rose to the challenge, but soon wanted more than just promote theological literacy among peasants or convince them to give up drinking and swearing. He started to develop a theology of his own, Clark argues, drawing on the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith, without ever admitting such a source of inspiration (p. 157-167). Trifa was eventually defrocked and removed from the leadership of the movement in the wake of a financial disagreement with Bălan, but the Lord's Army had continued to exist to this day and still is an entity affiliated with the ROC. Chapter Nine analyses another renewal movement also taking place inside the ROC, namely at St. Ștefan's Church in Bucharest, known as the Stork's Nest. This was the place where crowds started gathering to hear the preachings of Teodor Popescu, the parish priest, about personal conversion and justification by faith, influenced by his cantor, Dumitru Cornilescu, who was an eager translator of Protestant books and of a new version of the Bible. Just as in Trifa's case, Popescu was eventually defrocked on charges of heresy, but his followers still organized Tudorist gatherings up until the 1950s (p. 191).

A five-page conclusion provides the necessary integration of all the arguments put forward throughout the book, which achieves its promise of reconstructing 1920s Romania as a polyphony of religious ideas, practices and denominations, which most of the time attacked one another, but were nevertheless, consciously or not, influenced by the Other. As the subtitle of the book - *The Limits of Orthodoxy and Nation-Building* - clearly suggests, Clark confronts Romanian Orthodoxy with its limits both from the outside, mainly in the form of Repenter Christianity, as well as inside the church itself, where its leadership had to face regional tensions from the new provinces, calls for greater

social engagement and a new generation of talented reforming priests. The book enriches our understanding of the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the state in the first interwar decade, when both acted as centralizing actors, but faced different types of opposition along the process from the communities or the different minorities of the new provinces. A curious parallel comes to one's mind after reading Clark's compelling account: the threat of Repenter groups appeared so alarming and so obsessive in the eyes of the Orthodox leaders, just as that of Jews appeared in the eyes of the antisemitic nationalists. This happened although both minorities were small in number, constantly had a hard time having their legal rights respected by the authorities and were most of the time victims of crime and abuse of power. But they were both markers of difference.

Georgiana Țăranu*

* "Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania. georgianataranu87@gmail.com

REVIEW

Zoltán, Novák Csaba, *Epoca de Aur? Ceaușescu și maghiarii. Politica Partidului Comunist Român față de minoritatea maghiară în perioada regimului Ceaușescu*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2020, 297 p. + 33 – Bibliography, Name index

The work of the historian Novák Csaba Zoltán, *The Golden Age? Ceausescu and the Hungarians. The policy of the Romanian Communist Party towards the Hungarian minority during the Ceausescu regime*, published in Romanian, offers a synthetic and coherent image of a special relationship, that between the Romanian state and the most important minority. As stated in the introduction, the paper does not want to be a "catalogue of resentments" or a "political and institutional history of Hungarians in Romania." The proposed objective is achieved, at the end of the 300 pages of analysis, developed around important topics for the bilateral relationship mentioned above. The paper benefits from a substantial and current bibliography (including studies previously published by the author), an index of names as well as suggestive images, inserted in the text.

The nine chapters of this volume represent as many topics for debate: I. Background. From Stalinist integration to the policy of independence from Moscow (1944-1964); II. The policy of "independence" and the consolidation of Ceausescu's power in the period 1964-1967; III. Years of openness and possibilities. 1968 and the echoes of the Prague Spring; IV. The small "cultural revolution" and its effects in the first years (1971-1974); V. The national problem and the COMNM emptying by its content (1974-1984); VI. Ethnocratic state socialism and the crisis of dictatorship. The restriction of the institutional system of minorities (1984-1989); VII. The issue of nationalities in the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations and the international public opinion; VIII. The Hungarian political and cultural elite in Romania and the political power in the "Ceausescu era"; IX. Politics towards the Hungarian minority, as a matter of national security.

Historians and public opinion can find, in this volume, approached in the manner mentioned above, the main developments within the Hungarian minority. Specifically, the analyzes of the administrative reform of the 1960s, the community institutions integrated into the socialist organization chart, the reporting of Hungarian political and cultural elites (and their efforts to maintain identity), and the younger generation of the 1980s, to the regime's policy towards minority are one of the most important topics deal with it. Likewise, the talks on Hungary and the relationship - which became trilateral - between the two states and the Hungarian minority, especially in the 1980s, when it was obvious that the latter no longer acted as a bridge of cooperation between the two countries, as previously proclaimed their leaders. From the coexistence of the 1960s to the

hostility of the 1980s, the Hungarian minority-socialist state relationship is analyzed, detaching the initial aspects of convergence and subsequent conflict areas, caused by increased ideological pressure and the application of a social and economic policy in total dissonance with the tendencies in Europe (and even in the socialist bloc) and with the expectations of the whole society (the author mentioning, in several places, the generality of the new vision of the regime, after 1971, for Romanians and minorities alike). Not coincidentally, the title of the paper is under question, the approach starting from the hopes and illusions maintained by the party and its leader, and embraced by the Hungarian political elite in the mid-60s (with representatives in the highest party forums and state).

The volume is an important achievement. Future sequential studies, on the issues mentioned here, will have as mandatory reference the work subject to the above assessments.

Emanuel Plopeanu*

* "Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania. emmiplop@yahoo.com

CONTRIBUTORS

Dennis DELETANT

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College,
London, United Kingdom

ddeletant@gmail.com

Is a visiting professor of the Department of Romanian Studies "Ion Ratiu" at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, and Professor Emeritus at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College, London.

Florin ANGHEL

"Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania

fl_angel@yahoo.com

Florin Anghel is Professor at the Faculty of History and Political Science, „Ovidius” University of Constanța, with a doctoral thesis on the evolution of bilateral relations between Romania and Poland in the period between the two World Wars. His main research interests include the history of international relations in the 20th century, the evolution of political systems in Central Europe in the interwar period, the state of the Polish and Slovak communities of Romania until 1945.

Metin OMER

"Ovidius" university of Constanța, Romania

metinomer@yahoo.com

Metin Omer is a researcher at the Institute of Science, Culture and Spirituality at "Ovidius" University of Constant,a, Romania. His current areas of research include the historical evolution of Turkish and Tatar communities from Romania, especially after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and Romanian-Turkish relations.

Taras VINTSKOVSKYI

"I. I. Mechnikov" National University, Odesa, Ukraine

taras.ist@gmail.com

Professor at the Department of History of Ukraine, Faculty of History and Philosophy, National University I.I. Mechnikov, Odessa, Ukraine. Specialist in the history of Ukraine and Bessarabia in the first half of the

twentieth century, monographs and scientific studies published in Ukraine and abroad.

Miguel Pablo Sancho GÓMEZ

Universidad Católica de Murcia, Spain

mpsanco@ucam.edu

His PhD thesis, entitled “War and Politics in the Western Roman Empire (337-361)”, obtained the qualification of outstanding cum laude in 2008. Since 2006, he has been publishing works and giving conferences related to historical scientific research. Since 2011, he is a full-time professor and researcher at the Catholic University of Murcia (UCAM). He is currently getting ready new articles, books and conferences concerning Late Antiquity, the Roman Army, Roman Empire, the *Historia Augusta* and the Medieval World, and issuing a series of historical adventure novels, set in Fifteenth Century Germany.

T.O. SMITH

Huntington University, USA

tsmith@huntington.edu

Now at Huntington University he previously taught history at the University of East Anglia in the UK. He has produced four books and several articles concerning imperial and diplomatic history in Asia.

Gavin BOWD

University of St Andrews, Scotland, United Kingdom

gpb@st-andrews.ac.uk

His interests include Scottish, British, Madagascan and Romanian cultural and political exchanges with France; French colonial and post-colonial geographies; Modern Romanian politics and culture; Communism and post-communism..

Iryna MAKSYMENKO

”I. I. Mechnikov” National University, Odessa, Ukraine

maksymenko.iryna@onu.edu.ua

Associated Professor, Department of International Relations. Her main research interests include: Foreign Policy of Ukraine; Ukraine in the International Security System; Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Region; Ukraine-Romania Relations.

Augustin GURIȚĂ

"Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iași, Romania

augustingurita@yahoo.com

The main field of interest is the medieval and premodern history of the Romanians. In these fields we has published several studies and articles so far, and others are in print; He is interested in the history of the Church in Romania (14th-19th centuries), the history of Byzantium, the history of mentalities, the editing of historical sources, the study of Romanian-Cyrillic paleography, heraldry and genealogy.

Georgiana ȚĂRANU

"Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania

georgianataranu87@gmail.com

Georgiana Țăranu received a BA and a MA in History from the Faculty of History and Political Science, at the 'Ovidius' University of Constanta (Romania). Her PhD thesis from the "N. Iorga" Institute of History (Bucharest) discussed Nicolae Iorga' commitments towards Fascist Italy. Her main research interests are interwar Romanian intellectuals, fascism, and intellectual entanglements with totalitarianism.

Emanuel PLOPEANU

"Ovidius" University of Constanța, Romania

emmiplop@yahoo.com

Emanuel Plopeanu is an associate professor, PhD, at the "Ovidius" University of Constanta, Faculty of History and Political Science. His areas of interest include United States policy towards the South-East Europe in the 20th century and Romanian-Turkish relations in the 20th century.

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