

THE INTERNATIONAL EVENTS OF 1955 MIRRORED IN THE ROMANIAN RADIO PROPAGANDA

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Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 marked the beginning of a relative "thawing" in the Soviet internal policy of the leaders in Kremlin, led by Nichita Serghievici Hrușcirov, and the beginning, albeit timid, of a first period of détente in the international relations after the breakout of the "cold war". A first indication was the end of the war in Korea with the signature of the armistice of Panmunjon on 27 July 1953, an event promptly brought to the attention of listeners in Romania by the Romanian broadcasting stations¹ Undoubtedly, the post-Stalinist Soviet external policy took a sinuous path, especially owing to the struggle for power at Kremlin, but Hrușcirov succeeded, at least until the autumn of 1956, to lend it a tendency for détente and reconciliation in the relations with the western power. After the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez crisis, and also owing to the fact that in 1957 Hrușcirov was able to oust the main rival group in the struggle for power, a group including Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin and Kaganovici, the Soviet external policy of confrontation with the West would witness a revival, and reach an apex in 1962, with the so-termed crisis of the "Soviet Missiles in Cuba" that would set the world on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. Until then, the year 1955 would be one of the most important years of this first period of détente in the relations of the Soviet Union with the West, although one can hardly speak of a dezideologization of the international relations, and the events, sometimes contradictory, failed to mark the genuine end of the confrontation between the two parties, on all levels.

Faced with these fairly unpredictable developments, the Communist power in Bucharest adopted a conformist and "sensible" line of action, supporting in all ways the Soviet Union and the Soviet stand in international issues. As a result, the broadcasts of the Romanian stations continued to present to their listeners the international events from the point of view of the Soviet interests, which were at the same time the interests of the Romanian Communist leaders.

A noteworthy event in this sense was undoubtedly the Conference of Bandung, Indonesia, held in April 1955, when the basis were laid for the non - alignment movement, a movement that both Moscow and Washington would try to

¹ *Radiojurnalul* of 27 July 1953, 16:00 hrs, in Arhivele Societății Române de Radiodifuziune (to be further quoted A.S.R.R.), "Radiojurnale" File, 21-31 July 1953, f. 1.

turn to their own benefit. The Romanian Broadcasting Corporation, represented at the Conference by its reporter Eugen Preda, sought to lay emphasis on the anti-imperialist and anti-Westerner character of the works of the Conference in all its broadcasts and commentaries. Therefore, the *Buletin de știri* of 21 April, 15:00 hrs, presented the request made by the delegates of North Africa for support to the independence movements of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as the condemnation of French colonialism and of the refusal of the United Nations Organization to give a thorough approach of the North African issue². On the same day, the *Radiojurnal* of 16:00 hrs was trying to show that the Conference in Bandung was a great failure of the American policy and diplomacy: “The American diplomacy does not look friendly upon the Conference in Bandung, not only because the calling up of the Conference in itself is an independent manifestation of the policy of the Asian and African countries, but also because, such as noted by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru – this Conference ‘is in fact the putting into practice of the coexistence principle.’ No wonder that the proposal of the Prime Minister of Egypt, Nasser, that a conference of the Asian and African countries should be called up and that Cairo should host the 1956 session of the Conference, failed to elicit a favorable reaction in Washington”³. Moreover, the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation could only salute as a noteworthy event the speech delivered at the Conference by Ciu En Lai, Prime Minister of the Chinese People’s Republic, which was described as “... clear, to the point, and aiming to establish genuine relations of collaboration among countries in Asia and Africa,”⁴ criticize harshly the American correspondents and the “pro-American” delegates who “... have placed great hopes in the surfacing of insurmountable differences among the participants in the Conference”⁵, and disapprove severely the points of view expressed by participants who had no intention to fall in with Moscow at the Conference, such as Iraq and the Philippines, and who “... tried to create disunion at the works of the Conference, by launching attacks on the countries members of the Socialist camp. The Philippines and Iraq can state their opinion on Communism, but it is deplorable that they should do so at the Conference of the Asian and African countries. The Western Powers seem to have heralds at the Conference of the Asian and African countries. Unfortunately, when attacking Communism, Iraq and the Philippines are acting as representatives of the interests of the Western

² *Buletinul de știri* of 21 April 1955, 15:00 hrs, in A.S.S.R., “Radiojurnale” File, 21-30 April 1955, ff. 2-3.

³ *Radiojurnalul* of 21 April 1955, 16:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, ff. 6-7.

⁴ *Radiojurnalul* of 21 April 1955, 23:00, in *ibidem*, f. 1.

⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 2.

Powers, which can only cast a shadow on the main task of the Conference”⁶. This “main task” was in the view of the Communist leaders in Bucharest and of their radio propaganda the complete subordination of the Conference of Bandung to the interests of the Soviet Union and its satellites, interests lying beneath the pompous phraseology about independence, peace and cooperation among the participant states. Any contravention to these interests was to be condemned and criticized energetically.

On 25 April, the *Radiojournal* of 23:00, was informing the Romanian audience on the final press release of the Conference of the Twenty-Nine Asian and African Countries held at Bandung: “Taking into consideration the tense situation in the Middle East, created by the situation in Palestine, and also considering the peril posed by this tensioning to world peace, the Conference of the Countries of Asia and Africa voices its support to the right of the Arabs in Palestine and calls for the application of the resolutions of the United Nations Organization in the issue of Palestine, as well as for a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue”⁷. Further on, the Conference was showing support to Indonesia in the issue of Western Irian,⁸ and to Yemen, in the issue of Aden⁹. The final communiqué also pointed out to the imperativeness of the struggle for peace: “... it devolves upon the Asian and African countries attending the Conference to state their support to the requests for disarmament and the ban on thermonuclear weapons and to address the main countries in question to proceed with such a disarmament and ban”¹⁰. The release ended with an enumeration of the principles to be laid at the basis of the international relations, namely peace, collaboration and friendship relations: “Respect of the fundamental Man’s rights and of the goals and principles of the Chart of the United Nations Organization. Respect of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of all countries. Recognition of the equality of all, and of the equality of all nations, be they smaller or larger. The refraining from any intervention or interference with the internal affairs of other countries. The respect of the right of every country to individual or national defense, in agreement with the Chart of the United Nations Organization. The refraining from the employment of the agreements on collective defense to the particular benefit of one Great Power or another. Each country should refrain from exerting pressures on other countries. The refraining from any acts of aggression or threats to use force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any country. The

⁶ Ibidem, ff. 3-4.

⁷ *Radiojurnalul* of 25 April 1955, 23:00 hrs, in ibidem, f. 1.

⁸ Ibidem, f. 2.

⁹ Ibidem, f. 3.

¹⁰ Ibidem, ff. 5-6.

solving of all international issues in a peaceful way, through negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or settlement in court, or with the employment of other peaceful means, according to the choice of the parties involved, in agreement with the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Support to mutual interests and collaboration. The respect of justice and of international obligations.”¹¹ These principles were only fair and commendable. However, their putting into practice did not depend on the non aligned countries, which lacked the means to apply such principles in their international relations. They could only be applied by the Great Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, as well as by Great Britain and France.

Undoubtedly, the Romanian Communist propaganda, including the radio propaganda, was striving to accredit the idea that the works of the conference of Bandung, such as the works of the Conference of Leipzig, attended by 27 European trade-union movements under the influence of Moscow, were a confirmation of the historical imperativeness of replacing capitalism with socialism, of the perennial nature of the communist regimes, owing to the fact that they represented the most advanced society in the history of humanity, the communist society. Therefore, one of the *Gazeta radio* broadcasts, made at an unknown date, was noting: “While 29 Asian and African countries are in conference at Bandung to decide on common action against the forces of colonialism and war, the works of a conference gathering representatives of the working people and trade unions from 27 European countries are soon to begin in Leipzig. The purpose of this Conference is to identify and examine the means by which the working people in Europe can intensify their common struggle against the application of the agreements of Paris, against the revival of German militarism and of the atomic war preparations, for the setup of a security system on the Continent. Moreover, the Conference of Leipzig, while seeking the best ways to defend peace and collaboration on the European Continent, will also try to identify the most appropriate means and methods so that the working people in the capitalist countries should lead successfully their struggle against exploitation, for peace and for the victory of socialism in the world.”¹²

Despite the anti-capitalist discourse of the propaganda of the regime in Bucharest, the truth was that the Soviet Union was gradually abandoning the external policy carried out in the time of Stalin. Thus, the concept of the inevitability of a confrontation between capitalism and socialism was slowly giving way to that of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems. This change of view in the Soviet external policy became quite apparent in the Austrian issue, when

¹¹ Ibidem, ff. 8-11.

¹² “Emisiunea ‘Gazeta radio’” File, 1955, in ibidem, no date, ff. 1-3.

Hrușciiov agreed to the independence and neutrality of Austria, as well as to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and of all the other allied troops from the country. The Romanian Broadcasting Corporation was prompt to react to these events and salute the new approaches of the leaders of Kremlin to issues of external policy, even if these approaches raised some concern in Bucharest, the Romanian communists being apprehensive of a possible general withdrawal of the Soviets from Europe, followed by a neutralization of this European area, and by unwanted political changes.

In relation to the Austrian issue, the *Buletin de știri* of 21 April 1955, 0:45 hrs, showed that the press organ of the East-Germans, *Neues Deutschland*, had published an editorial on the outcome of the negotiations carried out by the Austrian governmental delegation in Moscow. According to the editorial, the world public opinion was under the impression of the negotiations in Moscow that would ensure to the Austrians the signing of the State treaty and the withdrawal of the occupation troops, if and when the Westerners were ready to take into account the will of the Austrian people. The editorial also noted that in the entire world these negotiations are seen as a contribution to the international détente, and that they are in fact the new and outstanding success of the consistent peace policy carried out by the Soviet Union, the initiator of the negotiations¹³. According to the editorial, a similar solution could also be applied to Germany, the system of European security put forward by the Soviet Government being liable to ensure the security of Germany and open the way to reunification, the signing of a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of the occupation troops.¹⁴ No doubt, the secret goal of the Soviet proposal for unification and neutralization of Germany was the extension of the Soviet influence over the entire territory of this country, for which reason the proposal was being opposed by the Westerners, especially by the United States of America, whose efforts had been directed for some time at achieving the complete withdrawal of the Soviets from Germany, an event that would eventually occur in the nineties. However, what was acceptable for smaller countries such as Austria or Finland was unacceptable for Germany, one of the main instruments to exert influence over the entire European continent.

This refusal of the West to accept the neutrality of Germany also explains the tenacity of the Romanian radio propaganda in insisting upon the neutrality of Austria and the advantages it would have had on this small country lying in the center of Europe. In the *Radiojournal* of 11 May 1955, 5:00, the Romanians were being informed about the declarations of the Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab in

¹³ *Buletinul de știri* of 21 April 1955, 0:45 hrs, in A.S.R.R., "Radiojurnale" File, 21-30 April 1955, ff. 1-2.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 3.

favor of the neutrality of Austria, seen as the best way to lessen the peril of a new war in Europe,¹⁵ and, on 13 May, about the declarations of Kopenig, president of the Communist Party of Austria, according to whom: “The successful closing of the conference of the ambassadors is a great joy to each Austrian. From now on, the Austrian people will decide their own fate. Austria will be freed of foreign troops, of military bases, of any relation to any military pacts. The Austrian people have now the duty to see that the neutrality they have pronounced themselves in favor of should be ensured. Austria will be able to develop her economy, to raise the standards of living of the working people, and to answer positively to their legitimate claims. The Austrian people owe this to the Soviet Union that despite of all hurdles and hardships made possible the signature of the State Treaty and defended successfully the interests of Austria at the Conference of Ambassadors”¹⁶. Along the same propagandistic line, the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation was announcing on 12 May that an ever greater number of deputies in the Bundestag of Bonn believed that the Soviet Union should be contacted in the attempt to give a peaceful solution to the German issue¹⁷. On 13 May, Dr. Heinemann, former minister in the Government of Bonn, was reported to have also requested the opening of negotiations with the Soviet Union¹⁸. However, on the same day, Adenauer, the Chancellor of the federal Republic of Austria, was said to have declared at a press conference in Paris that, “The arming of Western Germany cannot be sacrificed to the unification”¹⁹. Adenauer had declared himself openly against the creation of a united and neutral Germany, that would have belonged to neither military bloc, which in the interpretation of the propagandists in Bucharest meant that he was disregarding “the wish shown by the great majority of the West-German people who, especially in the recent period, under the influence of the negotiations in the Austrian issue, demand a peaceful settlement of the German issue, the end of remilitarization, and the unification of the country”²⁰. And, on 16 May 1955, during a *Buletin de știri* of the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation, the audience was informed that, “On 15 May, the Austrian people witnessed one of the most notable events in their history – the signature of the State Treaty which marked the birth of the sovereign and independent Republic of Austria, with the statute of a neutral state.”²¹

¹⁵ *Radiojurnalul* of 11 May 1955, 5:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, “Radiojurnale” File, 11-20 May 1955, f. 11.

¹⁶ *Radiojurnalul* of 13 May 1955, 23:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, ff. 4-5.

¹⁷ *Buletinul de știri* of 12 May 1955, 15:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, f. 14.

¹⁸ *Radiojurnalul* of 13 May 1955, 16:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, f. 8.

¹⁹ *Radiojurnalul* of 13 May 1955, 5:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, f. 10.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, ff. 10-11.

²¹ *Buletin de știri* of 16 May 1955, 15:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, f. 3.

Upon the signing of the State Treaty by which Austria was being freed of the Soviet military presence, the leaders in Kremlin dealt a heavy blow to the adhesion of Western Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty. Between 11 and 14 May 1955, a conference of the states belonging to the Soviet Bloc was held in Warsaw, the conference ending in the signing of the military Treaty of Warsaw. The Soviets had no real need for such a treaty, since they were already exerting control over the satellite countries through bilateral treaties which included military clauses. The intention of the Soviet Union had been to demonstrate its capability to set up and lead a military bloc similar with NATO and that its willingness to make concessions was moderate. Additionally, the communist leaderships of the satellite countries were being let known that the withdrawal from Austria was not going to be followed by a withdrawal from other regions in Central or Eastern Europe, and that they would not be abandoned and thus forced to share their power with other political forces.

As in the case of any event brought about by the Soviets, the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation gave an extensive coverage of the works of this Conference. Thus, the *Radiojournal* of 11 May 1955, 16:00, announced that “Today, at 10 a.m., Central European Time, the Conference of the European States for Peace and Security in Europe was called up at the Council of Ministers of the Polish People’s Republic to discuss issues deriving from the Decisions of the Conference of Moscow of the European countries of 29 November – 2 December 1954. The works of the Conference are attended by delegates of the states signatories of the Declaration of Moscow of 2 December 1954, the Soviet Union, the Polish People’s Republic, the Czech Republic, the German Democratic Republic, The Hungarian People’s Republic, the Romanian People’s Republic, and the Albanian People’s Republic.”²²

After this announcement, the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation made a comprehensive presentation of the speech of the Polish Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, which included the main elements that led to the creation of the Treaty of Warsaw. The Polish Prime Minister noted that, “the states taking part in the conference of Moscow, fully aware of the consequences of the ratification of the agreements of Paris (concerning Germany’s adhesion to NATO – note by E. D.) on the cause of peace and security in Europe, adopted a clear declaration stating the imperatives of joint measures to be taken for the setting up of the armed forces and of the related commandments, together with other measures aiming to strengthen the capacity of defense in the light of the recent developments.”²³ And,

²² *Radiojournal* of 11 May 1955, 16:00 hrs, in A.S.R.R., “Radiojurnale” File, 11-20 May 1955, ff. 1-2.

²³ *Radiojournal* of 12 May 1955, 17:30 hrs, in *ibidem*, f. 1.

further on: “Nowadays, the sacred duty of the governments represented at the Conference of Warsaw, governments that have to answer to their peoples for the maintaining of peace, independence, and inviolability of the borders, is to take and apply the measures discussed at the conference of Moscow.”²⁴ The reasons invoked for the signing of a military treaty of the Soviet Bloc, as given by Cyrankiewicz, included the aggressive policy of the West, carried out from a position of strength, the rearmament of Western Germany and her adhesion to NATO, which were considered as many threats to peace and security on the Continent.²⁵ “The Polish people – continued Cyrankiewicz – is fully aware that the treaty in view increases our defense capacity by adding to it the strength of our allies; along this treaty, the Polish border on the Oder and the Neisse, as well as our security and independence, will be guarded not only by the Polish people and its armed forces, but also by the powerful Soviet Union and by the democratic countries, joined together in order to defend our liberty and independence.”²⁶ Thus, the reason given by the Polish Prime Minister for the setting up of the Warsaw Treaty was an alleged peril from the West, a peril existing only in the minds of the communist leaders, who were attributing to their adversaries the intentions they were actually nurturing themselves.

The Romanian Broadcasting Corporation also presented the coverage of the works of the Conference of Warsaw in the communist press of Poland,²⁷ China,²⁸ Czechoslovakia,²⁹ Albania,³⁰ etc.

The *Radiojurnal* of 13 May 1955, 16:00, quoting TASS, informed the Romanian public about the Communiqué of the meeting of 13 May of the Conference of Warsaw of the European States for Peace and Security in Europe.³¹ According to the source, during the fourth meeting of the Conference of Warsaw chaired by Nikolai Alexandrovici Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance among the Albanian People’s Republic, the Bulgarian People’s Republic, the Democratic Czech Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the Romanian People’s Republic, the Hungarian People’s Republic, and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics had been discussed chapter by chapter. All the delegations of the countries attending the Conference had reached an agreement on the text of the

²⁴ Ibidem, f. 2.

²⁵ Ibidem, ff. 3-11.

²⁶ Ibidem, ff. 12-13.

²⁷ *Radiojurnalul* of 12 May 1955, 22:00 hrs, in ibidem, 6 ff.

²⁸ *Radiojurnalul* of 12 May 1955, 23:00 hrs, in ibidem, 5 ff.

²⁹ Ibidem, 7f.

³⁰ *Buletinul de știri* of 12 May 1955, 0:45, in ibidem, 1 f.

³¹ *Radiojurnalul* of 13 May 1955, 16:00 hrs, in ibidem, 4 ff.

treaty. The Treaty was to be signed on 14 May, at 10:00 hrs, at the State Council of the Polish People's Republic. A united commandment of the armed forces of the states members of the Treaty was also to be created.³²

Over one month after the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw, a commentary of the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation made during the broadcasting of *Gazeta radio*, in the month of June, the day not being mentioned, showed that the event still held a strong impact on the public opinion all over the world, having opened the way to a peaceful settlement of the main European issues at stake, especially of the German issue.³³ The purpose of the Treaty of Warsaw was to ensure peace and security on the European Continent, and it was in full agreement with the hopes of the German people in the reunification of the country. A united, democratic Germany was a prerequisite to maintaining peace in Europe and in the entire world. The German people were becoming ever more aware of this. For this reason, the Treaty of Warsaw gave the German Democratic Republic the liberty to carry out free negotiations for the peaceful unification of Germany and to take all the necessary measures in order to achieve this goal.³⁴ However, ten years after the end of World War Two, the communist exponents brought to power by the Soviets in the Central and South-Eastern European countries were unwilling to face any competition and, in exchange for their complete obedience, they were requesting guarantees from the Soviet Union in this respect. Thus, the reunification of Germany had become impossible in 1955. In fact, it could have only been achieved with the defeat of one of the parties involved in the conflict, a defeat that would have triggered the expulsion from Germany and the reunification of the country in a way such as put forward by the victor.

However, before this remote outcome, on 14 May 1955 the Treaty of Warsaw was created, a military instrument of the Soviet Bloc and an element of division of the European continent. From now on, two political and military blocs would face each other in the center of Europe for over three decades, NATO and the Treaty of Warsaw, both with the declared purpose of defending peace, but in fact ready to undertake defensive and offensive military actions at any time. Far from paving the way to the reunification of Germany, such as believed by the propaganda of the regime in Bucharest, the Treaty of Warsaw did little more than maintain the *statu quo* in Europe, with the German issues being settled only when

³² Ibidem, ff. 1-2.

³³ *Cum favorizează Tratatul de la Varșovia soluționarea problemei germane*, broadcasted during *Gazeta radio* at an unknown date, most probably during the month of June 1955, in "Emisiunea 'Gazeta radio'" File, 1955, f. 1.

³⁴ Ibidem, ff. 2-3.

the communist bloc and the military alliance thus generated were dissolved, owing to the inherent structural weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

The new Soviet leadership headed by Hrușcirov had no hesitation about attempting reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia, in order to demonstrate that it was promoting a different kind of external policy, and also in an attempt to restore the unity of the communist bloc compromised by the intransigent policy of Stalin. In this respect, an essential contribution was the visit of Hrușcirov and Bulganin to Belgrade in May-June 1955, a visit covered at length by the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Corporation. Therefore, the *Radiojournal* of 14 May 1955, 17:30, was informing about the visit of a higher Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia announced in the central Soviet newspapers to take place by the end of the month: "According to a common wish, for the continual improvement of the relations between the two countries and in order to consolidate peace, the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia have decided to organize a high level meeting of their representatives, to which effect delegations have been appointed."³⁵ On 15 of May, the following day, the Romanian stations broadcasted a commentary published in the Yugoslav newspaper "Borba", along which the soon to take place meeting of the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders would be a major international event, the result of positive developments in the international situation as a whole,³⁶ and an occasion to exchange views on international issues and solve the existing international disagreements between the two countries.³⁷ The visit was covered extensively by the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation, the Romanian listeners being kept informed about all the main steps.³⁸ However, the results were not as expected. Despite the reconciliation of the two parties, Yugoslavia could not be persuaded to rejoin the Soviet Bloc deserted in 1948 for a policy of neutrality.

A last event, significant in many respects, was the meeting in Geneva of the heads of governments of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, of 18-23 July 1955, in which several international issues were approached, including the German issue. Undoubtedly, this Conference had an important contribution to the international détente, and was covered in detail by the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation.

³⁵ *Radiojurnalul* of 14 May 1955, 17:30 hrs, in A.S.R.R., "Radiojurnale" File, 11-20 May 1955, f. 6.

³⁶ *Radiojurnalul* of 15 May 1955, 8:30 hrs, in *ibidem*, f. 1.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 2.

³⁸ See among others, *Radiojurnale* of 1 June 1955, 16:00 and 22:00 hrs, in *ibidem*, and *Buletinul de știri* of 2 June 1955, in *ibidem*.

Thus, the Romanian listeners were informed about the echoes of the conference in Geneva in the international press. *Emisiunile pentru străinătate* of 20 July 1955 quoted an editorial published in “Manchester Guardian” according to which Bulganin’s and Eden’s proposals in the disarmament issue could be placed in harmony.³⁹ Also, in an article on the beginning of the works of the Conference of Geneva, the diplomatic commentator of *Daily Express* was pointing out to a specific part in Bulganin’s discourse in which the remilitarization of Western Germany and its adherence to NATO had been identified as the main hurdle to the reunification of Germany.⁴⁰ Moreover, according to the special envoy of The Times to Geneva, the works of the Conference had opened in a friendly atmosphere. According to the same author, Bulganin’s speech had listed the causes which had made possible an improvement of the international relations and had pointed out to the Soviets’ intention to contribute to the détente.⁴¹ *The New York Herald Tribune*, *The New York Times* and *The New York Post* were unanimous about the willingness of the delegations in Geneva to search for all the possible means to establish a durable peace, for disarmament, and for the settlement of the German issue.⁴² Furthermore, in *Information*, Genéviève Tabouis had noted that the Conference in Geneva had opened in an atmosphere of unusual optimism: “Never before was such an atmosphere of reconciliation seen at a conference of the four powers.”⁴³ Eventually, Roger Massio, the correspondent of *Le Figaro*, when commenting on Bulganin’s speech, had pointed out to the fact that the latter, together with his French and English colleagues, had devoted a special focus to security: “Bulganin made evident efforts to adjust his views to those of the western powers,” had added the French journalist.⁴⁴

One should first note from this press review of the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation for listeners abroad that a selection had been made of elements favorable to the regime in Bucharest. Secondly, a selection had also been made of optimistic elements, liable to herald the success of the Conference. Thirdly, weight was being given to the speech of the Soviet Prime Minister, Bulganin, which was indicative of the fact that Romania was still gravitating, in a consistent way, to the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union.

Quite illustrative in this respect is the correspondence sent from Geneva by Teodor Marinescu, on 24 July 1955, after the closing of the works of the

³⁹ *Emisiunea pentru străinătate* of 20 July 1955, in *ibidem*, “Redacția emisiunilor pentru străinătate” File, 20-25 July 1955, f. 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, ff. 2-3.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, f. 3.

⁴² *Ibidem*, f. 5.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, f. 6.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 7.

Conference. The Romanian listeners were thus being informed that the news about the success of the conference of the heads of governments of the four powers had quickly traveled around the world.⁴⁵ In Teodor Marinescu's opinion, the Conference had opened the way to the further examination and the finding of a common solution to the most pressing international issues, such as European security, the disarmament, and the German issue.⁴⁶ "The summoning of the Conference in Geneva itself, said Teodor Marinescu, showed that nowadays the peoples show an ever stronger wish for peace, and this wish should be taken into account by all the governments and all the politicians. The results of the Conference of Geneva will strengthen the will of the peoples to continue the fight for international détente and for the end of the cold war."⁴⁷ However, all these hopes and desiderata would remain unanswered for a considerable period of time, the permanent contradictions among the great powers preventing any favorable evolutions.

One should note that the way in which the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation mirrored the international events of 1955 was considerably different from the approach given to similar events in the Stalinist time. Without putting aside the propagandistic discourse, the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation, forced by the new approaches to external policy of the leaders in Kremlin, presented the international events in a more balanced and accurate way, while making great efforts to regain its lost credibility. A neutral and unbiased observer would undoubtedly attribute the inability of the Romanian Broadcasting Corporation to reach its goal to the fact it continued to be the echo of the Soviet propaganda and an energetic defender of the Soviet theses.

⁴⁵ *Emisiunea pentru străinătate* of 24 July 1955, in *ibidem*, f. 1.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, ff. 3-5.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, ff. 8-9.